[arin-ppml] Accusation of fundamental conflictofinterest/IPaddress policy pitched directly to ICANN

Mike Burns mike at nationwideinc.com
Mon May 2 19:45:48 EDT 2011


>Not true. The chaos and disruption posed by unregulated registries will
>increase the costs to ARIN, ARIN members, and other participants in the
>industry regardless of whether they change registries or not.
>Owen

This is an assertion unsupported by facts. What additional costs will be imposed on ARIN?
True they would have to update a field in the whois database to point to the authoritative registry, sort of like the pointers to other RIRs in there now.
The letter to ICANN that began this thread included a set of regulations adopted from those used in the creation of private DNS registries.
Why do you keep insisting they would be unregulated?
Like the RIR's, like DNS Registries, all approved registries do answer to the community through adherence to those community-defined regulations.

If you are concerned about groundup or community development, may I suggest revisiting Benson's proposals, which were an attempt to create the policy which would allow for the creation of alternate registries under ARIN policy, but which met with an untimely end based on John Curran's feelings that the decisions had to be made at a global level. Now the argument holds that at that global level decisions should be made by the same small group of individuals running the RIRs, basically.

You are right in saying there are no policies about how domain names are justified or acquired in the rules which apply to DNS registries.
That's as it should be, and there is a burgeoning set of case law and trademark law that serves to answer those questions. 
I put more trust in the collective brainpower of worldwide jurisprudence and centuries of commonlaw experience to decide these issues than a tiny cabal of individuals with a vested interest in maintaining their positions in the status quo. Let the DNS registries concentrate on uniqueness and adherence to law as it develops, let number registries concentrate on uniqueness and title.

I think we understand your position on free markets, I am trying to avoid discussions of analogies far afield from current topics, so suffice it to say I disagree that the instances you reference resulted from activities in free markets.

Regards,

Mike






  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Owen DeLong 
  To: Mike Burns 
  Cc: Alexander, Daniel ; arin-ppml at arin.net 
  Sent: Monday, May 02, 2011 6:48 PM
  Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] Accusation of fundamental conflictofinterest/IPaddress policy pitched directly to ICANN




  On May 2, 2011, at 1:41 PM, Mike Burns wrote:


    Hi Dan,

    The existence of competing registries does not imply a requirement on anybody to change, so your argument about expense to existing participants is invalid.


  Not true. The chaos and disruption posed by unregulated registries will
  increase the costs to ARIN, ARIN members, and other participants in the
  industry regardless of whether they change registries or not.


   


    And yes, the market will sort out bad actors. That's one thing free markets do.


  Right... The market sorted out Enron... Eventually. However, non of us in
  California got our money back and we're all still paying higher electric
  bills as a result.


  The market sorted out the CMOs... Eventually. However, my house is now
  worth 1/3rd of what it was worth and the new restrictive regulations on
  refinancing prevent me from taking advantage of the new lower interest
  rates due to my home being devalued too close to the amount I still owe
  on it. Unfortunately, I wasn't irresponsible enough to be part of the cause
  of this problem, so, as a good actor, I am not entitled to any of the relief
  available from the government for the bad actors.


  I think I've had enough of the way markets sort out bad actors for a while.


    Nobody said anything about no oversight, to the contrary I have said the registries should work under the same framework as RIRs.


  The only oversight of the RIRs is their community processes and their
  membership-elected boards. If you are OK with the other registries being
  overseen by these same bodies, then, I'm not sure why you think they
  would somehow be run differently from the existing RIRs.


    Just like all DNS registrars have to comply with rules setup to govern their behavior.
    Before you can be a DNS registrar you have to comply with the rules, and maintain compliance.


  There are virtually no policies about how domain names are justified or
  acquired in those rules. There are provisions for trademark disputes, but,
  those are not applicable to IP addresses (unless you think that a
  particular soft drink vendor should be automatically entitled to
  the address 67.79.75.69).


  Owen


    It's true that I was being forward thinking about the additional services competing registries might offer, but my point is that those services would only be offered if there was a demand for them, if the private registries are to endure.



    Regards,

    Mike

    ----- Original Message ----- From: "Alexander, Daniel" <Daniel_Alexander at Cable.Comcast.com>
    To: "Mike Burns" <mike at nationwideinc.com>; <arin-ppml at arin.net>
    Sent: Monday, May 02, 2011 4:30 PM
    Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] Accusation of fundamental conflictofinterest/IPaddress policy pitched directly to ICANN


    Mike,

    While I can only speak for myself, I can attempt to answer your question
    of what may perturb some people. You make several very large assumptions
    in your claims, none of which were captured in the opt-in, opt-out, or any
    other proposals.

    You speak of title insurance, legal teams, and other items, ensuring that
    a competitive registry will provide better services than a community
    defined RIR. The problem is none of this is defined or required in any
    suggested framework. While some may provide these services, many may not,
    and there are no mechanisms to protect the ISP's or end users who rely on
    these services.

    While many advocates will quickly reply that the market will sort these
    bad actors out, it will be done at the expense of the people who currently
    rely on these RIR provided services at a fraction of the cost. If
    competitive registries are created without oversight, the burden and
    expense of validating registration records will be shifted to the very
    people who are supposed to benefit from this new model.

    This begs the question from some as to what purpose a commercial registry
    would serve other than to make money.

    My opinion only.
    Dan Alexander




    On 5/2/11 3:33 PM, "Mike Burns" <mike at nationwideinc.com> wrote:






        But what is it about ARIN that is broken? What exactly do you think

        needs

        to be fixed?



        The only thing I've gotten out of the discussions so far is that some

        people think there is money to be made by providing IPv4 addresses based

        on

        willingness and ability to pay rather than ARIN's current >demonstrated

        need policies.



        Why is it to my benefit if someone else makes money? Particularly if it

        perturbs the current mechanisms in a way that costs me money?



        Keith Hare





      Hi Keith,



      What is broken about ARIN is that scandalously large numbers of netblocks

      do

      not have valid POCs, for example. The stewardship of Whois leaves a lot

      to

      be desired.

      Competitive pressures would help to finally decide who controls these

      addresses and allow them to be transferred to those who would pay for

      them.

      Network operators don't really have much of a choice in accessing Whois

      information to determine the rights to advertise addresses, and competive

      registries.

      In my experience they rely on attestation and review of proferred

      chain-of-custody docs when determining who can advertise which addresses,

      when confronted with inconsistencies with whois.

      A competitive registry with a title insurance component will give network

      operators more security when deciding questionable cases.



      What is broken about ARIN is that their transfer policies are more

      restrictive than APNICs, and that will cause a flow of addresses out of

      ARIN

      and into APNIC.

      A competitive registry could presumably have a different transfer policy,

      as

      APNICs differs from ARINs.



      What is broken about ARIN is that ARIN has professed no statutory control

      over legacy addresses in the Plzak declaration in the Kremen case, and

      yet

      attempts to control the registration of legacy resources.

      With a private registry, the address rights holders can choose to opt-out

      of

      ARIN's dictats and choose their registry voluntarily.



      I don't see how the creation of a private registry will perturb the

      current

      mechanisms in a way that costs you money, could you share why you feel

      that

      way?



      Regards,



      Mike Burns



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