From cook at NETAXS.COM Fri Aug 1 01:55:11 1997 From: cook at NETAXS.COM (Gordon Cook) Date: Fri, 1 Aug 1997 01:55:11 -0400 (EDT) Subject: Special Report on Internet Governance Published - herewith the introduction with description of rootzone move scenarios and a possible solution to the DNS wars Message-ID: This is the introduction to the publication today of an anthology of COOK Report coverage of the DNS, IP and general Internet governance crisis of the past six months. Part I of what follows offers a new summary of events at a high level and then concludes with Parts II and III which contain entirely new material. Part II is a description of technical scenarios that could flow from a decision by IANA to remove the root zone files from NSI, and Part III offers a way of analyzing the DNS problems that could result in rendering the IAHC process moot by eliminating gTLDs and placing DNS under country codes and the laws of the respective countries in which the registrants of the domains live. Part I: Internet Governance Has Not Matured at Same Pace as Infrastructure A year ago the DNS debate was beginning to turn into warfare. The International Internet Ad Hoc Committee on DNS was about to be launched. The various other folk whom some were beginning to call the DNS "pirates" had put their operations into high gear. These developments carried on through January of this year when IAHC finalized its plans and a coalition of various interests emerged determined to derail IAHC by whatever means necessary. Once the White House became involved in February with the creation of the InterAgency Task Force on DNS, things got very messy very fast. The National Science Foundation has been well aware for more than a year that the parallel structure for the allocation of IP numbers in the Americas had to be disconnected from Network Solutions handling of DNS before the end of government involvement with the NSF - NSI Cooperative Agreement. IP number allocation issues in the rest of the world were handled by membership based organizations. It seemed reasonable to NSF that the Americas catch up to the rest of the world in this respect. Through out the winter the NSF worked diligently towards this end only to have the White House intercede and overturn all it plans on March 3. Unfortunately the White House action meant that federal bureaucrats who, more often than not, had only a limited knowledge of the Internet were now making policy that would determine the fate of some key elements of Internet governance.The formation of the American Registry for Internet Numbers was an inadvertent casualty of the White House action. Unfortunately it was only a couple of weeks before the "feds" decided that they would "fix" IP as well as DNS. As a result the announcement of ARIN, instead of happening on March 18, occurred only on June 24. In the meantime nothing was being done about the institutionalization of the authority functions of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. From a governance point of view IANA is the single most critical piece of Internet Infrastructure. Unfortunately the federal agencies involved were far more interested in pursuing their own agendas than in trying to understand why those who really new the workings of the net have talked for more than a year about the need to institutionalize the IANA. These people saw the need to shift the burdens of sole control from the shoulders of Jon Postel, who, as a single widely-trusted person was ill equipped to deal with the economic and legal pressures of a commercialized network that was in the midst of becoming a critical piece of communications infrastructure for governments and global corporations. Without understanding a complicated nexus of relationships, American policy makers were refashioning the DNS "piston" of the Internet engine with no awareness of its linkage to IP and the linkage of both to the IANA. The situation is messy because, while the IANA was the implementor of the IAHC process that threatens the livelihood of Network Solution?s control of the .com top level domain name, IANA also depends on NSI to run the key data bases that feed the DNS root servers and to fund the start up expenses for ARIN. Operationally Network Solutions is subordinate to IANA, which, at the same time, found itself loosing its operational funding and becoming the subject of legal attacks. To complicate things further IANA, through the IAHC process, is firmly allied with ISOC and some believe with ITU - an alliance that is generally unpopular within the commercial Internet community and one of the major reasons why the majority of that community is believed to favor the US government intervention. Although Glen Schlarmann and Brian Kahin are the titular co chairs of the Federal review effort, Ira Magaziner calls the ultimate shots from the White House and on June 18th, having come up to speed on the issues interceded with the Inter Agency DNS Task Force and ordered the formation of ARIN. However, the forces at play now go well beyond ARIN. The Rickety Foundation of Internet Governance The foundation of Internet governance has become a very rickety pedestal on which are balanced the conflicting interests of IANA, the Registries, the US government, Network Solutions, IAHC, the ITU and others. Regrettably Postel and the US government may be on that collision course over the issue of putting new top level domains in the root servers. Even more regrettable is as the struggle over DNS continues, no one is addressing immediate shortcomings in the IANA procedures. The Federal Interagency Task Force has an IANA task force. While we have not been able to ascertain what the IANA task force is doing, we have been told that there is very close to a total dearth of sound technical knowledge at work The continuing DNS disputes would seem to be intractable. Certainly NSI and IANA/IAHC have few common interests. The US government has not yet figured out a course of action. Whatever the "feds" do, it will likely be opposed to the interests of both IANA/IAHC and NSI. Some people believe the U.S. government will simply try to buy time by extending the life of the cooperative agreement so that it can at least continue to control NSI. The problem is that such a course of action may not have any affect on whether Jon Postel moves root to Europe. It is very difficult for us to see how the "feds" could do anything to prevent this from happening. If so control of NSI will be worth very little. Not fully certain of the range of tools at the command of the White House, we concluded that one outcome might be that pressures would rapidly grow on the feds to try to regulate the Internet. Of course the idea that any nation can regulate the international entity that is the Internet seems quite strange for the issue of porous national borders seems far more real for the Internet than for the telephony industry. Regulation? When we asked Tony Rutkowski whether he thought any of the current pressures would lead to any regulatory attempt. He replied that if we meant by regulation, increased government involvement in the net, that such increased involvement would likely come in the critical infrastructures area. There is a critical infrastructures group under the White House that is looking at the reliability and robustness and security of the Internet. In effect the NSTAC (National security Telecommunications Advisory Committee) is being extended to into the Internet area. NSTAC is basically made up of representatives of all the telcos meeting under a federal government aegis to deal with issues of robustness and security and what happens in times of national emergency. The purpose is to focus on what it takes to maintain the functions of the network under various fault conditions. It often involves contingency planning. He foresees the most likely denouement of the current governance issues as being actions taken by the private sector companies to keep DNS working and IP numbers allocated. The operators of the interconnected telephony networks keep those functioning with very little government assistance of any kind. He says that the role of government is to provide the parties with an appellate route in case things go very wrong and with antitrust protection - two very important considerations. [Editor: We are not sure that we are comfortable with these ideas.] Part II: Can Anyone Besides IANA Control the Totality of the Internet's DNS Machinery? Few people would claim to know exactly what might happen in the event of a decision to move management of the root zone or "dot" domain from Network Solutions to some other location in this country or Europe. We want very carefully to state that we are not advocating such a move. We also want to outline the various components of the DNS root server infrastructure and assess which people control them in an effort, not to make such a move more or less likely, but to help those involved in making the policy decisions become better aware of the range of results their policies could trigger. Certainly, from what we have been able to ascertain, the Federal Interagency Task Force is operating without any adequate understanding of the operation and technical impact of its decisions and therefore needs what help it can get. The Root Zone Server(s) Network Solutions runs A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET with an IP Address: 198.41.0.4 and J.ROOT-SERVERS.NET with the IP Address: 198.41.0.10. It also runs the 'dot' machine known as ROOT-SERVERS.NET (198.41.0.5). This is the machine responsible for the root zone that is also known as "dot". "Dot" is the ultimate master index for DNS (meaning that all root machines take their lead from it as to what the TLDs are and where the master zone file is for each TLD). Currently IANA is the Administrative Contact for the machine and Mark Kosters of Network Solutions the Technical Contact. According to standard operating procedure, the technical contact is obligated to follow the orders of the Administrative contact. In imagining an order to move the root zone, what could be significant here is that such an order would be detrimental to the interests of Network Solutions, the employer of Mark Kosters, the Technical Contact. Nevertheless, we are told that IANA (Jon Postel) has the ability to use the network to make software changes on this machine regardless of what Mark Kosters does or doesn't do. Let's assume then that IANA makes the move. In such a case, in order for the root servers to be able to find the new root zone, changes would have to be made at the top level of .net. Now "dot" net takes its authority from the a.root-server at NSI. Mark Kosters is the Technical and Administrative Contact for this machine. To make a change in the location of the root zone take operational effect, Mark would have to make appropriate changes to entries in the a.root-server. If this did not happen the other .net root servers wouldn't know how to find the location of the new root zone machine. At this point in our hypothetical scenario Kosters and his management would have to make some major decisions. A changed root zone location would ensure that IANA and IAHC could enter their seven new gTLDs into the root servers with ease. All the root servers would presumably continue pick up NSI's gTLDs, while NSI would have to voluntarily accept the loss of one of its major assets. Let's ask what could happen if NSI declined to make the changes in .net? At that point IANA would either have to back down, or go to war against NSI. If IANA did not back down, its only choice would be to go public and explaining the situation in a post to the Internet, give the location information for the new root zone and ask all DNS operators to update the root.cache files on their machines immediately. We are talking well over a million DNS machines for the Internet. Therefore this is not a small task. We have however spoken to several people and all agree that a "herd" mentality could be counted on that would result in the change of root.cache files for the root servers immediately, for the major backbones over night, for 90% of the net within 48 hours and for the remaining 10% in the next two weeks. NSI Unlikely to Resist Such an action on NSI's part however would be regarded as "treason" against the best interests of the Internet as a whole. It would confirm in everyone's mind the mistrust that already exists - rendering NSI as a rogue and outcast. It would likely justify, in the minds of many, NSI's servers as a 'legitimate' objects for physical attacks by means of the network. Because of the overwhelming importance of .com to the rest of the commercial Internet, it is not likely that serious commercial service providers would attempt to ever think of any boycott of .com. But such NSI action would increase the pressure to find a way to divest NSI of control of .com. Thus, although NSI would have to cooperate for a move of the root zone to be easily brought about, the consequences of its failing to cooperate would impact NSI so negatively that it is hard to imagine that NSI would resist. Resistance by the US government to a change of the root zone would be equally problematic. A "whois" on root-servers.net shows four machines: RS0.INTERNIC.NET (198.41.0.5), GW.HOME.VIX.COM (192.5.5.1), NS.RIPE.NET (193.0.0.193) NS.ISI.EDU (128.9.128.127). These four machines keep uniform copies of the root zone on them at all times. Moving root zone would mean, we believe, moving the administration of the root zone files from NSI in Virginia to one of the other three locations. NS.ISI.EDU is a machine at IANA headquarters. GW.HOME.VIX.COM belongs to Vixie Enterprises which is run by Paul Vixie, the author of the BIND software that implements DNS. Vixie is an out-spokenly loyal follower of IANA. NS.RIPE.NET is at RIPE headquarters in Europe. Readers will remember that it was at the recent RIPE meeting where RIPE and APNIC, in the absence of continued US funds for IANA, pledged money to support IANA. Our conclusion from the questions that we have asked is that IANA could move root zone administration to any other these other machines, which are themselves not root server machines, and in so doing further decentralize the DNS system - rendering changes instituted by a single party far more difficult. We can imagine the US government, by means of the National Science Foundation, ordering NSI not to permit new gTLDs in the root servers. But in such a case, if the administration of the root zone is no longer in NSI's hands, such a move is rendered effectively moot. (Ironically the June 97 order from NSF to NSI not to add new gTLDs, could become the primary cause for a shift by IANA of root zone administration away from NSI.) Now it has also been suggested that the US government could forbid US root server operators to point to a new root zone machine in Europe. Let's suppose this happened. In the initial look ups, DNS queries to government restricted root servers not finding, say a few months from now, a new IAHC top level domain, would automatically bounce to the other root servers until they wound up hitting a root server loyal to Postel's administration and containing the new gTLD. Unless the US government tried to physically cut of the United States from the rest of the world wide Internet - something impossible to imagine - the survivability design for the Internet has indeed created something that the US government can cajole but not control. This is an outcome that we find to be exceptionally welcome. Part III: A Scenario for a Political Resolution of the DNS Crisis In very recent discussions with a number of individuals we came upon some new ways of looking at the DNS problem. The DNS wars can be seen not so much as wars over Domain Names but as wars over the power that comes from control of the Internet. The IAHC process could be looked at as a way to preserve power at a global level for the buggy whip makers - those entities like WIPO and ITU whose interests are threatened by and antithetical to the interests of the Internet. Telephone companies in the case of the ITU, which for the last century have used the ITU to get into bed with national governments creating the national PTTs whose monopolies are only now going beginning to fall. Then there follow WIPO and INTA representing intellectual property and trademark interests. The unfettered functioning of the Internet will make it much harder to protect their standard sources of income. Now if you ask what reason the IAHC has for bringing these international regulatory bodies into play in the field of Internet governance, it is the because existence of top level domain names that transcend national boundaries. Get rid of top level domains including .com by placing .com under.us and you take away the international aspect of the crisis that allows ISOC, inadvertently or not, to bring the noses of the ITU, INTA, and WIPO camels under the Internet tent. Now what if we make another assumption that it takes time for communities to coalesce and to understand their common interests? If you are going to hold forth the North American Numbering Plan as the very model of industry self-regulation, you must realize that it came from a telephone industry that had roughly three quarters of a century to mature. On the other hand we have the Internet where 98% of the users today were not users two years ago. They don't think of themselves as members of a community yet and indeed they don't yet begin to even grasp the issues. Right now the only thing that is allowing the buggy whip makers to continue to exert their power over the governance process is the existence of GLOBAL top level domains. Ones that transcend national boundaries. Why not eliminate GLOBAL top level domains and deprive the IAHC and IPOC - CORE process of its very reason for existence? Now we will note that the role of the ITU as the holder of MoU signatories seems to us not to indicate an immediate threat of an ITU take over of the Internet. However, some may say it will be the first step in a process that will be hard to stop. On the other hand, WIPO and INTA's roles seem more immediately insidious. More top level domains will multiply and not alleviate the intellectual property and trademark issues that already threaten and indeed prevent the legitimate use of some business domains under .com. The result will be more work for the lawyers not less and more layers of legal underbrush, especially for small businesses to hack through in getting or keeping a viable business address in cyberspace. What happens then if we simply say that DNS is something to be worked out by each country according to the laws of that country and quit pretending that the Internet can do what the postal services cannot do and that is have addresses with no relationship what-so-ever to geography. In other words what happens if we institute a phase-out period for all global Top Level Domains except country codes? It could become possible for the US government to say this as it concludes what it might call the Internet development period that the current Federal Notice of Inquiry could be seen as summing up or bringing to an end - depending on one's point of view. What if the predominant prescription offered by the position papers submitted under the NOI was to be to get rid of Top Level Domains and let DNS be handled on a country by-country basis until such time in the future as the Internet has coalesced into a community that can offer a cohesive and unified alternative approach? Perhaps we should not try to solve the problems of global Internet governance in the short run. Perhaps we should localize them until there is indeed a sufficiently mature global Internet community capable of resolving its own problems. Otherwise the resolution to these problems may be forced by global powers whose interests are, not only outside, but also, perhaps, antithetical to those of the Internet community. Also, while we have sometimes found it difficult to understand the extreme suspicion with which IAHC is greeted, this way of approaching the problem - by rendering IAHC irrelevant to the process - may be the best way of keeping peace within the various parts of the network. It would adopt a course of action that looks more attractive than any of the alternatives. Certainly, given the tensions that IAHC is exploiting under the current approaches of the various players to the situation, IAHC would seem to be presently in the drivers seat and looking nearly unstoppable. Changing the most fundamental international basis of approaching DNS would seem to leave the other players with a playing field that they could accept and by avoiding the current collision course do the least harm to the stability of the Internet. While we don't believe this approach can solve the authority issue behind the IANA, issues that are truly global unless the registries can coalesce their own policy together in a coherent way, we do think that this approach could defuse what is otherwise shaping up as a lose-lose scenario for everyone involved. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Contents Introduction pp. 1 - 2, 76 Executive Summary pp. 5 - 10 April: Domain Name Service Under Stress Can IAHC Solution Work or Is NSI Unassailable? Could Legal Action Challenge Authority of IANA? pp. 11 - 16 May: Clinton Administration Embraces DNS Tar Baby, Magaziner & OMB Responsible Action Derails Agreement with Network Solutions & NSF to End Co-operative Agreement on April 1 1997 Ill Considered Move Halts Formation of ARIN IP Registry pp. 17 - 21 Some Source Documents with Our Interpretations Added Magaziner Interview, NSI Database Summary & Explanation, Rutkowski, Crocker & Dillon on IAHC, the Ambler Law Suit, Linda Sundro Makes Policy pp. 21 - 27 June: CIX, NSI & Rutkowski Favor Current U.S. Intervention Against IAHC DNS Plan IANA Authority & ARIN Still Critical Unsolved Problem IAHC February 4 Plan Generates Intense Opposition Success of IAHC Plan Uncertain -- Critics Want it Killed Now pp. 28 - 30 NSF Will Not Renew NSI Cooperative Agreement p. 30 CIX, Citing Failure of Process with IAHC, Cites Custodial Duty of US Gov?t to Maintain Stability Calls for an IANA Authority Accepted by US Government Asks for Separation IP Number & DNS Authority Wants to Phase out GLTDs within Five Years pp. 31 -35 July - August: ARIN Approved! Magaziner Breaks Log Jam Administration Makes Ninth Inning Move Helpful to Net Signs of Leadership Emerge from Sea of Hesitation Government Wide NOI on DNS Expected Shortly pp. 36 - 45 Rudolph Geist, USIPA Lawyer: ARIN is Unneeded Monopoly - Action Threatened by Unknown ISP Association Lawyer Shows Lack of ISP Business Issues Awareness pp. 46 - 48 IAHC?s Seven New Top Level Domains Will Confuse Customers -- Donna Hoffman Finds the Domains: ?Disaster Waiting to Happen From a Business Perspective? p. 49 September: Internet Governance Not Scaling Well IANA & IP Number Registry Policy Need Formalizing - NSF Tells NSI Not to Enter New Top Level Domains NSI Operational Failures & Direction of US Government Policy Could Give Impetus to Move of DNS Operations to Europe as Opening of ARIN Delayed pp. 50 - 68 Part I: Registry Policy, pp. 51 Part II: IANA Authority, pp. 56 Part III: Launching ARIN, pp. 62 Part IV: DNS, IANA and US Government on a Collision Course?, pp. 65 Appendix - July Aug. Issue: The NSF Inspector General's Plan to Administer and Tax the Internet World Wide [Rejected on April 17, 1997 ] pp. 69 - 75 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ How to Order: Price per copy (GBC bound) is $175, if paid by check in advance to COOK Network Consultants, or $225 if we must ship and invoice. Foreign shipping is $25 extra. $10 extra for Canada. For US - price includes USPS Priority Rate postage. Orders and Payment to COOK Network Consultants, 431 Greenway Ave, Ewing, NJ 08618, USA. ************************************************************************ The COOK Report on Internet For subsc. pricing & more than 431 Greenway Ave, Ewing, NJ 08618 USA ten megabytes of free material (609) 882-2572 (phone & fax) visit http://cookreport.com/ Internet: cook at cookreport.com On line speech of critics under attack by Ewing NJ School Board, go to http://cookreport.com/sboard.shtml ************************************************************************ From dcrocker at BRANDENBURG.COM Sun Aug 3 14:11:58 1997 From: dcrocker at BRANDENBURG.COM (Dave Crocker) Date: Sun, 03 Aug 1997 11:11:58 -0700 Subject: Special Report on Internet Governance Published In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970803111158.006bfb30@ng.netgate.net> In response to the latest Cook Report missive... At 01:55 AM 8/1/97 -0400, Gordon Cook wrote: >Part I: Internet Governance Has Not Matured at Same Pace as >Infrastructure > >through January of this year when IAHC finalized its plans and a coalition >of various interests emerged determined to derail IAHC by whatever means The term coalition suggests organization. Other than finding occasional sharing of papers, or the like, the opposition is mostly noted for its IN-ability to organize. Otherwise, we would see a serious, sustained, focused, detailed effort at developing an alternative proposal. Yes, there is a broad range of opponents, but no, there is no coalition. If anyone has seen such concrete, alternative proposal please send the URL, because it's a well-kept secret. Remember that general ideas are easy; but details remain devilish. >IANA. The situation is messy because, while the IANA was the implementor >of the IAHC process that threatens the livelihood of Network Solution?s It's easy to view the current situation as threatening their livelihood, but let's not foster that image automatically. 1) No one is trying to put them out of business nor does the gTLD MoU structure dictate such an outcome. A competitive market means that there will be multiple players, but it presumes that those players survive. If NSI attends to its market position, it will understand that it can well afford to have the competition since it is starting with a very substantial competitive advantage, namely operational history and public awareness. 2) A company which claims to be getting only 30% of the revenues it is owed probably has deeper survival problems than moving from monopoly to competition. >through the IAHC process, is firmly allied with ISOC and some believe with >ITU - an alliance that is generally unpopular within the commercial "Some believe". We need to be careful about citing beliefs. There is always someone, somewhere, who objects to something. So far, strong objections to the ITU involvement have primarily been coming only from people who have not bothered to study the ITU's real and limited role in the gTLD MoU structure. ITU gets to hold the documents, to publicize them, and to acquire signatories. For this it gets a vote on the POC. The ITU's acting as a depository means that the ITU staff did a review of the MoU and found it worthy. That's a quality assurance stamp of considerable benefit. While many of us from the Internet community have very strong and good cause for unhappiness about the ITU, we need to remember that the larger world has many who find the ITU involvement to ADD credibility. >Internet community and one of the major reasons why the majority of that >community is believed to favor the US government intervention. Although There is no strong constituency for government intervention. There are occasional voices calling for it, but no serious proposals in that direction and no serious efforts in that direction. If such serious positions are held, it would be good to document them, since they are so far quite elusive. In point of fact, the US government wants to get out of this business as quickly as it can. It has stated this repeatedly and forcefully. >The Rickety Foundation of Internet Governance > >The continuing DNS disputes would seem to be intractable. Certainly NSI >and IANA/IAHC have few common interests. To date, this would seem true. NSI has worked for maintaining exclusive control over .com and the gTLD MoU dictates sharing. However, NSI last week made public statements that it will support sharing, as long as the operational reliability of the activity is assured. Reliability is of course a matter to which NSI has become quite sensitized, especially recently. >figured out a course of action. Whatever the "feds" do, it will likely be >opposed to the interests of both IANA/IAHC and NSI. Some people believe >the U.S. government will simply try to buy time by extending the life of >the cooperative agreement so that it can at least continue to control NSI. The US government has stated very forcefully that it wants to get out of this business. Further, their "control" of NSI is difficult to discern. Evidence to the contrary would be interesting to see. In any event a more likely reason for trying to extend things, even if only for a bit, would be to facilitate a transition. >The problem is that such a course of action may not have any affect on >whether Jon Postel moves root to Europe. It is very difficult for us to This phrase "moves root to Europe" is a favorite with some folks and seems resistant to further education. The "root" is a collection of machines around the globe. Many are in the US, but not all. Efforts have been underway to add machines elsewhere around the world. That is a matter of operational reliability and efficiency, not politics. The master copy of the data now is maintained on a machine at NSI, with the contents specified by IANA. There have been plans for a long time to move it elsewhere. I've yet to hear of final plans; it there is evidence that the plans are to make a machine in Europe hold the master copy, it's news to me. >Not fully certain of the range of tools at the command of the White House, >we concluded that one outcome might be that pressures would rapidly grow >on the feds to try to regulate the Internet. Of course the idea that any The White House just issued a clear and firm statement that this is exactly what they do NOT want to see done to the Internet. Why is this, therefore, a likely outcome? >Regulation? > >any kind. He says that the role of government is to provide the parties >with an appellate route in case things go very wrong and with antitrust >protection - two very important considerations. [Editor: We are not sure >that we are comfortable with these ideas.] Well, I suggest that we all try to find a way to get comfortable. Given our history, folks might find it remarkable that the above assessment from Tony is one with which I personally concur. Private-sector initiative is continuing to look quite reasonable. Intervention is likely to be necessary only when a player with excessive leverage does not play fair. >Part II: Can Anyone Besides IANA Control the Totality of the Internet's >DNS Machinery? > >information for the new root zone and ask all DNS operators to update the >root.cache files on their machines immediately. We are talking well over a >million DNS machines for the Internet. Therefore this is not a small task. Remember that sites update the list of root server addresses periodically, so this is not nearly an onerous as it might sound. On the other hand, the transition certainly does take time, as you note. >over night, for 90% of the net within 48 hours and for the remaining 10% >in the next two weeks. In terms of a global transition, 2 days to 2 weeks is a rather nice -- and extremely small -- window, don't you think? On the other hand, characterizing it as being a result of herd mentality is a bit of an insult to the analytic skills and degree of independence of the ISPs making this change. On the average, they are more typically assessed as being highly independent. If they travel the same path, on a matter such as this, it is because they think it is the right path. >..., the consequences of its failing to >cooperate would impact NSI so negatively that it is hard to imagine that >NSI would resist. One assumes and hopes that you are right. I've heard that various NSI and SAIC senior executives have stated strongly that they do not want to be responsible for fragmenting the net. >June 97 order from NSF to NSI not to add new gTLDs, could become the >primary cause for a shift by IANA of root zone administration away from >NSI.) Such an assessment presumes an antagonistic relationship between IANA and the US government. Given the long history of IANA/USG cooperative efforts, such a schism seems extremely unlikely. In fact, it seems sufficiently unlikely so as to make its consideration a matter of concern, since it just adds to the pot of FUD, for no good reason. >Now it has also been suggested that the US government could forbid US root Let's stop this line of analysis at its (pardon the pun) core, because it is useful only for sowing yet more seeds of fear, uncertainty and doubt. Actions which fundamentally fragment the DNS are not going to be taken because none of the principal parties in this drama are that irresponsible, no matter how vigorously one or another may pursue a position. I do not claim to know what specific actions will be taken to avoid such a fragmentation but it is very clear that a number of parties have significant leverage and they will use it to ensure continued and integrated operation. >Part III: A Scenario for a Political Resolution of the DNS Crisis >new ways of looking at the DNS problem. The DNS wars can be seen not so >much as wars over Domain Names but as wars over the power that comes from Yes, it is clear that many people are viewing this as a fight for power. In the process of viewing things that way, they ignore the operational concerns which prompted the original efforts. Name space congestion under .com is a matter of operational difficulty, not power. On the other hand, moving from monopoly to competition is quite clearly a matter of power. The two major forces that originally prompted the creation of the IAHC were 2.5 years of unresolved discussion and debate over name space congestion (not being able to get a name that was "natural" to your purposes) and monopoly control over existing gTLDs. The trademark issues were quite separately developing. They were added to the IAHC work just as the time of its formation, rather than earlier. >.... Now if you ask what reason the IAHC has for >bringing these international regulatory bodies into play in the field of >Internet governance, it is the because existence of top level domain names >that transcend national boundaries. Get rid of top level domains including >.com by placing .com under.us and you take away the international aspect >of the crisis that allows ISOC, inadvertently or not, to bring the noses >of the ITU, INTA, and WIPO camels under the Internet tent. The real irony to the above interpretation of ITU/INTA/WIPO involvement is that during the IAHC discussions, the representatives from those organizations suggested eliminating gTLDs. They were quite comfortable with displacing 1 million+ users who already have established practise using a gTLD. Those of us from the Internet side observed that such displacement was 1) rather unfriendly, and 2) quite procrustean. The fact that gTLDs create some complexities is no reason to do away with them, since they happen also to provide interesting opportunities. For example,they level a referential playing field quite nicely. There are many actions which could make life simpler, but they do not necessarily make life better. Let's be careful about choosing between scalpels and bludgeons. >Now what if we make another assumption that it takes time for communities >to coalesce and to understand their common interests? If you are going to ... >thing that is allowing the buggy whip makers to continue to exert their The curious part about the above is that it honors the benefit of continuity -- permitting learning over a period of time -- and then relegates such learning into the category of archaic practise. Either one believes that there is some benefit in careful growth or there isn't. And of course, the real answer is that it depends. Evolving the existing structure and service is appropriate when it is basically working well and only needs tuning. Wholesale replacement is necessary when things are massively broken. In truth, the current situation with the DNS is not a transition from horses to cars. It is a) adding more names, as has been done many times before, b) moving from monopoly to competition, and c) exploring the space of dispute resolution with adjunct procedures to those of local jurisdictions. The system needs changes, but then the system has periodically needed changes and hence the system has evolved. It needs evolution, now, not replacement. (For that matter, I don't see a real replacement proposal on the table.) For that matter the Draconian measure of eliminating gTLDs, in favor of national TLDs exclusively, is hardly a move from buggies to automobiles. It eliminates individual choice and power, rather than increasing them. >Now we will note that the role of the ITU as the holder of MoU signatories >seems to us not to indicate an immediate threat of an ITU take over of the >Internet. However, some may say it will be the first step in a process Some will say. Somebody, somewhere said something bad. Let's try to focus on real and concrete issues rather than this continuing campaign of FUD opponents like to pursue. Look at the history of the ITU in this space. It has not done a very good job of garnering power, now has it? Has the ITU suddenly become vastly more clever? Is the ITU looking for a role? Of course it is. That's not an evil desire. Is the ITU making a power play? Of course it isn't. The MoU doesn't give it the basis for such a play. >that will be hard to stop. On the other hand, WIPO and INTA's roles seem >more immediately insidious. More top level domains will multiply and not WIPO administers a process. They do not set the policy for resolving disputes. They get a seat on the oversight committee. INTA gets a seat on he oversight committee. It is appealing to wish-away the importance and impact of trademark concerns but that won't help the real and pressing problems involving them. Playing the FUD factor by saying how evil and dangerous one or another player is does not help either. Look at performance and look at leverage. So far, both of these participants have played well and constructively. And neither of them has particularly strong leverage. >alleviate the intellectual property and trademark issues that already >threaten and indeed prevent the legitimate use of some business domains >under .com. The result will be more work for the lawyers not less and more The trademark community wants no new TLDs. Viewing the addition of TLDs as part of conspiracy for additional power by the trademark community flies in the face of the facts. Besides that, the claim that new TLDs will make trademark policing more difficult is true only if an NSI-like policy is in place and access to information is difficult. >What happens then if we simply say that DNS is something to be worked out >by each country according to the laws of that country and quit pretending Effective today, you are allowed only one email address and it will be chosen by your provider. Web pages must conform to a specific format, to be specified by your government. Choice makes life more complicated, but it doesn't necessarily make life worse. What happens if we say that the DNS is something to be worked out by the community, according to the desires of the user and provider community, and quit pretending that everything must fit into old boundaries all the time? (I must note an interest aspect to the timing of this proposal. It is late. It is very late. Why is that? Could it possibly be that those opposing the MoU have been cycling through one argument after another and keep failing to prevent it, so now they cycle to the next choice? No, I'm sure this is an entirely well-meant suggestion and couldn't possibly be one more, in a long line, of such destructive efforts.) >Perhaps we should not try to solve the problems of global Internet >governance in the short run. Perhaps we should localize them until there Let's put this genie back into the bottle? You bet! Sounds like fun. let's see. i know i saw that cork around here somewhere... d/ -------------------- Dave Crocker Internet Mail Consortium +1 408 246 8253 675 Spruce Dr. fax: +1 408 249 6205 Sunnyvale, CA 94086 USA info at imc.org , http://www.imc.org From mbobo at post.cis.smu.edu Sun Aug 10 10:14:18 1997 From: mbobo at post.cis.smu.edu (Marvin Bobo) Date: Sun, 10 Aug 1997 09:14:18 -0500 Subject: signoff naipr Message-ID: <01BCA5A7.7FDC5980.mbobo@post.smu.edu> signoff naipr From join at netsol.com Mon Aug 11 08:43:30 1997 From: join at netsol.com (ARIN Members) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 1997 08:43:30 -0400 (EDT) Subject: ARIN now accepting applications for membership Message-ID: <199708111243.IAA27949@info.netsol.com> The American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) is now accepting applications for membership. ARIN is a membership-based organization that will help determine IP allocation policy now and in the future. Be part of this process by becoming a member today. Take advantage of this opportunity to participate. ARIN is open to new members now! Join at http://www.arin.net/members/appform.html. ARIN is also asking for recommendations for the initial Advisory Council. All recommendations received by September 5, 1997 will be considered. If interested, please complete the AC form located at http://www.arin.net/members/adform.html. From setty at LOGICAL.NET Mon Aug 11 09:43:54 1997 From: setty at LOGICAL.NET (B. Shekar Setty) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 1997 09:43:54 -0400 (EDT) Subject: signoff naipr In-Reply-To: <01BCA5A7.7FDC5980.mbobo@post.smu.edu> Message-ID: Signoff naipr From jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com Mon Aug 11 04:49:39 1997 From: jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com (Jeff Williams) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 1997 09:49:39 +0100 Subject: ARGH! Off Topic ... Re: Personal Attacks, Power, and the PAB References: <3.0.2.32.19970811153444.00b54438@alpha.ah.net> Message-ID: <33EED223.7A28@ix.netcom.com> Adam, Adam Todd wrote: > > >> I just tried to get the phone number for IEG. Nothing > >> is listed and not much shows up in the Phone Directoy. > > Didn't try very hard. I'm in Australia and checked up on Jeff some months > ago. Rick, I think you had better go back to Detective Kindergarder 101. It would seem that possibly some "Grand Standing" is in play here or Ricks part. Though I must admit I was quite suprised in that he has never don anything like that befor. A bit concerning I think. > > >> A call to all numbers you list as your business only > >> show up as a hotel called HomeStead Village. > > So, a call to my number will probably get you a hotel, executive > appartment, my mobile phone, my mother .... He never called. I checked all the other numbers that I have in my name and my buisness's name as well. > > > First of all Homestead Village is a temporary number I use for some > > Jeff, you mean it's cold too cold to sleep in the railway yard when your > travelling? LOL! Only if it is a private pulman car! > > >The number in my sig file will put directly in contact with me at my > >office as it it is a virtual number. You know what that is Rick? > > Does that mean we get swords and grandae launchers and wear goggles and > stand in a funny big machine? > > >the 913-294-2375 will reach me or my office nearly always, even if I am > >traveling. SO I know that you did not call that number, for I am in > >and have been all day. > > Jeff, it's probably STD, and his phone is bard from anything except inter > exchange calls. I don't think that is the case in this particular situation. More like some vicious rumor started back on the IAHC-Discuss list by Brian Durrell. > > > My, you ability to do research and be a Deputy Director or > >PAB, is certianly making me very suspicious of your and possibly > >PAB's reasearch capicity and VERY limited abilities. Not a good > >sign. > > Jeff, who said the PAB was ethical. It's a front for aurgmentation and > political embarassment whilst the real work is done via other secret people. I am not questioning the ethical standing. But their ability to do research, now for all to see, should be in question for some anyway. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Business Development, Technology Domain Registration and Network Advisory > Adam Todd Personal http://adamtodd.ah.net > Phone +61 2 9729 0565 Network http://www.ah.net > > AU Root Server Confederation http://aursc.ah.net > > -- > DOMAIN-POLICY administrivia should be sent to > To unsubscribe send a message with only one line "SIGNOFF DOMAIN-POLICY" > For more help regarding Listserv commands send the one line "HELP" Regards, -- Jeffrey A. Williams DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java Development Eng. Information Eng. Group. IEG. INC. Phone :913-294-2375 (v-office) E-Mail jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com From tarrett at si-net.com Mon Aug 11 12:29:24 1997 From: tarrett at si-net.com (Troy) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 1997 11:29:24 -0500 Subject: signoff naipr Message-ID: <199708111122.LAA10082@si-net.com> Signoff naipr ___________________________________________ Mailto: tarrett at si-net.com Site...: http://www.si-net.com/~tarrett ICQ...: 1558744 or http://wwp.mirabilis.com/1558744 From jdfalk at priori.net Mon Aug 11 13:28:17 1997 From: jdfalk at priori.net (J.D. Falk) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 1997 10:28:17 -0700 Subject: signoff naipr In-Reply-To: <199708111122.LAA10082@si-net.com> [9708.11] References: <199708111122.LAA10082@si-net.com> Message-ID: <19970811102817.32566@priori.net> Lots of people have recently written: > signoff naipr As with most mailing lists, you can't sign off by sending your signoff request to the entire list. Instead, send it to the -request address -- in this case, that would most likely be . Please remember this simple bit of information, as it will serve you well in your future endeavors. ********************************************************* J.D. Falk voice: +1-415-482-2840 Supervisor, Network Operations fax: +1-415-482-2844 PRIORI NETWORKS, INC. http://www.priori.net See us at ISPCON '97, booth #501 "The People You Know. The People You Trust." ********************************************************* From jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com Mon Aug 18 12:07:37 1997 From: jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com (Jeff Williams) Date: Mon, 18 Aug 1997 17:07:37 +0100 Subject: Racko and Shu respond to NTIA Request for Public Comment References: <33F8C2C1.352F346C@inetnow.net> Message-ID: <33F87349.446E@ix.netcom.com> Richard, Though I havn't compleatly digested your attachment here, I did notice a lack of mention of allocations of IP addresses perposed by the ARIN structure. Is or has that been considered? Richard Shu wrote: > > The attached document is our response (speaking unofficially and not on behalf of any organization) > to the NTIA RFC. > > The deadline is today (August 18th) but I suspect that any responses reaching them before the start > of business tomorrow (8 AM Eastern Time?) will be considered. Also, if a steady flow of responses > continues to be submitted this week, I expect they will consider those as well. No guarantees, this > is just my private opinion. > > Please feel free to submit the attached document verbatim as your response or modify the text to > reflect your opinions and submit the modified document. > > I invite non-U.S. citizens to inform the government of our great country as to the proper limits of > their involvement. > > Finally, Bob and I would welcome any feedback directed either to one of the relevant mailing lists > or to us directly. > > Regards, > Richard Shu (rshu at inetnow.net) > Bob Racko (bobr at dprc.net) > > --------------------------------------------------------------- > To: Ms. Paula Bruening > From: Bob Racko, Richard Shu > Re: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE [Docket No. 970613137-7137-01] > The following is response to the Request for Comments on the Registration and Administration of Internet issued by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). > Messrs. Racko and Shu are responding as interested private citizens. They operate root servers which are part of the Universal Domain Name System (uDNS) root server confederation. Mr. Shu represents uDNS at the Root Server Confederation (RSC) roundtable. This roundtable includes the following Root Server Confederations: eDNS, uDNS, AlterNIC, caNIC, AURSC. > Contact information: > Richard Shu (rshu at inetnow.net) > Bob Racko (bobr at dprc.net) > _________________________________________________________________________________ > The Government seeks comment on the principles by which it should evaluate proposals for the registration and administration of Internet domain names. > Are the following principles appropriate? > The principles are generally appropriate to the registration and administration of Internet domain names. However, this section presumes that the U.S. government should solicit and evaluate proposals. The level of international objection to IAHC proposal is a strong indication that the evolution of the Domain Name System is an international and non-U.S. centered phenomenon. Accordingly, the U.S. government should be hesitant to make any unilateral moves such as endorsing a particular proposal > The U.S. government needs to determine whether to support or oppose NSI's claim of proprietary rights to the .com, .org and .net domains. It further needs to determine which entities, if any, should rule on the creation of new gTLDs. > Are they complete? If not, how should they be revised? > The principles set forth are more or less comprehensive. We would suggest some changes in emphasis. Most importantly, the primacy of proprietary rights such as trademarks and service marks as codified in existing law should be emphasized. > We would also suggest that, although "synchronization of domain names among DNS servers" is an ideal to be pursued, lack of synchronization is not fatal to the interoperation of the Internet. > We define two modes through which a DNS server can be "out of synch" with other DNS servers. A server can create an active fault by hosting a domain name with a conflicting mapping from the mapping generally available on other servers. Alternatively, a server can create a passive fault by failing to carry a domain name generally available on other servers. It should be clear that an active fault is much more serious than a passive fault. > Finally, it should be asserted that registration of SLDs can be performed by an entity other than the entity which maintains the TLD database. This opens the door to sharing the registration function for a TLD. > How might such principles best be fostered? > In keeping with the country's strong tradition of free enterprise, the U.S. government should seek to open up the TLD registration industry up to market forces by removing barriers to competition. > The U.S. government should seek to discourage, prevent and prohibit anti-competitive activity. It should seek to promote introduction of additional root servers and TLD registries. In particular, in recognition of the fact that root server operation and TLD registration require only a moderate level of infrastructure, the U.S. government should promote the entry of small-businesses into the industry and seek to prevent large corporations from dominating and monopolizing the market. > The administration of the Domain Name System should be structured so as to strongly discourage active faults. Free market forces should be allowed to act so as to mimimize and ultimately eliminate passive faults. > > a. Competition in and expansion of the domain name registration system should be encouraged. Conflicting domains, systems, and registries should not be permitted to jeopardize the interoperation of the Internet, however. The addressing scheme should not prevent any user from connecting to any other site. > b. The private sector, with input from governments, should develop stable, consensus-based self-governing mechanisms for domain name registration and management that adequately defines responsibilities and maintains accountability. > c. These self-governance mechanisms should recognize the inherently global nature of the Internet and be able to evolve as necessary over time. > d. The overall framework for accommodating competition should be open,robust, efficient, and fair. > e. The overall policy framework as well as name allocation and management mechanisms should promote prompt, fair, and efficient resolution of conflicts, including conflicts over proprietary rights. > f. A framework should be adopted as quickly as prudent consideration of these issues permits. > > B. General/Organizational Framework Issues > 1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of current domain name registration systems? > Advantages: > Having a single entity perform root service and SLD registration has simplified the administrative tasks. Coordination among multiple entities adds complexity to the task. > Disadvantages: > The same agency that allows commercial registration in a limited set of domains also has final say over what other domains are included in root servers that they administer. This is a disadvantage as it discourages the introduction of other brands of gTLDs as well as disenfranchises those who would offer competitive root service. > The current system discourages the creativity exhibited in other ISO country codes. It does not show flexibility at the SLD level. If more flexibility were provided, then the .us domain could be as popular as .com. > > 2. How might current domain name systems be improved? > The U.S. government should encourage the domain name registry industry to grow by incentivizing it without subsidizing it or regulating it. > Organizations which have control over the creation and termination of TLDs should not also provide TLD registration activities because of the inherent confict of interest. > The U.S. government should encourage the use of TLDs that allow entities that wish to register a SLD to select an appropriate TLD which characterizes their products, services and activities. For example, one group of TLDs might correspond to SIC areas. This would reduce conflicts over proprietary rights. > There is great concern over the desire of some parties to monopolize certain TLDs in the hopes of realizing financial gain. We urge that TLDs consisting of non-trademarkable marks (e.g. common English words) be made non-exclusive. Registration of second level domains in those TLDs should be open to all entities that meet the qualifications to be a registry. > The U.S. government should assist in building the public trust by endorsing operational standards or encouraging their formation. > > 3. By what entity, entities, or types of entities should current domain name systems be administered? What should the makeup of such an entity be? > Domain name registration should not be performed, subsidized or regulated by governments. > Centralizing DNS operations and/or limiting the number of TLDs does not promote commercialization or the sustainable growth of competitive offerings. > There are several business models currently in use by root server confederations. Root server confederations can be commercial, volunteer or non-profit organizations. All three can co-exist: NSI and AlterNIC (www.alternic.net) iare commercial operations, eDNS (www.edns.net) is operated on a volunteer basis, uDNS (www.udns.org) is non-profit, pgMedia is a hybrid. > 4. Are there decision-making processes that can serve as models for deciding on domain name registration systems (e.g., network numbering plan, standard-setting processes, spectrum allocation)? > The current system for registering trademarks and service marks seems to be the best solution for exclusive domains based on trademarkable words. Industry self-regulation via certification of professionals (e.g. doctors and lawyers) is a good model for regulating the TLD registry industry. > Are there private/public sector administered models or regimes that can be used for domain name registration (e.g., network numbering plan, standard setting processes, or spectrum allocation processes)? > The model of a centralized reservations system handling bookings made on a decentralized basis by independent entities (e.g. travel agencies) seems to be a close fit. This does not require or preclude a centralized database. A set of cooperating, decentralized databases can also satisfy the requirements and may, in fact, facilitate the concept of shared TLD registries. > What is the proper role of national or international governmental / non-governmental organizations, if any, in national and international domain name registration systems? > Governments need to expand the judicial system to handle more volume for trademark/servicemark protection and rulings. The structure and procedures of the existing system are well-established and are well-suited to application in the domain name industry. The major failing seems to be that the system is overwhelmed by volume. To the extent that governments are unable to expand the judicial system to handle the increased load, the industry should encourage the use of private conflict resolutio > The primacy of trademark law should be asserted. In particular, governments should insist that the 'prior-use' principles of of trademark law be strictly applied with respect to domain names. > The government should allow entities to assert exclusive control over only those TLDs that are based on trademarks or service marks. > With respect to trademark and service mark issues, the Internet should be considered a 'medium' like radio broadcasting or magazine publishing. Products advertised in a medium are still differentiable when they are clearly associated with an industry (soap,food,cars,travel etc.). > 5. Should generic top level domains (gTLDs), (e.g., .com), be retired from circulation? > No, this would be very disruptive to the Internet. Also, the current gTLDs should not be closed (i.e. new registrations of SLDs should be allowed) > Should geographic or country codes (e.g., .US) be required? If so, what should happen to the .com registry? > No, but geographic or country codes (e.g., .US) should be kept open and shared as should the .com, .net and .org gTLDs. > Are gTLD management issues separable from questions about International Standards Organization (ISO) country code domains? > Yes. Geographic specialization needs to be encouraged but cannot supplant the economic benefit of global economies (including global marketing). > 6. Are there any technological solutions to current domain name registration issues? > Yes there are technical solutions to the technical problems. The major obstacles to evolution of the TLD registry industry have been political rather than technical. A number of experimental TLD registration systems (AlterNIC, eDNS, and pgMedia) have proven the technical viability of TLD proliferation. > The initial failure of the TLD registry industry to cooperate has its roots in the desire to monopolize the industry for financial gain. Current trends in the evolution of the industry point towards an increasing willingness to share registration activities for a particular TLD. > Let us first identify what the issues are: > 1) Synchronization > This is technically straightforward long as different root servers agree that they want to synchronize. > 2) Shared registration > Root server synchronization (among TLDs) can be resolved with protocols. The issue of shared SLD reservations can be addressed by distinguishing SLD registration operations from TLD server operations. TLD servers could host a central database that is analogous to the central database used for airline reservations. > Are there any issues concerning the relationship of registrars and gTLDs with root servers? > Yes, TLD registrars need to be able to count on the operations of the root servers which carry their TLDs. The creation of a new TLD should occur via a protocol which is clearly stated and consistently applied. Ideally, an automated mechanism should be implemented to process applications for new TLDs. > 7. How can we ensure the scalability of the domain name system name and address spaces as well as ensure that root servers continue to interoperate and coordinate? > Software on root servers should automatically determine whether a registered TLD server meets the operational criteria established by industry self-regulatory associations. These operational criteria should include performance metrics such as latency, response-time and downtime. The software will automatically de-commission any TLD server that is overloaded or improperly load balanced and automatically commission any server that requests to be authoritative for any new TLD via a protocol that > Multiple TLD servers may respond as authoritative nameservers for the same TLD, Timestamps on name (subdomain) activation can be used to resolve any conflicts. Root servers can clearly determine first-use and then decommission any TLD server that acts to multiply define a name in the same domain. This would act as a disincentive for competing registries to create conflicts with other's SLDs and yet permit multiple TLD servers and registries for the same TLD. > 8. How should the transition to any new systems be accomplished? > The U.S. government should endorse and encourage other governments to endorse a revised protocol for existing root servers. The major player in the industry (NSI) should be invited to participate in the setup and formation of other root server confederations. > 9. Are there any other issues that should be addressed in this area? > > C. Creation of New gTLDs > 10. Are there technical, practical, and/or policy considerations that constrain the total number of different gTLDs that can be created? > There are no technical or practical considerations that constrain the total number of gTLDs that can be created. This has been proven by the fact that there are over 8 million SLDs in the .com domain. > By analogy, a root name server could equally handle a very large number of TLDs without significant degradation in performance. DNS performance is less a function of the number of TLDs than it is a function of the SLDs served by a TLD server. It might be argued that proliferation of TLDs would act to decrease the operational load placed on any single TLD server. > Some entities stand to gain financially by limiting the number of TLDs. The U.S. government should strenuously oppose as anti-competitive any proposal which seeks to limit the number of TLDs. > Some parties might assert that there are policy considerations based upon the desire to use the domain name system as a directory service. While some TLDs are, in fact, structured to provide a directory service (most notably, the ISO country code TLDs), this approach has generally led to long, unesthetic names whose directory value is of questionable value. > 11. Should additional gTLDs be created? > No, at least not by governments. The government should neither mandate nor prohibit the creation of additional gTLDs. The decision to create or terminate gTLDs should be made by the free market. This is a crotoca; distinction. The government should not attempt to determine which gTLDs should be created or even how many should be created. Instead, it should take a "laissez-faire" approach which allows the free market to make these decisions. > 12. Are there technical, business, and/or policy issues about guaranteeing the scalability of the name space associated with increasing the number of gTLDs? > No. If the majority of gTLDs are shared, the number of TLDs can increase dramatically with little effect on DNS operations. The best indication of this is the fact that the .com TLD has over 8 million SLDs and there are no known performance issues directly related to the number of SLDs. By analogy, a root name server could equally handle a very large number of TLDs without significant degradation in performance. DNS performance is less a function of the number of TLDs than it is a function o > > 13. Are gTLD management issues separable from questions about ISO country code domains? > Yes. Neither the U.S. government nor any U.S.-centric industry organization is appropriate for administering issues regarding resources used internationally because it will create international disputes. The management of ISO country code domains is properly under the jurisdiction of each national government. Ideally, the management of gTLDs should be under the jurisdiction of self-regulating industry associations. Failing that, the gTLDs should be managed by a quasi-governmental internation > > D. Policies for Registries > 15. Should a gTLD registrar have exclusive control over a particular gTLD? > > Are there any technical limitations on using shared registries for some or all gTLDs? > Yes and No. It is useful to differentiate between the function performed by a TLD registry and a TLD server. As mentioned earlier, these functions do not need to be performed by the same entity. > A registry populates one or more TLD servers. This is by agreement with the operators of the TLD servers. A TLD server owner may compete with another TLD server owner over the same TLD. The competition is fair and consistent with interoperability if only one TLD server answers for a given SLD. > Any conflicts caused by multiple responses for the same SLD can be detected by the resolving DNS server at the ISP. Conflicts can posted back to both the TLD servers and the roots who will take appropriate action including, if necessary, the decommissioning of the offending TLD server. > Can exclusive and non-exclusive gTLDs coexist? > Yes. In fact, the current gTLDs can either be kept exclusive (to NSI) or made non-exclusive. > 16. Should there be threshold requirements for domain name registrars, and what responsibilities should such registrars have? Who will determine these and how? > Self-regulating industry associations should establish requirements for domain name registrars. These registrars should have as primary responsibility the assurance to the registrant that their requested SLD does not conflict with a prior registration. > Similarly, industry association should set requirements for root servers and TLD servers. The primary goal of these requirements should be to ensure the stability of the Internet. > 17. Are there technical limitations on the possible number of domain name registrars? > None seem evident. > 18. Are there technical, business and/or policy issues about the name space raised by increasing the number of domain name registrars? > None seem evident except the possibility of a registrar perpetrating fraud. This, however, is a risk that is not unique to the domain registry industry. > 19. Should there be a limit on the number of different gTLDs a given registrar can administer? > No. Monopolizing the space can be avoided but our experiencce shows that this is best done by disincentives rather than by artificial limits. If all non-trademarkable words must be sharable, this is a strong disincentive. > Does this depend on whether the registrar has exclusive or non-exclusive rights to the gTLD? > Yes. Exclusive gTLDs must have pre-existing use outside the internet/medium before being permitted exclusive use of a TLD or trademark within the medium. However, as there is no limit to the number of trademarks that an entity may possess, it is reasonable to assert that there should be no limit on the number of trademarked exclusive gTLDs, that an entity may claim. > 20. Are there any other issues that should be addressed in this area? > > E. Trademark Issues > > 21. What trademark rights (e.g., registered trademarks, common law trademarks, geographic indications, etc.), if any, should be protected on the Internet vis-a-vis domain names? > All trademark rights should be protected on the Internet. This principle should be asserted with respect to all forms of Internet activity, not just domain names. Trademark law should treat the Internet as a broadcast medium which is limited by: > 1) geographic scope if an ISO or greographic TLD is suffixed on the name > 2) SIC area if it is suffixed by a TLD that is associated with an SIC 'brand' area. > 3) international scope if there is no suffix or 'brand' protection then, is a matter of providing service until a court of competent jurisdiction serves notice of judgement that is different from the current name holder. > 22. Should some process of preliminary review of an application for registration of a domain name be required, before allocation, to determine if it conflicts with a trademark, a trade name, a geographic indication, etc.? > No. It is incumbent on the applicant to determine if there is a potential conflict. Preliminary review is unnecessary it will add cost to and delay the application process. > If so, what standards should be used? Who should conduct the preliminary review? If a conflict is found, what should be done, e.g., domain name applicant and/or trademark owner notified of the conflict? Automatic referral to dispute settlement? > 23. Aside from a preliminary review process, how should trademark rights be protected on the Internet vis-a-vis domain names? > No service 'holds' or suspensions should be permitted. As a condition of certifying a registry and accepting its registrations, each registry should be made to agree to be bound by court decisions. > What entity(ies), if any, should resolve disputes? > The normal judicial system having competent jurisdiction. > Are national courts the only appropriate forum for such disputes? > Not always. International courts of law and other inteernational organizations may be an appropriate forum. The operating principle should be that marks on the Internet such as TLDs and SLDs are subject to the same law as other marks. > Specifically, is there a role for national / international governmental / nongovernmental organizations? > Yes but existing organizations are adequate. It is unnecessary and unadvisable to invent and implement an entirely new system which would then compete with the existing system for jurisdiction. > > 24. How can conflicts over trademarks best be prevented? > Making trademark information widely available and also domain registration information widely available. However, it should be considered that the incidence of trademark conflicts is not as high or as critical as some would assert. > NSI is currently registering 80,000 names per month on average with 3 trademark conflicts each month. It would appear that the problem of trademark conflicts is somewhat exaggerated. > What information resources (e.g. databases of registered domain names, registered trademarks, trade names) could help reduce potential conflicts? > All of the above mentioned databases would help. > If there should be a database(s), who should create the database(s)? > Creation of the database should be left to private enterprise. There are currently private services that provide trademark searches. > How should such a database(s) be used? > It would be advisable for a domain name applicant to search such databases prior to submitting an application. A non-refundable application fee would increase the incentive to perform due diligence. > 25. Should domain name applicants be required to demonstrate that they have a basis for requesting a particular domain name? > No. Such a policy would prevents automation of the application process because it adds a component to the application that requires human review. > If so, what information should be supplied? Who should evaluate the information? On the basis of what criteria? > The cost of evaluating the information would have to be passed on to the applicant and thus raise the cost of registration for all applicants. > 26. How would the number of different gTLDs and the number of registrars affect the number and cost of resolving trademark disputes? > The number of gTLDs has less effect on the number and cost of resolving trademark disputs than the taxonomy of gTLDs. If TLDs are generic (e.g. .com, .corp, .inc, .web), then they do increase trademark disputes. If they are named with more specific categories (e.g. .law, .oil, etc.), then they do not. > 27. Where there are valid, but conflicting trademark rights for a single domain name, are there any technological solutions? > There may be technological solutions but the best solution may be a policy solution. > The existing hierarchy of international, national and state trademark registries follows a protocol of respecting first use within a particular geographic extent. The same principles should be applicable with respect to domain names. > For an SLD name, the issue is already handled. Having multiple TLDs for the same SIC area (tld-brands) the trademark resolution can be put in the hands of those who are registrars for the TLD chosen. The registrars should defer to the courts or form a review body themselves. The quality of the decisions will directly affect the profitablity of the registrar. > At higher levels, conflicting international trademarks have resolution which cross governmental boundaries. Individual governments best abstain and defer to the existing international bodies (or offer to educate them). > 28. Are there any other issues that should be addressed in this area? > Allowing exclusive ownership / sponsorship / farming or even administration of a TLD (without trademark) tends to invite speculation. > Still others used 'external' pressures to maintain control and monopoly of TLDs. > Some attempted to use trademark protection for non-trademarkable names by claiming waivers "for Internet purposes" or with a simple prefixing period as in .music to dissuade competition and increase FUD. This produced additional trademark speculation which would eventually be overturned but initially kept valid registrars from starting operations. -- Jeffrey A. Williams DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java Development Eng. Information Eng. Group. IEG. INC. Phone :913-294-2375 (v-office) E-Mail jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com From jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com Tue Aug 19 06:17:31 1997 From: jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com (Jeff Williams) Date: Tue, 19 Aug 1997 11:17:31 +0100 Subject: Racko and Shu respond to NTIA Request for Public Comment References: <33F8C2C1.352F346C@inetnow.net> <3.0.3.32.19970819090827.030364b8@pop.srv.paranet.com> Message-ID: <33F972BB.4C40@ix.netcom.com> Stephen, Stephen Sprunk wrote: > > IP allocations are not domain issues; domain issues are not IP allocations. > Quit trying to confuse people, and quit bothering those of us on IP > allocation lists with domain politics. True in a sense only. IP address allocations are not directly tied to Domain concerns or DNS. However, as is well known their relationship is none the less connected. Been over and over this several times. Go get some education and find out. >;) > > Stephen > > At 17:07 08-18-97 +0100, you wrote: > >Richard, > > > > Though I havn't compleatly digested your attachment here, I did notice > >a lack of mention of allocations of IP addresses perposed by the ARIN > >structure. Is or has that been considered? > > > >Richard Shu wrote: > >> > >> The attached document is our response (speaking unofficially and not on > behalf of any organization) > >> to the NTIA RFC. > [ Irrelevant document removed ] > > -- > Unsolicited commercial/propaganda email subject to legal action. Under US > Code Title 47, Sec.227(a)(2)(B), Sec.227(b)(1)(C), and Sec.227(b)(3)(C), a > State may impose a fine of not less than $500 per message. Read the full > text of Title 47 Sec 227 at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/47/227.html Regards, -- Jeffrey A. Williams DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java Development Eng. Information Eng. Group. IEG. INC. Phone :913-294-2375 (v-office) E-Mail jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com From jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com Sun Aug 24 14:16:40 1997 From: jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com (Jeff Williams) Date: Sun, 24 Aug 1997 19:16:40 +0100 Subject: ISPCON - Telage summary References: Message-ID: <34007A88.720@ix.netcom.com> Ellen and all, Notice: Official response to follow. From: Jeff Williams Director and co-Founder of IEG. INC.) Subject: IEG. INC. Official response to Mr. Don Telage NSI To: Fellow Particapants at ISPCON My response Starts here intermixed with Mr. Telage's comments. Ellen Rony wrote: ISPCON report, part 1 - Great conference again. Excellent, informative presentations. Overheard that it had 4,000 attendees (unconfirmed number). Here is a fairly lengthy summary of the comments made by Don Telage on Friday.8/22. I thought the conference room would be packed, but such was not the case. It seems that the ISPs are focused on the bottom line and do not yet realize how governance issues will affect them or why they should be involved. More work needs to be done to raise that awareness. Re: Dr. Telage: I expected he might a person who has hair on his teeth. Instead, he is articulate, informational, personable, reasonable, accessible, warm and likeable. So here are notes from his talk. No spell checker. All comments below are from Dr. Telage, not the messenger (well, one annotation). Questions from audience in brackets. A few full, exact quotes included. Will try to make time to post notes from Mockapetris, Kashpureff and DNRC sessions later. For NSI response to NOI, see August 18 NTIA posting, but it will also be posted on netsol web site, _________________________________________________ >From Dr Telage: NSI - "we're the company that everyone loves to hate" 3 objectives of talk: 1. Address the question of why are we where we are in this governance issue? Why should it not be expected? Hindsight point of view. 2. Look at some of the controversial issues. Stress areas where there are some misunderstandings. Where NSI has a view, want to present our opinion. Information/clarification phase. 3. Speculate on where whole process going? What hints do we have on where it needs to go? What should we as a community do to get a good outcome for the Internet. Find an outcome that respects the business and lets each of the stakeholders continue their function. Future direction. Policy changes that we make today are going to have impacts down the road. You should take an interest in what is being done with your Internet, because it is your Internet, no one else's. Internet was done way it was done because it served an effective purpose. Right model for the functions it had in the first 20 years. Consensus-driven work. No top down. Global skunkworks type of arrangement. Marvelous quality to it. ISPs responsible for why it needs to change. ISPs brought tens of thousands of customers who had different mind set and objectives of prior years. Brought commercial interests and priorties, conflicting interests, business priorities. and that is the reason it needs to change. its function is now changed. We have the old role, but the consensus model isn't going to work when big money and rapid time elements are involved, when laws are involved, when countries feel a stake in, that is what is generating the change. You generated an unbelievable commercial explosion. I don't think we are close to the top curve. Perspective so small in time scale. In five years, this curve will be seen as flat. Growth will be greater soon than we can ever imagine. Growth relentless. We have to make it more industrial strength to get where we need to go. Commercial operations have impacted the operational stuff at bowels of Internet, root server operators, IP registries, changed business models, too. IANA, IAB, IESG vulnerable, not indemnified not protected. "It's almost inappropriate that individuals or small collections of individuals who happen to have an historical name to them can operate in a governance role anymore." Too much to ask of these individuals. They must feel the strain.] We're in this role and it feels very threatening to us. Postel must feel very vulnerable. I don't think Jon Postal feels threatened at all, form some conversations that I have had and heard of with Jon, he feel more betrayed personaly and profesionaly. So it seems like MR. Telage, is trying to shore some things up here with the IANA, IA and the IESG. Intreating shift of emphisis in this remark. Food for thought possibly. You be the judge. Internet basically grew up in U.S. From a national point of view, with exception of RIPE and APNIC, most of critical elements are still within continental U.S. Until month ago, everyone of root servers were in the U.s. Month ago shipped a second server offshore. 2/3 of traffic volume is within U.S. Internet global in extent, but in terms of balance of infrastructure, topology and activity, it is still US-centric. We (U.S.) should take leadership role to fix things. First of all there have been two Root servers outside the US for more than a year now, so I see that Mr. Telage is a bit innaccurate with his facts. This is astounding in a way. He should know better than this. I agree that the US should take a leadership role baised on his very reasons in his next sentance, but not a dominating one. Even though the most usace and infrastructure in in the US currently, this will only be true for a small amount of time. Once China and most of asia comes online in a more significant way, our dominance will not be there. Hence, the reason for not dominating the situation now. Be open, accepting, encourgaging and inviting to the whole world. By doing this we better ourselves perportionaly. Re: Cooperative agreement. NSI feels it doesn't have a technical direction role. Agreement almost implies that IANA has the responsibility and we have always treated that to be the case. That's where policy decisions, appeals are made to IANA, network numbering policies and identifiers originate there. NSF trying to get out of its role for 2 years. IATF wouldn't let NSF out last April. Not no, but "hell no. One semblance of stability, wouldn't allow NSF to leave. Legal activity. NSI sued by PGMedia for antritrust activity. IANA told NSI it has no authority in these matters, do what you want. NSF letter on June 10 with a plan to introduce competition into the DNS, please approve or modify and respond. NSF said no, not until US govt has chance to review this entire matter. Aug 11 NSF said no again. Mr. Telage, makes a very good point here. In accordance with the Telecommunications act of 1996, NSF is mandated to allow for private enterprise to be a working partner, unincumbered reguardless of size or stature in the commercial sector. This puts NSF's Aug. 11th answer in contrast with the US congress and federal Law. SO it would seem that NSF is indeed in abayance of antitrust laws as well. More intrigue to issue: Justice Department conducting investigation into NSI antitrust behavior. Even though we are operating under govt contract, andappealed to both what we think are the authorities and have been denied approval. Being sued, denied an ability to defend ourselves (NSI), and being investigated by Justice Department. Not well informed District Court judge could order a solution tomorrow which would overrrule the contract. Not the way to do it. Needs orderly process. Well NSI and NSF had had more than a year to develope that process, to little avail. Why? Becouse it is not in NSI's intrest? Maybe? OR is it due to poor managment a feet dragging? Likely? I don't pretend to know. Reguardless, if I know that I or We (IEG. INC.) can do it, than surely NSI and the NSF could have or already should have. Airing dirty laundry. Recent snafu on Internet. Let bad root file go out. Tried to notify them. Couldn't notify root server operators because they are volunteers. Whole structure needs higher performance standers. Needs 7x24 accountability. No fail safe in the system. That whole structure needs to be put more under control. I agree. And this should have been done more than two years ago. Many warned, to no avail. So I guess, "Those who fail to manage, manage to fail". DNS Advantages: terrifically easy to use. Large name space. Easy to understand. More self funded. Resilient to growth. Disadvantages: Open to spoofing. Was a peer to peer system, not designed to deal with hostile activities. DNS security is something that is already under development by the IETF. In addition, this problem was and should have been known long ago. Many, including myself warned of this weakness, and were shruged off as being excentric. Well I guess, again failier to realize the obvious is always a rude awakener. Directory system is sorely lacking. Need to figure out how to get information easily. Average user can't get WHOIS for Germany, etc. Needs to be put together in some unified way. No uniform registration policies worldwide. Some treat it as holy grail to other extreme at NSI. We treat it as a brand, a registration identity. The Internet needs to figure out what domains are, what registration is and how it should be dealt with registration in a uniform way. This again has ben known or suspected for over two years now. Yet NSI and NSF are just now realizing it. How short sited, which again points out the poor judgment of NSI's managment and NSF's oversite. Registries have to operate in legal vacuum are hugely vulnerable. In order to protect selves have to put in policies aren't popular. But alternative, with no indemnification from any legal body, risks going out of business. Other registries haven't hit volume points so haven't seen this yet. They will, soon. "NSI supports competition of any form that the community decides is necessary, either through the addition of new TLDS or through the imposition of a shared registration concept if it is done with stability and is done orderly and it respects the legacy positions of the registries." This is a very serious problem indeed. Replacment of the lagacy DNS software is paramount to meet future demand. It is still not too late to be proactive here, but somehow I doubt this will happen in light of past history. "Sharing .com, sharing .de, sharing .net, sharing .uk, that's not a problem. Not easy to do, but we support it. Relative to adding new TLDs, no technical limit. Not issue. Issue is possible confusion in Internet space, implementation guidelines, pushing the problem up one level. Community not in agreement on this. 3 camps: 1) want to get into business, want new TLDS ; 2) trademark owners or those who got name , want no more TLDS, see this as intellectual property nightmare for them.; 3) group lost out in court battle and still lusts after name...wants new TLD so they another shot at the name and procedure. This is where the curx of many of the discussions have centered for nearly a year and a half now. I agree that there is no limit to the possibilities of TLD's that could be created if a shared system of registries in a Round Table fassion is accepted or in place. This is already underway. SOme call these services "Alternitive Registries". Alternitive or not, they exist, and are not likely to go away. SO the IANA/IETF/ISOC/POC/CORE/IAB need to find a way to work WITH these RSC's, not Flame them. We have a long way to go here. "Competition will one of the most important things that this industry needs: it will induce people to invest." NSI has invested 10s of millions of dollars into new facility. 34,000 sq ft, state of the art facility. Key question: do we want to make a change of DNS system that only affects top level. It is hierarchical system. Parallel in IP level, portability. Technically difficult to do. Issues of routability. Well I agree. And first on that list is a modification or update to RFC2050, RFC1917, RFC1918. In doint this in a open manner, and getting on with either IPv6 or IPv8, we can shoot alot of these problems very quickly. This doesn't seem to be the way ARIN and the IANA seem to want to head however. So openess and providing for the expandability in usefull way does not seem to be in their intrest. One must question this logic. If you do sharing, you will end up building another back office facility. That facility will wind up being a monopoly. Somewhere, all of this stuff needs to come together for reconciliation. Creates a wholesale monopoly back office and retail front office. I don't agree that the back office facility will end up being an monopoly at all. Most of my coleague's do not either. This sounds like another "Scare tactic" for some power freeks to control as much of the central parts of the internet as they can and use the ole "Medicare scare Tactic" argument to get tit done. Whole issue of what a gTLD is has always baffled me. Policy change should affect all elements in that class. 60 TLDS where you can register no matter you live or where your host is. What's the distinction between a gTLD and one of these guys? Volume. [comment from Rick Wesson....historical difference; gTLDs do not have a historic value and do not have association with ISO 3166] Just above Mr. Telage stated that there is no limit to the number of TLD's possible. He seems to almost conterdict himself here with saying that 60 will allow you to register no matter where you live or where your host is. This may be so, but does not answer the brending concerns. .COM is as big as it is for 2 reasons. .US not widely accepted. Ugly ducking of TLDS. Growth in Internet has been in US and it doesnt have a popular ISO 3166. .COM filled void. Problem is volume, not geography. When other TLDs start experiencing growth, they will have same problems. Hence the need to offer alternitives. As many as there is a precieved demand for. Not to mention splitting the load. Re registration pricing graphs: Tremendous variability. Charge enuf to make reasonable profit to invest and improve offerings. Other registries need to look on this as investment oriented activity. I agree. And this is something that will need to be an ongoing experiment. But I suspect as demand grows so will price, as well as costs. Hence the need to act now. [Q: could Poland start a new TLD?] No, wouldn't get included in 13 root servers. Were not taking any new applications based on NSF's directions. Bad idea! Contredictory to his previous statments on this critique as well. Mr. Telage seems to have no real direction here, nor any suggestions as to what possible directions he would like to see things go. We have a fundamental problem with iPOC initiative. We feel changes need to be evolutionary. Stakes too high to do anything too radical until we know impacts. Need managed transition period top make necessary changes to stabilize infrastructure. Shipping the problem to inexperienced international body where complexity goes up is not a wise move. Needs to be market driven at some level, needs to be internationally governed, needs to be industrial strength. Needs period of transition to evolve to another body, some U.S. agency that has skills set perhaps. Sounds like he is for NSF or some other government agency to step in here. Regulation? Lets hope that is a misevaluation on my part. Broad objectives for transition: Overarching issues: 1) Establish legal framework. Who is in charge? What is in charge? Everyone ducks the bullet. We the stakeholders are in charge, all over the world. The internet users is what is in charge, both commercial and otherwise. 2) Need to bring all the competition into the space. Only way will spur investment required to raise registries to performance levels to grow Internet globally. Profit will motivate. Things that require investment will respond to profit. 3) Fill in DNS trademark vacuum. How do domain names and trademarks relate? Must fix these first before moving whole infrastructure offshore. Will take 18-24 months. Too long. Not that big of a problem. Usage of international Tradmark law should do it just fine. Make DOmain names a tradmarkable entitity. NSI PROPOSAL: 4-layer chart. Legal layer - US government. Allows registry to derive authority from someone. Similar to N.A. Numbering Council has same model. Intl participation from stakeholders, does policy development. Governance layer - IPAG (international policy advisory gorup) intl body which accepts membership from interested stakeholder globally; membership based on usage or volume representation. operational layer - manage critical functions. nonprofit business. not highly capitalized. Need DNS manager: resp for managing the root, the dot, failsafe operations. Should move from us and other volunteers. Analog on DNS side to IP side. business layer - litkely registries and ISPs willb e the same. capital intensive. customer interface. needs incentive for investment. profit layer. To many layers here to be efectual and reactive to global stake holders needs not and certianly in the future. More streamlining is needed. Remove unneeded redundance. WOrk this like a buisness, not like a social club, from a structual point of view. This process will never be affective or work long term. Just creates a bunch of bearuacrats. Cutover from us agency to international is easy if 4 layers are in place. "We want to be a registrar. That's all we want to be.' Not realistic statment baised on this layering structure in this statment. Broad rush questions: How do we view names? Are DNS space and trademarks the same? What is business model that is needed at each layer? Does model we have chosen work operationally? What's the governance model here that I community wants? Registries in a bind. No immunity from suit but must protect selves from financial instinction. Cannot wilfully and knowingly infringe trademarks. We registered 125K names last month. With no policy in place, we would have gotten thousands of suits. As is, 30+ lawsuits naming us. 1,300 written disputes on 1.6 million registrations. Problem doesn't need to be solved by draconian means such as trademark pre-screening. Work on the exceptions. Good point here. I agree. [remaining comments in response to audience questions] NSI can't do a prepayment policy. Too many different payment arrangements. ISPs need to pay by check; companies need purchase orders. I don't agree with this at all. But I understand his point. A need to automate payment parctices is paramount to good financial tracking and managment in todays electornic age. Old payment methods can still be used, but should not be manditory. This makes fudiciary responsibility to cumbersom for many and very expensive as well. This is also anti small buisness. Dispute policy prevents lawsuits for "contributory infringement". Following advice of attorneys. Every domain registrant has signed a 2 year contract. Cannot be prorated. If registrant wants to go another registrar when that becomes available, that is your choice, but you have signed a 2 year contract (my note: which means your money won't be refunded). This is a common business practice. Good point. But what is in that two year contract. I hope it is not like the gTLD-MoU contract. SIgning theirs IS NOT GOOD BUISNESS! So I think the real story in this comment is in the fine print. In hindsight, NSI should have written the cooperative agreement differently so that NSF indemnified NSI from all policy related matters. -end Telage comments- Hindsite hell, NSI was told this by many befor they singed that contract! Pass the buck again, I see. - End of our comments and official response - -- Jeffrey A. Williams DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java Development Eng. Information Eng. Group. IEG. INC. Phone :913-294-2375 (v-office) E-Mail jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com From jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com Sun Aug 24 14:16:40 1997 From: jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com (Jeff Williams) Date: Sun, 24 Aug 1997 19:16:40 +0100 Subject: ISPCON - Telage summary References: Message-ID: <34007A88.720@ix.netcom.com> Ellen and all, Notice: Official response to follow. From: Jeff Williams Director and co-Founder of IEG. INC.) Subject: IEG. INC. Official response to Mr. Don Telage NSI To: Fellow Particapants at ISPCON My response Starts here intermixed with Mr. Telage's comments. Ellen Rony wrote: ISPCON report, part 1 - Great conference again. Excellent, informative presentations. Overheard that it had 4,000 attendees (unconfirmed number). Here is a fairly lengthy summary of the comments made by Don Telage on Friday.8/22. I thought the conference room would be packed, but such was not the case. It seems that the ISPs are focused on the bottom line and do not yet realize how governance issues will affect them or why they should be involved. More work needs to be done to raise that awareness. Re: Dr. Telage: I expected he might a person who has hair on his teeth. Instead, he is articulate, informational, personable, reasonable, accessible, warm and likeable. So here are notes from his talk. No spell checker. All comments below are from Dr. Telage, not the messenger (well, one annotation). Questions from audience in brackets. A few full, exact quotes included. Will try to make time to post notes from Mockapetris, Kashpureff and DNRC sessions later. For NSI response to NOI, see August 18 NTIA posting, but it will also be posted on netsol web site, _________________________________________________ >From Dr Telage: NSI - "we're the company that everyone loves to hate" 3 objectives of talk: 1. Address the question of why are we where we are in this governance issue? Why should it not be expected? Hindsight point of view. 2. Look at some of the controversial issues. Stress areas where there are some misunderstandings. Where NSI has a view, want to present our opinion. Information/clarification phase. 3. Speculate on where whole process going? What hints do we have on where it needs to go? What should we as a community do to get a good outcome for the Internet. Find an outcome that respects the business and lets each of the stakeholders continue their function. Future direction. Policy changes that we make today are going to have impacts down the road. You should take an interest in what is being done with your Internet, because it is your Internet, no one else's. Internet was done way it was done because it served an effective purpose. Right model for the functions it had in the first 20 years. Consensus-driven work. No top down. Global skunkworks type of arrangement. Marvelous quality to it. ISPs responsible for why it needs to change. ISPs brought tens of thousands of customers who had different mind set and objectives of prior years. Brought commercial interests and priorties, conflicting interests, business priorities. and that is the reason it needs to change. its function is now changed. We have the old role, but the consensus model isn't going to work when big money and rapid time elements are involved, when laws are involved, when countries feel a stake in, that is what is generating the change. You generated an unbelievable commercial explosion. I don't think we are close to the top curve. Perspective so small in time scale. In five years, this curve will be seen as flat. Growth will be greater soon than we can ever imagine. Growth relentless. We have to make it more industrial strength to get where we need to go. Commercial operations have impacted the operational stuff at bowels of Internet, root server operators, IP registries, changed business models, too. IANA, IAB, IESG vulnerable, not indemnified not protected. "It's almost inappropriate that individuals or small collections of individuals who happen to have an historical name to them can operate in a governance role anymore." Too much to ask of these individuals. They must feel the strain.] We're in this role and it feels very threatening to us. Postel must feel very vulnerable. I don't think Jon Postal feels threatened at all, form some conversations that I have had and heard of with Jon, he feel more betrayed personaly and profesionaly. So it seems like MR. Telage, is trying to shore some things up here with the IANA, IA and the IESG. Intreating shift of emphisis in this remark. Food for thought possibly. You be the judge. Internet basically grew up in U.S. From a national point of view, with exception of RIPE and APNIC, most of critical elements are still within continental U.S. Until month ago, everyone of root servers were in the U.s. Month ago shipped a second server offshore. 2/3 of traffic volume is within U.S. Internet global in extent, but in terms of balance of infrastructure, topology and activity, it is still US-centric. We (U.S.) should take leadership role to fix things. First of all there have been two Root servers outside the US for more than a year now, so I see that Mr. Telage is a bit innaccurate with his facts. This is astounding in a way. He should know better than this. I agree that the US should take a leadership role baised on his very reasons in his next sentance, but not a dominating one. Even though the most usace and infrastructure in in the US currently, this will only be true for a small amount of time. Once China and most of asia comes online in a more significant way, our dominance will not be there. Hence, the reason for not dominating the situation now. Be open, accepting, encourgaging and inviting to the whole world. By doing this we better ourselves perportionaly. Re: Cooperative agreement. NSI feels it doesn't have a technical direction role. Agreement almost implies that IANA has the responsibility and we have always treated that to be the case. That's where policy decisions, appeals are made to IANA, network numbering policies and identifiers originate there. NSF trying to get out of its role for 2 years. IATF wouldn't let NSF out last April. Not no, but "hell no. One semblance of stability, wouldn't allow NSF to leave. Legal activity. NSI sued by PGMedia for antritrust activity. IANA told NSI it has no authority in these matters, do what you want. NSF letter on June 10 with a plan to introduce competition into the DNS, please approve or modify and respond. NSF said no, not until US govt has chance to review this entire matter. Aug 11 NSF said no again. Mr. Telage, makes a very good point here. In accordance with the Telecommunications act of 1996, NSF is mandated to allow for private enterprise to be a working partner, unincumbered reguardless of size or stature in the commercial sector. This puts NSF's Aug. 11th answer in contrast with the US congress and federal Law. SO it would seem that NSF is indeed in abayance of antitrust laws as well. More intrigue to issue: Justice Department conducting investigation into NSI antitrust behavior. Even though we are operating under govt contract, andappealed to both what we think are the authorities and have been denied approval. Being sued, denied an ability to defend ourselves (NSI), and being investigated by Justice Department. Not well informed District Court judge could order a solution tomorrow which would overrrule the contract. Not the way to do it. Needs orderly process. Well NSI and NSF had had more than a year to develope that process, to little avail. Why? Becouse it is not in NSI's intrest? Maybe? OR is it due to poor managment a feet dragging? Likely? I don't pretend to know. Reguardless, if I know that I or We (IEG. INC.) can do it, than surely NSI and the NSF could have or already should have. Airing dirty laundry. Recent snafu on Internet. Let bad root file go out. Tried to notify them. Couldn't notify root server operators because they are volunteers. Whole structure needs higher performance standers. Needs 7x24 accountability. No fail safe in the system. That whole structure needs to be put more under control. I agree. And this should have been done more than two years ago. Many warned, to no avail. So I guess, "Those who fail to manage, manage to fail". DNS Advantages: terrifically easy to use. Large name space. Easy to understand. More self funded. Resilient to growth. Disadvantages: Open to spoofing. Was a peer to peer system, not designed to deal with hostile activities. DNS security is something that is already under development by the IETF. In addition, this problem was and should have been known long ago. Many, including myself warned of this weakness, and were shruged off as being excentric. Well I guess, again failier to realize the obvious is always a rude awakener. Directory system is sorely lacking. Need to figure out how to get information easily. Average user can't get WHOIS for Germany, etc. Needs to be put together in some unified way. No uniform registration policies worldwide. Some treat it as holy grail to other extreme at NSI. We treat it as a brand, a registration identity. The Internet needs to figure out what domains are, what registration is and how it should be dealt with registration in a uniform way. This again has ben known or suspected for over two years now. Yet NSI and NSF are just now realizing it. How short sited, which again points out the poor judgment of NSI's managment and NSF's oversite. Registries have to operate in legal vacuum are hugely vulnerable. In order to protect selves have to put in policies aren't popular. But alternative, with no indemnification from any legal body, risks going out of business. Other registries haven't hit volume points so haven't seen this yet. They will, soon. "NSI supports competition of any form that the community decides is necessary, either through the addition of new TLDS or through the imposition of a shared registration concept if it is done with stability and is done orderly and it respects the legacy positions of the registries." This is a very serious problem indeed. Replacment of the lagacy DNS software is paramount to meet future demand. It is still not too late to be proactive here, but somehow I doubt this will happen in light of past history. "Sharing .com, sharing .de, sharing .net, sharing .uk, that's not a problem. Not easy to do, but we support it. Relative to adding new TLDs, no technical limit. Not issue. Issue is possible confusion in Internet space, implementation guidelines, pushing the problem up one level. Community not in agreement on this. 3 camps: 1) want to get into business, want new TLDS ; 2) trademark owners or those who got name , want no more TLDS, see this as intellectual property nightmare for them.; 3) group lost out in court battle and still lusts after name...wants new TLD so they another shot at the name and procedure. This is where the curx of many of the discussions have centered for nearly a year and a half now. I agree that there is no limit to the possibilities of TLD's that could be created if a shared system of registries in a Round Table fassion is accepted or in place. This is already underway. SOme call these services "Alternitive Registries". Alternitive or not, they exist, and are not likely to go away. SO the IANA/IETF/ISOC/POC/CORE/IAB need to find a way to work WITH these RSC's, not Flame them. We have a long way to go here. "Competition will one of the most important things that this industry needs: it will induce people to invest." NSI has invested 10s of millions of dollars into new facility. 34,000 sq ft, state of the art facility. Key question: do we want to make a change of DNS system that only affects top level. It is hierarchical system. Parallel in IP level, portability. Technically difficult to do. Issues of routability. Well I agree. And first on that list is a modification or update to RFC2050, RFC1917, RFC1918. In doint this in a open manner, and getting on with either IPv6 or IPv8, we can shoot alot of these problems very quickly. This doesn't seem to be the way ARIN and the IANA seem to want to head however. So openess and providing for the expandability in usefull way does not seem to be in their intrest. One must question this logic. If you do sharing, you will end up building another back office facility. That facility will wind up being a monopoly. Somewhere, all of this stuff needs to come together for reconciliation. Creates a wholesale monopoly back office and retail front office. I don't agree that the back office facility will end up being an monopoly at all. Most of my coleague's do not either. This sounds like another "Scare tactic" for some power freeks to control as much of the central parts of the internet as they can and use the ole "Medicare scare Tactic" argument to get tit done. Whole issue of what a gTLD is has always baffled me. Policy change should affect all elements in that class. 60 TLDS where you can register no matter you live or where your host is. What's the distinction between a gTLD and one of these guys? Volume. [comment from Rick Wesson....historical difference; gTLDs do not have a historic value and do not have association with ISO 3166] Just above Mr. Telage stated that there is no limit to the number of TLD's possible. He seems to almost conterdict himself here with saying that 60 will allow you to register no matter where you live or where your host is. This may be so, but does not answer the brending concerns. ..COM is as big as it is for 2 reasons. .US not widely accepted. Ugly ducking of TLDS. Growth in Internet has been in US and it doesnt have a popular ISO 3166. .COM filled void. Problem is volume, not geography. When other TLDs start experiencing growth, they will have same problems. Hence the need to offer alternitives. As many as there is a precieved demand for. Not to mention splitting the load. Re registration pricing graphs: Tremendous variability. Charge enuf to make reasonable profit to invest and improve offerings. Other registries need to look on this as investment oriented activity. I agree. And this is something that will need to be an ongoing experiment. But I suspect as demand grows so will price, as well as costs. Hence the need to act now. [Q: could Poland start a new TLD?] No, wouldn't get included in 13 root servers. Were not taking any new applications based on NSF's directions. Bad idea! Contredictory to his previous statments on this critique as well. Mr. Telage seems to have no real direction here, nor any suggestions as to what possible directions he would like to see things go. We have a fundamental problem with iPOC initiative. We feel changes need to be evolutionary. Stakes too high to do anything too radical until we know impacts. Need managed transition period top make necessary changes to stabilize infrastructure. Shipping the problem to inexperienced international body where complexity goes up is not a wise move. Needs to be market driven at some level, needs to be internationally governed, needs to be industrial strength. Needs period of transition to evolve to another body, some U.S. agency that has skills set perhaps. Sounds like he is for NSF or some other government agency to step in here. Regulation? Lets hope that is a misevaluation on my part. Broad objectives for transition: Overarching issues: 1) Establish legal framework. Who is in charge? What is in charge? Everyone ducks the bullet. We the stakeholders are in charge, all over the world. The internet users is what is in charge, both commercial and otherwise. 2) Need to bring all the competition into the space. Only way will spur investment required to raise registries to performance levels to grow Internet globally. Profit will motivate. Things that require investment will respond to profit. 3) Fill in DNS trademark vacuum. How do domain names and trademarks relate? Must fix these first before moving whole infrastructure offshore. Will take 18-24 months. Too long. Not that big of a problem. Usage of international Tradmark law should do it just fine. Make DOmain names a tradmarkable entitity. NSI PROPOSAL: 4-layer chart. Legal layer - US government. Allows registry to derive authority from someone. Similar to N.A. Numbering Council has same model. Intl participation from stakeholders, does policy development. Governance layer - IPAG (international policy advisory gorup) intl body which accepts membership from interested stakeholder globally; membership based on usage or volume representation. operational layer - manage critical functions. nonprofit business. not highly capitalized. Need DNS manager: resp for managing the root, the dot, failsafe operations. Should move from us and other volunteers. Analog on DNS side to IP side. business layer - litkely registries and ISPs willb e the same. capital intensive. customer interface. needs incentive for investment. profit layer. To many layers here to be efectual and reactive to global stake holders needs not and certianly in the future. More streamlining is needed. Remove unneeded redundance. WOrk this like a buisness, not like a social club, from a structual point of view. This process will never be affective or work long term. Just creates a bunch of bearuacrats. Cutover from us agency to international is easy if 4 layers are in place. "We want to be a registrar. That's all we want to be.' Not realistic statment baised on this layering structure in this statment. Broad rush questions: How do we view names? Are DNS space and trademarks the same? What is business model that is needed at each layer? Does model we have chosen work operationally? What's the governance model here that I community wants? Registries in a bind. No immunity from suit but must protect selves from financial instinction. Cannot wilfully and knowingly infringe trademarks. We registered 125K names last month. With no policy in place, we would have gotten thousands of suits. As is, 30+ lawsuits naming us. 1,300 written disputes on 1.6 million registrations. Problem doesn't need to be solved by draconian means such as trademark pre-screening. Work on the exceptions. Good point here. I agree. [remaining comments in response to audience questions] NSI can't do a prepayment policy. Too many different payment arrangements. ISPs need to pay by check; companies need purchase orders. I don't agree with this at all. But I understand his point. A need to automate payment parctices is paramount to good financial tracking and managment in todays electornic age. Old payment methods can still be used, but should not be manditory. This makes fudiciary responsibility to cumbersom for many and very expensive as well. This is also anti small buisness. Dispute policy prevents lawsuits for "contributory infringement". Following advice of attorneys. Every domain registrant has signed a 2 year contract. Cannot be prorated. If registrant wants to go another registrar when that becomes available, that is your choice, but you have signed a 2 year contract (my note: which means your money won't be refunded). This is a common business practice. Good point. But what is in that two year contract. I hope it is not like the gTLD-MoU contract. SIgning theirs IS NOT GOOD BUISNESS! So I think the real story in this comment is in the fine print. In hindsight, NSI should have written the cooperative agreement differently so that NSF indemnified NSI from all policy related matters. -end Telage comments- Hindsite hell, NSI was told this by many befor they singed that contract! Pass the buck again, I see. - End of our comments and official response - -- Jeffrey A. Williams DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java Development Eng. Information Eng. Group. IEG. INC. Phone :913-294-2375 (v-office) E-Mail jwkckid1 at ix.netcom.com