Multihoming sites and ARIN

[John W. Stewart III]

 > Observation 5,
 > 
 > The creation of markets for IP space and routing slots obviates
 > the need for ARIN as a policy body for allocation (i.e., 
 > the market does the allocation), further with a true market
 > we can now have competing registries for IP space -- similar
 > to the IAHC results, registries do registry work, rather
 > than attempt to regulate market forces.  

you might be able to convince me of this for space that
is already allocated.  but what do we do about currently
*un*allocated space? do different registries on the
supply-side of the market just pick randomly and hope
for uniqueness?

 > Observation 6,
 > 
 > With the removal of allocation policy issues, ARIN becomes
 > a lot less controversial, and the costs of lawyers goes 
 > way down :)  

as hinted at above, for the sake of uniqueness, it could
be argued that having one/few organization(s) allocate
*new* addresses is a good thing (or at least less bad
than the alternative)

 > Observation 7,
 > 
 > I'm soliciting bids from any tier-1 provider who will 
 > guarantee, through their own routing and by negotiation with
 > their peers, for 100 routing table slots for a period of
 > three years.

this is very significant.  scott is pointing out the
difference between getting an address and being routed.
in the current system i'm not sure how easy it is to
separate these issues .. if address assignment isn't
[at least] loosely correlated with topology, then a
market-driven allocation system in a vacuum with
respect to routing could end up destroying the routing
system.  however, i claim that *if* i knew exactly
what "full" meant for a default-free routing table and
*if* i had the ability to control what routing
announcements i hear win (i.e., get a slot) and which
ones loose (i.e., get dropped on the floor), then it
might be more possible to separate allocation and
routing .. and in fact, in that case the market-driven
approach might result in better aggregation (either
that or global routing of a /32 could be really, really,
really, really expensive)

/jws

 > 
 > -scott
 > 
 > At 03:18 PM 2/20/97 PST, Yakov Rekhter wrote:
 > >Scott,
 > >
 > >> >On Thu, 20 Feb 1997, Scott Huddle wrote:
 > >> >> I bid $2500 for a /19 anywhere in The Swamp.  Those holding /24s
 > >> >> are encouraged to find their neighbors and put together a
 > >> >> contiguous block.  
 > >> >
 > >> >Heck, I'd bid $5000 for the same, and consider it a standing offer.
 > >> 
 > >> Observation 1, if there were a market for address space, there is 
 > >> money to pay for renumbering.  (i.e., I'll pay you $Y for your
 > >> two discontiguous /18s and give you a /19 in new space.)
 > >> 
 > >> Observation 2, the job of a registry in a market scheme becomes
 > >> more one of recording "trusteeship" rather than setting policy 
 > >> of distribution.  
 > >> 
 > >> Observation 3, $5001. :) 
 > >
 > >Somewhat controversial:
 > >
 > >Observation 4: the decision on whether there should be a market
 > >for address space should  be controlled *neither* by registries,
 > >*nor* by various I* organizations (IETF, ISOC, IAB, IESG).
 > >
 > >Yakov.
 > >
 > >