[arin-ppml] ARIN-2019-7: Elimination of the Waiting List (was:Re: Looking for final show of support on revised Advisory Council Recommendation Regarding NRPM 4.1.8. Unmet Requests

Sun Jun 23 08:40:42 EDT 2019

Hi Milton,

I answered your question by submitting a proposal to place returned addresses in 4.10 to starve the waiting list to death.

That should be ready for debate next week, but we can begin.

Why is that silly?

It's likely to be an extremely marginal addition to the 4.10 /10 block. 

Do you think the 4.10 block is silly? Maybe you have an issue with it's current size?

I think we should all let our minds wander over the problems and misaligned incentives generated by having ARIN regulate, sponsor "facilitators", and also operate in the marketplace as sellers and "revokers"?

I think we need a more in-depth legal analysis before ARIN takes the risk that these behaviors put it's 501c.6 status in jeopardy. 

For example, do proceeds from sales have to inure to the benefit of the entire ARIN community, or members only, or special charities selected by the board?

To me, it's too big a risk and precedent to set, when the alternative is incrementing the size of an already-in-place reserve pool with important characteristics that mitigate the waiting list pool problems.

Regards,
Mike

---- On Sun, 23 Jun 2019 06:07:49 -0400 Mueller, Milton L <milton at gatech.edu> wrote ----

I see that no one has answered the question I posed - if v4 resources are reclaimed by ARIN how does it dispose of them efficiently if it does not auction them off? 

Marty is correct that ARIN could refuse to accept returns. That that would require the would-be returning party to auction them off itself. That works. That's the only sensible modification I've seen in this discussion. 

But what about reclamations or revocations? Basically, it's crickets. Some people want to retain a waiting list (and thus ignore the obvious fraud incentives generated by the current policy). Some people want to waste the addresses by putting them into 4.10, another rather silly way of avoiding the problem. 

Anyone who opposes this policy has to either defend the waiting list that created the current problem, or fritter away valuable resources in one way or another. Both options are worse than the entirely speculative complaints against the proposed policy. 

Another thing to keep in mind is that the scale of this problem is rather minor. Those predicting doom and gloom seem to be overlooking the fact that the amount of reclaimed or revoked IPv4 numbers is a small and shrinking factor in the overall picture. 

Dr. Milton L Mueller 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
School of Public Policy 

One prospective answer is to dump theminto 

-----Original Message----- 

ARIN would be a competitor AND a regulator in the marketplace. 

I oppose the idea and support the idea of placing returned and revoked addresses in 4.10. 
Actually I proposed that as a new policy a few days ago but maybe it got lost or I filled out the template wrong. 

Regards, 
Mike Burns 

-----Original Message----- 
From: ARIN-PPML <mailto:arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net> On Behalf Of Roberts, Orin 
Sent: Thursday, June 20, 2019 1:01 PM 
To: ARIN-PPML List <mailto:arin-ppml at arin.net> 
Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] ARIN-2019-7: Elimination of the Waiting List (was:Re: Looking for final show of support on revised Advisory Council Recommendation Regarding NRPM 4.1.8. Unmet Requests 

IE ARIN would be a competitor in a marketplace for which it holds a monopoly. 

Orin Roberts 
IP PROVISIONING 
Bell Canada 

-----Original Message----- 
From: ARIN-PPML <mailto:arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net> On Behalf Of mailto:hostmaster at uneedus.com 
Sent: June-20-19 12:57 PM 
To: ARIN-PPML List <mailto:arin-ppml at arin.net> 
Subject: [EXT]Re: [arin-ppml] ARIN-2019-7: Elimination of the Waiting List (was:Re: Looking for final show of support on revised Advisory Council Recommendation Regarding NRPM 4.1.8. Unmet Requests 

Oppose 

I have no problem with the idea of getting rid of the waiting list part of the proposal. 

I do have a problem with an auction, as I think it will cause lots of issues when ARIN revokes resources, because it certainly will be alleged that "ARIN did it for the money", as has already been discussed, and will make any legal action a lot more costly. The Board choosing to use auction proceeds for legal costs would be like pouring gasoline on a fire, and I note that the Board could choose to spend auction proceeds in this fashion, since how to spend the proceeds is totally under their control. 

Rather than an auction, I propose putting the returns in the 4.10 Dedicated IPv4 Block to Facilitate IPv6 Deployment.  This pool is limited to a /24 maximum.  This use would also promote IPv6 use. 

This would leave the marketplace as the only source of IPv4 addresses greater than a /24.  It would also effectively limit any "free" addresses to smaller players. 

If we are giving out "Free" addresses at ARIN, why not impose a condition that the addresses so provided be used as part of IPv6 deployment? 

Albert Erdmann 
Network Administrator 
Paradise On Line Inc. 

On Thu, 20 Jun 2019, Alyssa Moore wrote: 

> Hi folks, 
> 
> Trying to do a temperature check here. If you're following this 
> thread, please indicate whether you support or oppose this draft policy. 
> 
> On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 11:42 AM David Farmer <mailto:farmer at umn.edu> wrote: 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Jun 16, 2019 at 2:50 PM Mueller, Milton L <mailto:milton at gatech.edu> 
>> wrote: 
>> 
>>> OK, I’ve read it, and here is my reaction: 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> This policy requires legal comment. ARIN’s Articles and Bylaws do 
>>> not specifically prohibit ARIN from monetizing returned or revoked 
>>> resources by selling those resources into the transfer market 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> So point #1 is that this proposed policy does not violate any 
>>> articles or bylaws. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Today, ARIN does not financially benefit in any material way from 
>>> such revocations. Adoption of this policy would for the first time 
>>> allow the party in a contested revocation situation to argue that 
>>> ARIN seeks to financially benefit. Avoiding that concern is also significant. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I am totally unimpressed with this argument. If ARIN revokes 
>>> addresses for nonpayment it is financially benefiting from the revocation is it not? 
>>> It is basically taking them back because it is not getting paid. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> If ARIN “gets paid” by selling the numbers into the transfer market 
>>> what is the difference exactly? 
>>> 
>> 
>> Referring to the waiting list policy, the Draft Policy says, "this 
>> policy provides valuable number resources essentially for free". 
>> 
>> Yes, ARIN currently financially benefits, but currently, that benefit 
>> is at a level of cost recovery, "essentially for free" as stated above. 
>> Whereas, if ARIN were to dispose of resources using the market, the 
>> level of financial benefit is likely to be orders of magnitude larger. 
>> Furthermore, if this wasn't the case, then the impact on the market 
>> and the potential for fraud supposedly created by the waiting list, 
>> that the draft policy proposes to mitigate, wouldn't exist in the first place. 
>> 
>> In short, "what is the difference", probably, several orders of 
>> magnitude in the level of financial benefit involved. Where the 
>> financial motivations from simple "cost recovery" can probably be 
>> summarily dismissed by the court. Whereas the potential financial 
>> motivations, that one might even call a windfall, from market-based 
>> transactions probably at least needs to be examined and evaluated by 
>> the court, and probably wouldn't be summarily dismissed. The outcome 
>> of the two situations might be the same in the end, but the level of 
>> effort involved defending and the level of risk of an adverse ruling, are not the same at all. 
>> 
>> More generally, ARIN participating in the market seems distasteful 
>> and counter to its overall mission, but doesn't directly violate its 
>> Articles and Bylaws. 
>> 
>> That said that doesn't mean ARIN can't implement the policy, but 
>> these risks need to be evaluated when compared to other alternatives 
>> being considered, along with the possible benefits this policy could have as well. 
>> 
>> -- 
>> =============================================== 
>> David Farmer               Email:mailto:farmer at umn.edu 
>> Networking & Telecommunication Services Office of Information 
>> Technology University of Minnesota 
>> 2218 University Ave SE        Phone: 612-626-0815 
>> Minneapolis, MN 55414-3029   Cell: 612-812-9952 
>> =============================================== 
>> _______________________________________________ 
>> ARIN-PPML 
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> 
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