[ARIN-consult] Community Consultation on IRR Route Validation. attorney client communication.

[Gert Doering]

Hi,

On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 08:28:08PM +0000, Hannigan, Martin wrote:
> AS 32787 and AS 20940 will continue to use and expand use of RADB for the foreseeable future. 

So, what do you suggest how the gaping security problems of RADB can be
solved?

Now, I understand that you can buy a maintainer object, and thus protect
your own address space - but as a user of the RADB, how can I see which
objects are legitimate, and which (paid-for!) maintainers just put in
stuff that does not belong to them?

I point to our own hijacked route entry again - 185.54.188.0/22, registered
and maintained by "MAINT-AS197329", very obviously not legitimate 
(since a RADB query also shows the RIPE DB object where this address space 
belongs to!).  The RADB maintainers do not think there is a problem and
they should maybe remove it (but expect me to go chase whoever put it in).

Building routing filters from a data source this quality might give
people a warm and fuzzy feeling, but someone who wants to announce other
people's address space will not be hindered the least by that.

Gert Doering
        -- NetMaster
-- 
have you enabled IPv6 on something today...?

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