<html><head></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><br><div><div>On May 2, 2011, at 1:41 PM, Mike Burns wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><div>Hi Dan,<br><br>The existence of competing registries does not imply a requirement on anybody to change, so your argument about expense to existing participants is invalid.<br><br></div></blockquote>Not true. The chaos and disruption posed by unregulated registries will</div><div>increase the costs to ARIN, ARIN members, and other participants in the</div><div>industry regardless of whether they change registries or not.</div><div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div>And yes, the market will sort out bad actors. That's one thing free markets do.<br><br></div></blockquote>Right... The market sorted out Enron... Eventually. However, non of us in</div><div>California got our money back and we're all still paying higher electric</div><div>bills as a result.</div><div><br></div><div>The market sorted out the CMOs... Eventually. However, my house is now</div><div>worth 1/3rd of what it was worth and the new restrictive regulations on</div><div>refinancing prevent me from taking advantage of the new lower interest</div><div>rates due to my home being devalued too close to the amount I still owe</div><div>on it. Unfortunately, I wasn't irresponsible enough to be part of the cause</div><div>of this problem, so, as a good actor, I am not entitled to any of the relief</div><div>available from the government for the bad actors.</div><div><br></div><div>I think I've had enough of the way markets sort out bad actors for a while.</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type="cite"><div>Nobody said anything about no oversight, to the contrary I have said the registries should work under the same framework as RIRs.<br><br></div></blockquote>The only oversight of the RIRs is their community processes and their</div><div>membership-elected boards. If you are OK with the other registries being</div><div>overseen by these same bodies, then, I'm not sure why you think they</div><div>would somehow be run differently from the existing RIRs.</div><div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div>Just like all DNS registrars have to comply with rules setup to govern their behavior.<br>Before you can be a DNS registrar you have to comply with the rules, and maintain compliance.<br><br></div></blockquote>There are virtually no policies about how domain names are justified or</div><div>acquired in those rules. There are provisions for trademark disputes, but,</div><div>those are not applicable to IP addresses (unless you think that a</div><div>particular soft drink vendor should be automatically entitled to</div><div>the address 67.79.75.69).</div><div><br></div><div>Owen</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type="cite"><div>It's true that I was being forward thinking about the additional services competing registries might offer, but my point is that those services would only be offered if there was a demand for them, if the private registries are to endure.<br><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#000000"><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#144FAE"><br></font></font></div></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><div><br>Regards,<br><br>Mike<br><br>----- Original Message ----- From: "Alexander, Daniel" <<a href="mailto:Daniel_Alexander@Cable.Comcast.com">Daniel_Alexander@Cable.Comcast.com</a>><br>To: "Mike Burns" <<a href="mailto:mike@nationwideinc.com">mike@nationwideinc.com</a>>; <<a href="mailto:arin-ppml@arin.net">arin-ppml@arin.net</a>><br>Sent: Monday, May 02, 2011 4:30 PM<br>Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] Accusation of fundamental conflictofinterest/IPaddress policy pitched directly to ICANN<br><br><br>Mike,<br><br>While I can only speak for myself, I can attempt to answer your question<br>of what may perturb some people. You make several very large assumptions<br>in your claims, none of which were captured in the opt-in, opt-out, or any<br>other proposals.<br><br>You speak of title insurance, legal teams, and other items, ensuring that<br>a competitive registry will provide better services than a community<br>defined RIR. The problem is none of this is defined or required in any<br>suggested framework. While some may provide these services, many may not,<br>and there are no mechanisms to protect the ISP's or end users who rely on<br>these services.<br><br>While many advocates will quickly reply that the market will sort these<br>bad actors out, it will be done at the expense of the people who currently<br>rely on these RIR provided services at a fraction of the cost. If<br>competitive registries are created without oversight, the burden and<br>expense of validating registration records will be shifted to the very<br>people who are supposed to benefit from this new model.<br><br>This begs the question from some as to what purpose a commercial registry<br>would serve other than to make money.<br><br>My opinion only.<br>Dan Alexander<br><br><br><br><br>On 5/2/11 3:33 PM, "Mike Burns" <<a href="mailto:mike@nationwideinc.com">mike@nationwideinc.com</a>> wrote:<br><br><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">But what is it about ARIN that is broken? What exactly do you think<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">needs<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">to be fixed?<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">The only thing I've gotten out of the discussions so far is that some<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">people think there is money to be made by providing IPv4 addresses based<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">on<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">willingness and ability to pay rather than ARIN's current >demonstrated<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">need policies.<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">Why is it to my benefit if someone else makes money? Particularly if it<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">perturbs the current mechanisms in a way that costs me money?<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">Keith Hare<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">Hi Keith,<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">What is broken about ARIN is that scandalously large numbers of netblocks<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">do<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">not have valid POCs, for example. The stewardship of Whois leaves a lot<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">to<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">be desired.<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">Competitive pressures would help to finally decide who controls these<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">addresses and allow them to be transferred to those who would pay for<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">them.<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">Network operators don't really have much of a choice in accessing Whois<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">information to determine the rights to advertise addresses, and competive<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">registries.<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">In my experience they rely on attestation and review of proferred<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">chain-of-custody docs when determining who can advertise which addresses,<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">when confronted with inconsistencies with whois.<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">A competitive registry with a title insurance component will give network<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">operators more security when deciding questionable cases.<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">What is broken about ARIN is that their transfer policies are more<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">restrictive than APNICs, and that will cause a flow of addresses out of<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">ARIN<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">and into APNIC.<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">A competitive registry could presumably have a different transfer policy,<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">as<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">APNICs differs from ARINs.<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">What is broken about ARIN is that ARIN has professed no statutory control<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">over legacy addresses in the Plzak declaration in the Kremen case, and<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">yet<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">attempts to control the registration of legacy resources.<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">With a private registry, the address rights holders can choose to opt-out<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">of<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">ARIN's dictats and choose their registry voluntarily.<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">I don't see how the creation of a private registry will perturb the<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">current<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">mechanisms in a way that costs you money, could you share why you feel<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">that<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">way?<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">Regards,<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">Mike Burns<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">_______________________________________________<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">PPML<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List (<a href="mailto:ARIN-PPML@arin.net">ARIN-PPML@arin.net</a>).<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at:<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite"><a href="http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-ppml">http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-ppml</a><br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">Please contact <a href="mailto:info@arin.net">info@arin.net</a> if you experience any issues.<br></blockquote><br>_______________________________________________<br>PPML<br>You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to<br>the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List (<a href="mailto:ARIN-PPML@arin.net">ARIN-PPML@arin.net</a>).<br>Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at:<br><a href="http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-ppml">http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-ppml</a><br>Please contact info@arin.net if you experience any issues.<br></div></blockquote></div><br></body></html>