[arin-ppml] Accusation of fundamental conflict ofinterest/IPaddress policy pitched directly to ICANN

[Keith W. Hare]

Mike,

So, your issues with ARIN are:

1. ARIN has large numbers of netblocks without valid POCs.

I was under the impression that ARIN has a process in place to validate POCs. This policy was developed and discussed one while ago on the PPML mailing list. I suspect that if the policy had been developed five years earlier, the POCs would be in better shape. 


2. ARIN transfer policies are more restrictive than APNIC transfer policies.

The ARIN transfer policies where developed and discussed on the PPML mailing list. I'm sure that a policy proposal that reduced the restrictiveness of the ARIN policies would also get a lot of discussion. 


3. ARIN has professed no statutory control over legacy addresses in the Plzak declaration in the Kremen case, and yet attempts to control the registration of legacy resources. 

I found a lot of information about the Kremen case, but did not immediately find the "Plzak declaration" to which you refer. I did find an interesting article, "LEGAL AND POLICY ASPECTS OF INTERNET NUMBER RESOURCES", by Stephen M. Ryan, Esq., Raymond A. Plzak, & John Curran, apparently from SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 24] in 2008.

My take on legacy resources is that ARIN was given the responsibility for legacy resources, but ARIN's authority over legacy resources is fuzzy. There-in lies the tension.

I view ARIN's policies over legacy resources as more benevolent than dictator-ish, particularly since I have the ability to participate in that policy development.

Keith



-----Original Message-----
From: Mike Burns [mailto:mike at nationwideinc.com] 
Sent: Monday, May 02, 2011 3:34 PM
To: Keith W. Hare; arin-ppml at arin.net
Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] Accusation of fundamental conflict ofinterest/IPaddress policy pitched directly to ICANN



>But what is it about ARIN that is broken? What exactly do you think needs 
>to be fixed?

>The only thing I've gotten out of the discussions so far is that some 
>people think there is money to be made by providing IPv4 addresses based on 
>willingness and ability to pay rather than ARIN's current >demonstrated 
>need policies.

>Why is it to my benefit if someone else makes money? Particularly if it 
>perturbs the current mechanisms in a way that costs me money?

>Keith Hare


Hi Keith,

What is broken about ARIN is that scandalously large numbers of netblocks do 
not have valid POCs, for example. The stewardship of Whois leaves a lot to 
be desired.
Competitive pressures would help to finally decide who controls these 
addresses and allow them to be transferred to those who would pay for them.
Network operators don't really have much of a choice in accessing Whois 
information to determine the rights to advertise addresses, and competive 
registries.
In my experience they rely on attestation and review of proferred 
chain-of-custody docs when determining who can advertise which addresses, 
when confronted with inconsistencies with whois.
A competitive registry with a title insurance component will give network 
operators more security when deciding questionable cases.

What is broken about ARIN is that their transfer policies are more 
restrictive than APNICs, and that will cause a flow of addresses out of ARIN 
and into APNIC.
A competitive registry could presumably have a different transfer policy, as 
APNICs differs from ARINs.

What is broken about ARIN is that ARIN has professed no statutory control 
over legacy addresses in the Plzak declaration in the Kremen case, and yet 
attempts to control the registration of legacy resources.
With a private registry, the address rights holders can choose to opt-out of 
ARIN's dictats and choose their registry voluntarily.

I don't see how the creation of a private registry will perturb the current 
mechanisms in a way that costs you money, could you share why you feel that 
way?

Regards,

Mike Burns