[arin-ppml] Accusation of fundamental conflict ofinterest/IPaddress policy pitched directly to ICANN

Mike Burns mike at nationwideinc.com
Mon May 2 20:25:44 EDT 2011


Hi Jonathan, answers inline.

>What is broken about ARIN is that scandalously large numbers of netblocks do not have valid POCs, for example. The stewardship of Whois leaves a lot to be desired.

>What steps would a commercial entity take to resolve this that RIRs cannot?

A commercial entity could recognize justification-free legacy transfers, and many legacy transfers happened  but were not reflected in Whois because of this.
Not that the RIRs cannot do this, but they have not. It could well be that changing conditions will cause a realization of the legal realities of these transfers, and induce an RIR community to change policy to turn that registry into a title agency, reviewing evidence of property transfers without reference to the need to transfer networks or customers, or justify a need.


>Competitive pressures would help to finally decide who controls these addresses and allow them to be transferred to those who would pay for them.
>Leaving other equally "worthy" entities with less money unable to acquire space despite their need?

I meant competitive pressures between registries, but sure, poor entities couldn't afford expensive IP addresses.

>Network operators don't really have much of a choice in accessing Whois information to determine the rights to advertise addresses, and competive registries.

>I'd argue that network operators are the very ones who give the RIR their "power." I also don't see why you seem to claim that they can't? Tell me, what's stopping them from using whatever registry they want?

I couldn't agree more. I don't think there really is anything stopping them from using whatever registry they want. I think they have slim pickings in registries now, and use what they have, but they don't trust it unilaterally. If a registry comes along that offers network operators some insurance against conflict or abuse claims, my bet is they would avail themselves of it rather than turn down business.

>What is broken about ARIN is that their transfer policies are more restrictive than APNICs, and that will cause a flow of addresses out of ARIN and into APNIC.
>Could you explain why you think this?

All else being equal, I believe buyers and sellers will migrate towards the freer market. The justification is like a transaction cost. Transactions will go to where the cost is lowest.


>Not to speak for him but you did say " Competitive pressures would help to finally decide who controls these addresses and allow them to be transferred to those who would pay for them."


>Were you not suggesting that the folks with the most money would be the ones who got address space registered to their name and the others would be out in the rain?


>Let me know if I misunderstood.

Yes, you misunderstood, I was talking about competitive pressures between registries. If a registry becomes freer, like APNIC did, it puts competitive pressures on the other registries to free their markets up,  that's what I was trying to say. Sorry if I was unclear. But yes, eventually it will cost money to get IP addresses. I guess the richer you are, the more easy it will be to acquire addresses in the post-exhaust world. I don't see any honest way around this, but at least this will serve to free up huge swaths of address space currently on the sideline. Wouldn't this buy some time to finally get that orderly V6 transition in motion?

Regards,

Mike Burns








    A competitive registry could presumably have a different transfer policy, as APNICs differs from ARINs. 
    What is broken about ARIN is that ARIN has professed no statutory control over legacy addresses in the Plzak declaration in the Kremen case, and yet attempts to control the registration of legacy resources.
    With a private registry, the address rights holders can choose to opt-out of ARIN's dictats and choose their registry voluntarily.



  As I said above, I don't think there is anything stopping someone from "choosing their registry voluntarily."  


    I don't see how the creation of a private registry will perturb the current mechanisms in a way that costs you money, could you share why you feel that way?



  Not to speak for him but you did say " Competitive pressures would help to finally decide who controls these addresses and allow them to be transferred to those who would pay for them."


  Were you not suggesting that the folks with the most money would be the ones who got address space registered to their name and the others would be out in the rain?


  Let me know if I misunderstood.


  Jon Fernatt
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