[arin-ppml] 2011-1 dissent Was: Re: ARIN-2011-1:ARINInter-RIRTransfers - Last Call
george.herbert at gmail.com
Mon Oct 24 19:10:07 EDT 2011
On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 3:57 PM, William Herrin <bill at herrin.us> wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 6:43 PM, Mike Burns <mike at nationwideinc.com> wrote:
>> How many times could you rinse/repeat this cycle before the activity became
>> so evident that ARIN refused to authorize the transfer, and instead
>> attempted reclamation due to fraud?
> Hi Mike,
> As many as you want until the Board adopts a policy which declares
> defines such use illegitimate. If the policy says it isn't fraud then
> it isn't fraud no matter how egregious. ARIN simply isn't allowed to
> make it up as they go; they're bound by the policies. One problem with
> 2011-1 as presently drafted is that it takes some dubious activities
> that current policy defines as "not fraud" and creates an only
> moderately circuitous path to easy cash.
>> I agree that protections against fraud in obtaining addresses from the free
>> pool will become increasingly important, and if there was some work in the
>> past related to detecting related-legal-entities, it would be prudent to
>> revisit that subject.
> I'll take counterpoint: protections will become unimportant relatively
> quickly because we're nearly out of addresses in the ARIN free pool
> too. Nevertheless, we need some protections _until_ events render
> matter moot.
>> Bill, what would you think about preventing those who receive addresses from
>> the free pool from selling addresses for some timeframe commencing at the
>> time of their last allocation?
> Do we really want to lock unused or underused addresses out of play
> for folks who DO meet ARIN's needs-justification when the whole point
> of transfers is that we don't have enough addresses to go around?
> Bill Herrin
Obviously locking addresses out of play a bit is the point; we're
putting up some roadblocks, nobody objects to the idea of it not being
The question is whether the roadblocks are effective and limited
(i.e., don't get in the way of those with legitimate non-speculative
needs, do at least slow down speculators just in it for a few $$$).
I am so far convinced that we don't actually know the answer; this, to
me, argues for slowing down and some more thinking about it and gaming
the scenarios some more.
Slowing down has its own costs - including potentially affecting those
with legitimate non-speculative needs. The point at which those costs
become real and significant is perhaps a bit too late; figuring out
where we are in the understanding as we approach that point would be
optimal. But this is a policy and business scenario debate, not a
game theory exercise per se...
-george william herbert
george.herbert at gmail.com
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