[arin-ppml] ARIN-prop-165 Eliminate Needs-BasedJustificationon8.3 Specified Transfers
jmaimon at chl.com
Fri Feb 17 14:50:02 EST 2012
Mike Burns wrote:
>> I've been told that parties who want to make a marketplace also want the
> results from their transactions to be in the registry and accepted by the
> community. Interestingly enough, the inherent conflict between wanting
> the community to accept the results of their 'sales' in the registry but
> not wanting to follow the same community's policies for changes to the
> registry hasn't been very well understood.
> As Owen noted, it is the routing community which holds the cards here.
> My guess is that if ARIN maintains it's anti-free-market tendencies,
> that routers will simply look at whomever is the registrant in Whois,
> then rely on their customer's documentation of chain of custody of the
> address rights from that Whois registrant up to their customer.
> Then they will have the customer attest to this chain of custody and
> route the addresses.
> And they will let the courts settle any discrepancies or challenges to
> that chain of custody.
> At some point, the professed desire to be registered, which you accept
> above, will drive the creation of a private registry for lucky legacy
> holders who never signed an RSA.
> And we will have a permanent class system for IPv4 addresses.
Not only do you have to make the case that this is a likely outcome, you
must also make the case that the resultant negative effects are best
headed off with this proposal which you support, and that any negative
effects from this proposal are a worthy cost to obtain its benefits.
While I share your concern about registration and routing data
fragmentation, I must note that it has never been the case that industry
routing decisions were based solely and predictably on registration data.
However, it has always been the case that the best approach to
attempting to ensure unique routability starts with unique registration,
with community-wide acceptance of such.
Unless that changes in a substantial fashion, ARIN and the RiR's will
always have value to the community, and transfers performed without that
system will not realize that value.
As a small suggestion to those who agree with your concerns, or at the
least, with your supported solution, chipping away in piecemeal fashion
at transfers' needs requirements is likely to win wider support then
appearing to do away with them completely.
I will note that the more publicly known transfers did not seem to get
overly hung up on needs requirements. I suspect that like all
bureaucracy, familiarity breeds conformance competency or as others have
said, going along to get along was the prevailing attitude.
But enough about registration.
Lets talk conflict, where ARIN records a transfer or allocation to a
party that is contested by another party who has not obtained its
claimed exclusivity rights pursuant to registry policy.
How likely is that scenario to become commonplace? Whom do you project
to win these kinds of confrontations? Who will be the losers?
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