[arin-ppml] The AC has a job to do with 2009-1 can you please help?

[Jeremy H.Griffith]

On Mon, 6 Apr 2009 00:12:13 -0400, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu> wrote:

>[I said:]
>> I think sooner is better.  One major benefit of the sunset clause
>> is that it puts a limit on speculation.  If someone "acquires" many
>> blocks for resale, using whatever ploy works, I want them to know
>
>There is an obvious logic problem here.

Yes, there is.  But it isn't mine.  ;-)

>Under all the transfer proposals that have made it into ARIN's 
>pdp, ARIN has to assess and establish the "need" of the recipient 
>before any blocks can be transferred. That in itself catches 
>speculation. 

No, it doesn't.  All is does is qualify recipients who want to
use the space.  It does nothing to prevent others from acquiring
inventory to sell to those people by purchasing shaky companies 
that happen to have some.  There are lots of those now, and a
canny investor can buy them cheap, thereby becoming the "owner" 
of their RTU, then sell off the resource at a handsome profit.
Please don't tell me this possibility has not occurred to you.  ;-)

>Don't think that will work? Hmm, the critics have proven too much. 
>Assume ARIN and all the other RIRs can be duped into handing out 
>IPv4 addresses to organizations that don't really need them, 
>"using whatever ploy works." Well, then, bad actors don't need a 
>transfer policy, they can just apply for addresses now and hoard them. 

I don't assume any such thing.  They won't be *getting* the blocks
from ARIN, because ARIN **won't have any**.  Doh.  And they won't
be getting them from ARIN ahead of time, because they can't justify
them to ARIN.  So where do *you* think they will come from?

>When addresses are scarce, hoarding is bad. Can we agree on that? 
>Especially when it can serve as a barrier to entry. 

Of course.

>In that case, we need a transfer policy even more, because hoarding 
>by people who don't need addresses is by definition worse than 
>speculating in addresses, which at least moves them to people who 
>need them enough to be willing to pay for them. 

Again, the assumption is that the rich are more worthy than the
poor.  What if a nonprofit health research center needs some?
Absent a transfer policy, we might have something like ARIN 
posting a list of people waiting for addresses, that those with 
extra ("extra" being defined more narrowly as we go along) may
want to support by returning a block earmarked for a specific
worthy cause.  That's just off the top of my head; my point is 
that you assume that having money is the prime consideration
for allocation, and I don't.

>Or is Mr. Griffith assuming that needs-based allocation will 
>work perfectly when we don't have a transfer policy and suddenly 
>break down when we do? Is this anything more than an expression 
>of his hostility to a transfer policy? 

Is this laughable line of argument any more than a ploy for
libertarian capitalism at any cost?  ;-)

Actually, I *do* think a transfer policy will skew the allocation
that is currently based on needs, and has been since the start,
in a negative way.  The immediate effect is that it would make
a company that was justified for its block under current rules,
but felt it could spare some of it for the good of the community,
*unable* to donate it back, because the stockholders could claim
it should have been sold instead.  I consider that disincentive
to compassion and generosity a bad idea.

>Can we stop confusing the debate over a sunset clause with an 
>opinion poll on whether you like transfer markets or not?

I don't believe that's confusing it.  It is just raising a point
you find difficult to deal with.  Sorry, you do *not* get to
frame this debate.  <g>

>Let's face facts: the date of a sunset is inherently arbitrary. 
>Arbitrariness in a situation already characterized by massive 
>and potentially crippling uncertainty is bad, really bad. We 
>won't know whether the policy sunsets at a date before we even 
>widely use it and lack enough evidence to make a decision, or 
>whether it comes in the middle of a smashing success, or it 
>comes two years after some disastrous failure. 

That's exactly why I favor a short-term limit to try out this
radically new (for ARIN) policy that Milton Friedman would have 
loved.  Eliminate the uncertainty; it's just for a year, folks.  
Then as that time gets closer, we'll have experience on which to 
base a decision about renewing it, or not.

We re-elect US Representatives every two years.  Would it be 
better to put them in office permanently, like judges, and recall 
them if things got bad?  Of course not.  We have scheduled reviews,
called "elections".  This is not a difficult concept, eh?

>What we do know is that the moment the clock runs out we have 
>to have this same stupid debate over again, regardless of its 
>relevance. 

Not if one of us has learned from experience, we don't.

>You don't need a sunset. If the policy causes known problems, 
>modify it or repeal it, with the burden of proof falling on 
>those who claim there is a problem. 

And there you have it.  You want the burden of proof to fall
on those who disagree with you.  Simple.  And that reversal
of burden of proof is exactly why the community, and the AC, 
put the sunset into 2008-6 in the first place.

>(Contrary to Griffith's completely unfounded and legally 
>uninformed speculations, transfer recipients who sign an 
>RSA will have no basis for a lawsuit claiming takings.)

No, they won't.  But the guy who bought Failing Electronics,
Inc., to get its resources for resale sure will.  Ask *your*
legal department.  ;-)

>If it doesn't cause known problems, leave it in place. 

Since we don't have the experience yet to know the problems,
we need to have a short-term trial to determine what they are.

HTH!

--JHG <jhg at omsys.com>