From info at arin.net Wed Feb 3 12:12:35 2021 From: info at arin.net (ARIN) Date: Wed, 03 Feb 2021 12:12:35 -0500 Subject: [ARIN-Suggestions] Responses to ACSP 2021.1 and ACSP 2021.2 Message-ID: <1CB130B7-4AAD-4413-B7A6-CC40E7B429EE@arin.net> On 3 February, we issued our response to ACSP 2021.1, which was received on 15 January, 2021: This suggestion appears to be a duplicate of ACSP Suggestion 2012.20: Remove result limit for Whois-RWS child network queries, which requests support for allowing queries to return more than 256 network records (the current limitation). That suggestion is awaiting prioritization and has not yet been scheduled on ARIN?s Work Plan. Thank you for participating in the ARIN Consultation and Suggestion Process. Your suggestion will remain open until implemented. The full text of the suggestion is available below and at: https://www.arin.net/participate/community/acsp/suggestions/2021/2021-1/ Description: Requesting network records limited to 256 - ARIN please release this limitation or increase it to more. Value to Community: By releasing this limitation on ARIN or increasing it to more, we can all stop criminals from attacking our networks by having the information to do so. Timeframe: Not specified On 3 February, we also issued our response to ACSP 2021.2, which was received on 25 January, 2021: Thank you for your suggestion, numbered 2021.2 upon receipt, requesting that ARIN offer Web Authentication (WebAuthn) and FIDO2 security key support. This suggestion appears to be a duplicate of ACSP 2019.14: Implement FIDO2 (WebAuthn) for ARIN Online. Both of these suggestions will remain open for consideration alongside other potential improvements to our ARIN Online login functionality for inclusion on our future work plan. The full text of the suggestion is available below and at: https://www.arin.net/participate/community/acsp/suggestions/2021/2021-2/ Description: The ARIN Online website should offer Web Authentication (WebAuthn) support in order for ARIN members to be able to secure their accounts using FIDO2 Security Keys. Value to Community: Given the risk a compromise of one?s ARIN Online account could represent to one?s business, additional measures to prevent unauthorized account access are beneficial. Support for FIDO2 will allow ARIN members to additionally protect their account by requiring a ?Security Key? (a physical device). FIDO2 is successor to traditional Multi-Factor Authentication mechanisms such as SMS OTPs or TOTPs. In contrast to TOPT keys (which exist just as a copy-able string), the main advantage of FIDO2 Security Keys is that they cannot be copied, as the keys are stored in a HSM. FIDO2 is an open standard, Security Keys can be obtained from a number of different vendors at low cost. Timeframe: Not specified From info at arin.net Tue Feb 23 09:23:15 2021 From: info at arin.net (ARIN) Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2021 09:23:15 -0500 Subject: [ARIN-Suggestions] Response to ACSP 2021.3: Provide Certificate Transparency for RPKI and Closing of ACSP 2015.15: Improvements to SSL Security for whois.arin.net Message-ID: On 23 February, we issued our response to ACSP 2021.3, which was received on 17 February: Thank you for your suggestion, numbered 2021.3 on confirmed receipt, asking that we provide certificate transparency for RPKI. We agree this is a beneficial improvement and will prioritize it for future implementation. Thank you for participating in the ARIN Consultation and Suggestion Process. Your suggestion will remain open until implemented. The full text of the suggestion is available below and at: https://www.arin.net/participate/community/acsp/suggestions/2021/2021-3/ Description: ARIN should publish immutable logs about the existence of RPKI certificates as they are issued or revoked, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certificate authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. Value to Community: ARIN already has gone a long way to maximize the trustworthiness of the Trust Anchor by offering a hosted RPKI environment anchored on non-repudiation. A next step is to enable anyone to audit the ARIN TA in the form of a practice known as ?Certificate Transparency?. Timeframe: Not specified On 23 February, we also closed ACSP 2015.15: Improvements to SSL Security for whois.arin.net with the following response: Thank you for your suggestion, numbered 2015.15 on confirmed receipt, asking that ARIN remove support for weak Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange parameters. We have completed this work with our most recent system update. Because this work has been completed, we are closing your suggestion. Thank you for your participation in the ARIN Consultation and Suggestion Process. The full text of the suggestion is available here: https://www.arin.net/participate/community/acsp/suggestions/2015/2015-15/ Regards, The American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN)