[arin-ppml] Accusation of fundamental conflict ofinterest/IPaddress policy pitched directly to ICANN

[Alexander, Daniel]

Mike,

While I can only speak for myself, I can attempt to answer your question
of what may perturb some people. You make several very large assumptions
in your claims, none of which were captured in the opt-in, opt-out, or any
other proposals. 

You speak of title insurance, legal teams, and other items, ensuring that
a competitive registry will provide better services than a community
defined RIR. The problem is none of this is defined or required in any
suggested framework. While some may provide these services, many may not,
and there are no mechanisms to protect the ISP's or end users who rely on
these services. 

While many advocates will quickly reply that the market will sort these
bad actors out, it will be done at the expense of the people who currently
rely on these RIR provided services at a fraction of the cost. If
competitive registries are created without oversight, the burden and
expense of validating registration records will be shifted to the very
people who are supposed to benefit from this new model.

This begs the question from some as to what purpose a commercial registry
would serve other than to make money.

My opinion only.
Dan Alexander




On 5/2/11 3:33 PM, "Mike Burns" <mike at nationwideinc.com> wrote:

>
>
>>But what is it about ARIN that is broken? What exactly do you think
>>needs 
>>to be fixed?
>
>>The only thing I've gotten out of the discussions so far is that some
>>people think there is money to be made by providing IPv4 addresses based
>>on 
>>willingness and ability to pay rather than ARIN's current >demonstrated
>>need policies.
>
>>Why is it to my benefit if someone else makes money? Particularly if it
>>perturbs the current mechanisms in a way that costs me money?
>
>>Keith Hare
>
>
>Hi Keith,
>
>What is broken about ARIN is that scandalously large numbers of netblocks
>do 
>not have valid POCs, for example. The stewardship of Whois leaves a lot
>to 
>be desired.
>Competitive pressures would help to finally decide who controls these
>addresses and allow them to be transferred to those who would pay for
>them.
>Network operators don't really have much of a choice in accessing Whois
>information to determine the rights to advertise addresses, and competive
>registries.
>In my experience they rely on attestation and review of proferred
>chain-of-custody docs when determining who can advertise which addresses,
>when confronted with inconsistencies with whois.
>A competitive registry with a title insurance component will give network
>operators more security when deciding questionable cases.
>
>What is broken about ARIN is that their transfer policies are more
>restrictive than APNICs, and that will cause a flow of addresses out of
>ARIN 
>and into APNIC.
>A competitive registry could presumably have a different transfer policy,
>as 
>APNICs differs from ARINs.
>
>What is broken about ARIN is that ARIN has professed no statutory control
>over legacy addresses in the Plzak declaration in the Kremen case, and
>yet 
>attempts to control the registration of legacy resources.
>With a private registry, the address rights holders can choose to opt-out
>of 
>ARIN's dictats and choose their registry voluntarily.
>
>I don't see how the creation of a private registry will perturb the
>current 
>mechanisms in a way that costs you money, could you share why you feel
>that 
>way?
>
>Regards,
>
>Mike Burns
>
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