[arin-ppml] The AC has a job to do with 2009-1 can you please help?

[Stephen Sprunk]

Jeremy H.Griffith wrote:
> On Mon, 6 Apr 2009 00:12:13 -0400, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu> wrote:
>   
>> Under all the transfer proposals that have made it into ARIN's pdp, ARIN has to assess and establish the "need" of the recipient before any blocks can be transferred. That in itself catches speculation. 
>>     
>
> No, it doesn't.  All is does is qualify recipients who want to use the space.  It does nothing to prevent others from acquiring inventory to sell to those people by purchasing shaky companies that happen to have some.  There are lots of those now, and a canny investor can buy them cheap, thereby becoming the "owner" of their RTU, then sell off the resource at a handsome profit.  Please don't tell me this possibility has not occurred to you.  ;-)
>   

That scenario is already possible today using M&A transfers, except that 
today the buyer _doesn't_ have to justify their "need" and it costs a 
lot more to have lawyers create the necessary shell company, sell it, 
etc.  If you consider this a serious risk, you should be proposing that 
M&A transfers be repealed -- it's not a problem specific to paid transfers.

>> Don't think that will work? Hmm, the critics have proven too much. 
>> Assume ARIN and all the other RIRs can be duped into handing out 
>> IPv4 addresses to organizations that don't really need them, 
>> "using whatever ploy works." Well, then, bad actors don't need a 
>> transfer policy, they can just apply for addresses now and hoard them. 
>>     
>
> I don't assume any such thing.  They won't be *getting* the blocks
> from ARIN, because ARIN **won't have any**.  Doh.  And they won't
> be getting them from ARIN ahead of time, because they can't justify
> them to ARIN.  So where do *you* think they will come from?
>   

He said "now", and ARIN does have addresses to give out today and for at 
least a couple more years.

>> In that case, we need a transfer policy even more, because hoarding 
>> by people who don't need addresses is by definition worse than 
>> speculating in addresses, which at least moves them to people who 
>> need them enough to be willing to pay for them. 
>>     
>
> Again, the assumption is that the rich are more worthy than the poor.

No, the assumption above is that it's better that _someone_ get the 
addresses than _nobody_, which is quite different.

> What if a nonprofit health research center needs some?  Absent a transfer policy, we might have something like ARIN posting a list of people waiting for addresses, that those with extra ("extra" being defined more narrowly as we go along) may want to support by returning a block earmarked for a specific worthy cause.

Corporations make charitable donations all the time.  The proposed 
transfer policy does not specify that one side must pay the other; it 
just says that the grantor is allowed to designate the grantee.  Having 
a market value for those addresses might also provide them tax benefits 
for making such a donation, if they wish.

> That's just off the top of my head; my point is that you assume that having money is the prime consideration for allocation, and I don't.
>   

It's the best mechanism we have available in a capitalist society.  
ARIN's done the communist thing for the last 10 years, and that's bought 
us rapidly approaching resource exhaustion -- just like it did in 
Russia, China, Cuba, etc.  Capitalism may not be ideal, but it's the 
least-bad system for managing scarce resources that humanity has yet 
discovered (see also: democracy).

>> Or is Mr. Griffith assuming that needs-based allocation will 
>> work perfectly when we don't have a transfer policy and suddenly 
>> break down when we do? Is this anything more than an expression 
>> of his hostility to a transfer policy? 
>>     
>
> Is this laughable line of argument any more than a ploy for libertarian capitalism at any cost?  ;-)
>
> Actually, I *do* think a transfer policy will skew the allocation that is currently based on needs, and has been since the start, in a negative way.  The immediate effect is that it would make a company that was justified for its block under current rules, but felt it could spare some of it for the good of the community, *unable* to donate it back, because the stockholders could claim it should have been sold instead.  I consider that disincentive to compassion and generosity a bad idea.
>   

Corporations donate money and other assets all the time.  The right to 
use a particular set of numbers is just another asset, to be potentially 
donated like any other.

>> Let's face facts: the date of a sunset is inherently arbitrary. Arbitrariness in a situation already characterized by massive and potentially crippling uncertainty is bad, really bad. We won't know whether the policy sunsets at a date before we even widely use it and lack enough evidence to make a decision, or whether it comes in the middle of a smashing success, or it comes two years after some disastrous failure. 
>>     
>
> That's exactly why I favor a short-term limit to try out this radically new (for ARIN) policy that Milton Friedman would have loved.  Eliminate the uncertainty; it's just for a year, folks.  Then as that time gets closer, we'll have experience on which to base a decision about renewing it, or not.
>   

Given the time and effort involved in an ARIN policy cycle, and the need 
for organizations to budget a year or more ahead of time, a single year 
"experiment" just isn't workable.  I thought even three years was on the 
short side...

S

-- 
Stephen Sprunk         "God does not play dice."  --Albert Einstein
CCIE #3723         "God is an inveterate gambler, and He throws the
K5SSS        dice at every possible opportunity." --Stephen Hawking

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