[arin-ppml] Q1 - ARIN address transfer policy: why the trigger date?

[Owen DeLong]

On Jun 20, 2008, at 9:49 AM, Paul Vixie wrote:

> without commenting on the merits of your "no transfers allowed" policy
> recommendation, i do have questions about one thing you've said here:
>
>> I do not believe that allowing address space to flow only to those  
>> with the
>> greatest financial resources is in the best interests of the  
>> internet.  That
>> is one predictable outcome of an address trading market.
>
> isn't this inevitable in times of shortage, regardless of the shade  
> (regulated
> or unregulated) of the market that inevitably occurs when humans face
> shortages?  if it is, then our choice is not whether a market  
> appears, but
> rather, whether that inevitable market is regulated or unregulated.
>
I don't accept your premise that a market is inevitable.  I do believe  
that
some black market trades will occur, but, that if they become  
significant,
it will become exponentially difficult to get those traded addresses  
routed
and thus the black market will rapidly collapse if it ever becomes  
significant.
I think that if a very small black market continues, there's little we  
can do
about that, but, at least this will keep it relatively small.

>> I think that the subprime mortgage and oil futures markets are  
>> examples of
>> how professionally regulated markets fail to do the right thing,  
>> and I
>> cannot imagine that we will somehow miraculously do better than the
>> regulators in those markets.
>
> do you think that the oil and gas situation right now would be worse  
> or better
> if that market were less regulated than it is?  if you think it  
> would be worse
> then could it not also be the case that the professionals who  
> regulate that
> market could be part of a vast corrupt kleptocracy, or institutionally
> incompetent, or just less well rewarded/motivated/resourced than  
> those they
> regulate?  in short can you explain why you consider this a parallel  
> case?

I think it would be far worse.  I think that with no regulation, the  
speculators
who first crippled the mortgage markets would have us paying close to
$10/gallon for gasoline by now.  Yes, it is possible that the  
regulators are
corrupt, incompetent, etc. However, while I believe ARIN to be likely to
be less corrupt, I do not believe us likely to be more competent at
market regulation.  I am quite certain that ARIN would also be less
well rewarded/resourced than those they regulate if this were to become
a target for speculators.

I consider this a parallel case because it is a market that is likely to
attract speculators if it is not regulated in such a way as to prevent
them. Further, I believe that the backlash against the various anti-
speculation provisions of the proposed policy is reasonable evidence
that such regulation would be burdensome and undesirable to the
community.  A market without such regulation would, in my opinion
be quite harmful.  As such, no market and no such regulation
seems the safest course.

Owen