[arin-ppml] Accusation of fundamental conflictofinterest/IPaddress policy pitched directly to ICANN
owen at delong.com
Mon May 2 21:41:31 EDT 2011
On May 2, 2011, at 4:45 PM, Mike Burns wrote:
> >Not true. The chaos and disruption posed by unregulated registries will
> >increase the costs to ARIN, ARIN members, and other participants in the
> >industry regardless of whether they change registries or not.
> This is an assertion unsupported by facts. What additional costs will be imposed on ARIN?
ARIN will have to interact with and provide services to competing registries acting
without regard to community derived policies. This will, by definition create costs.
> True they would have to update a field in the whois database to point to the authoritative registry, sort of like the pointers to other RIRs in there now.
The pointers to other RIRs are very static. The pointers to these competing registries would be very dynamic.
That is a cost.
> The letter to ICANN that began this thread included a set of regulations adopted from those used in the creation of private DNS registries.
> Why do you keep insisting they would be unregulated?
I consider the current DNS registries virtually unregulated and the system that has been
created to be a haven for abuse, spammers, and all manner of monetization of degenerate
behavior. The fact that you have chosen this fundamentally flawed model as your shining
example of success is why I continue to refer to it as a recipe for failure.
> Like the RIR's, like DNS Registries, all approved registries do answer to the community through adherence to those community-defined regulations.
The DNS registries do not answer to the community. They answer to a very narrow
group of people motivated to make money out of creating additional TLDs as near
as I can tell.
Where is the community forum for DNS activity regarding gTLDs that provides an
equivalent open forum to PPML and the ARIN Public Policy Meetings?
> If you are concerned about groundup or community development, may I suggest revisiting Benson's proposals, which were an attempt to create the policy which would allow for the creation of alternate registries under ARIN policy, but which met with an untimely end based on John Curran's feelings that the decisions had to be made at a global level. Now the argument holds that at that global level decisions should be made by the same small group of individuals running the RIRs, basically.
Benson's proposals met with a timely end at the hands of the AC based on the
facts of the situation and the judgment of the various members of the AC.
While I cannot speak for the others, I can say that the reasons I voted to abandon
Benson's proposals included:
1. If Benson wanted to bring global policy, the policies needed to be submitted
as proposals for global policy and would need to be submitted to each of
the 5 regions. The proposals submitted made no mention of global policy
and did contain subject matter that would require global policy changes in
order to alter the terms of ICP-2 regarding the formation of new registries
for number resources.
2. I believe that competing registries are contrary to the community interest and
represent bad policy. I have seen no evidence that having them would in any
way improve registration services, whois accuracy, or any other aspect of
internet number resource administration.
3. Benson's proposals did not receive significant support from the community
on PPML and there was significant opposition to them from the community.
Benson petitioned the proposals and was not able to get 10 people from 10 different
organizations to support either of the petitions. If there is such wide community support
for this idea as you seem to perceive, why were there not 10 people willing to step up
and say so?
> You are right in saying there are no policies about how domain names are justified or acquired in the rules which apply to DNS registries.
I'm glad you recognize that domain names are unregulated.
> That's as it should be, and there is a burgeoning set of case law and trademark law that serves to answer those questions.
The burgeoning set of case law and trademark law is:
1. An example of how regulators will step in when we fail.
2. The result of our failure to maintain the separation between domain names
and trademarks that should have been preserved from the early days of
3. The direct result of caving to the wishes of WIPO instead of first considering
the best interests and desires of the wider internet community.
> I put more trust in the collective brainpower of worldwide jurisprudence and centuries of commonlaw experience to decide these issues than a tiny cabal of individuals with a vested interest in maintaining their positions in the status quo. Let the DNS registries concentrate on uniqueness and adherence to law as it develops, let number registries concentrate on uniqueness and title.
You keep using terms like "tiny cabal of individals" to describe a process open literally to
anyone who chooses to participate. I have tremendous difficulty understanding how you
can equate those two and it makes it very difficult to carry on a meaningful discussion of
the characteristics of the process when you insist on framing it that way.
> I think we understand your position on free markets, I am trying to avoid discussions of analogies far afield from current topics, so suffice it to say I disagree that the instances you reference resulted from activities in free markets.
I'm all for free markets where they make sense. The distribution of number resources
is not one of the places where that is true. If you have so much faith in the collective
brainpower of worldwide jurisprudence and common law experience, then, you
must realize that even the ITU and NANPA have justified need requirements for
things like country codes and NPA numbers. These are examples of finite number
resources being administered in a manner contrary to a free market and the
recognition that free market administration would not serve the public interest
in those cases.
Why on earth would you consider the administration of IPv4 number resources to
be significantly better served by a market?
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Owen DeLong
> To: Mike Burns
> Cc: Alexander, Daniel ; arin-ppml at arin.net
> Sent: Monday, May 02, 2011 6:48 PM
> Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] Accusation of fundamental conflictofinterest/IPaddress policy pitched directly to ICANN
> On May 2, 2011, at 1:41 PM, Mike Burns wrote:
>> Hi Dan,
>> The existence of competing registries does not imply a requirement on anybody to change, so your argument about expense to existing participants is invalid.
> Not true. The chaos and disruption posed by unregulated registries will
> increase the costs to ARIN, ARIN members, and other participants in the
> industry regardless of whether they change registries or not.
>> And yes, the market will sort out bad actors. That's one thing free markets do.
> Right... The market sorted out Enron... Eventually. However, non of us in
> California got our money back and we're all still paying higher electric
> bills as a result.
> The market sorted out the CMOs... Eventually. However, my house is now
> worth 1/3rd of what it was worth and the new restrictive regulations on
> refinancing prevent me from taking advantage of the new lower interest
> rates due to my home being devalued too close to the amount I still owe
> on it. Unfortunately, I wasn't irresponsible enough to be part of the cause
> of this problem, so, as a good actor, I am not entitled to any of the relief
> available from the government for the bad actors.
> I think I've had enough of the way markets sort out bad actors for a while.
>> Nobody said anything about no oversight, to the contrary I have said the registries should work under the same framework as RIRs.
> The only oversight of the RIRs is their community processes and their
> membership-elected boards. If you are OK with the other registries being
> overseen by these same bodies, then, I'm not sure why you think they
> would somehow be run differently from the existing RIRs.
>> Just like all DNS registrars have to comply with rules setup to govern their behavior.
>> Before you can be a DNS registrar you have to comply with the rules, and maintain compliance.
> There are virtually no policies about how domain names are justified or
> acquired in those rules. There are provisions for trademark disputes, but,
> those are not applicable to IP addresses (unless you think that a
> particular soft drink vendor should be automatically entitled to
> the address 220.127.116.11).
>> It's true that I was being forward thinking about the additional services competing registries might offer, but my point is that those services would only be offered if there was a demand for them, if the private registries are to endure.
>> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Alexander, Daniel" <Daniel_Alexander at Cable.Comcast.com>
>> To: "Mike Burns" <mike at nationwideinc.com>; <arin-ppml at arin.net>
>> Sent: Monday, May 02, 2011 4:30 PM
>> Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] Accusation of fundamental conflictofinterest/IPaddress policy pitched directly to ICANN
>> While I can only speak for myself, I can attempt to answer your question
>> of what may perturb some people. You make several very large assumptions
>> in your claims, none of which were captured in the opt-in, opt-out, or any
>> other proposals.
>> You speak of title insurance, legal teams, and other items, ensuring that
>> a competitive registry will provide better services than a community
>> defined RIR. The problem is none of this is defined or required in any
>> suggested framework. While some may provide these services, many may not,
>> and there are no mechanisms to protect the ISP's or end users who rely on
>> these services.
>> While many advocates will quickly reply that the market will sort these
>> bad actors out, it will be done at the expense of the people who currently
>> rely on these RIR provided services at a fraction of the cost. If
>> competitive registries are created without oversight, the burden and
>> expense of validating registration records will be shifted to the very
>> people who are supposed to benefit from this new model.
>> This begs the question from some as to what purpose a commercial registry
>> would serve other than to make money.
>> My opinion only.
>> Dan Alexander
>> On 5/2/11 3:33 PM, "Mike Burns" <mike at nationwideinc.com> wrote:
>>>> But what is it about ARIN that is broken? What exactly do you think
>>>> to be fixed?
>>>> The only thing I've gotten out of the discussions so far is that some
>>>> people think there is money to be made by providing IPv4 addresses based
>>>> willingness and ability to pay rather than ARIN's current >demonstrated
>>>> need policies.
>>>> Why is it to my benefit if someone else makes money? Particularly if it
>>>> perturbs the current mechanisms in a way that costs me money?
>>>> Keith Hare
>>> Hi Keith,
>>> What is broken about ARIN is that scandalously large numbers of netblocks
>>> not have valid POCs, for example. The stewardship of Whois leaves a lot
>>> be desired.
>>> Competitive pressures would help to finally decide who controls these
>>> addresses and allow them to be transferred to those who would pay for
>>> Network operators don't really have much of a choice in accessing Whois
>>> information to determine the rights to advertise addresses, and competive
>>> In my experience they rely on attestation and review of proferred
>>> chain-of-custody docs when determining who can advertise which addresses,
>>> when confronted with inconsistencies with whois.
>>> A competitive registry with a title insurance component will give network
>>> operators more security when deciding questionable cases.
>>> What is broken about ARIN is that their transfer policies are more
>>> restrictive than APNICs, and that will cause a flow of addresses out of
>>> and into APNIC.
>>> A competitive registry could presumably have a different transfer policy,
>>> APNICs differs from ARINs.
>>> What is broken about ARIN is that ARIN has professed no statutory control
>>> over legacy addresses in the Plzak declaration in the Kremen case, and
>>> attempts to control the registration of legacy resources.
>>> With a private registry, the address rights holders can choose to opt-out
>>> ARIN's dictats and choose their registry voluntarily.
>>> I don't see how the creation of a private registry will perturb the
>>> mechanisms in a way that costs you money, could you share why you feel
>>> Mike Burns
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