[arin-ppml] [EXT] Re: Open Petition for ARIN-prop-266: BGP Hijacking is an ARIN Policy Violation
marilson.mapa at gmail.com
Tue May 7 22:46:29 EDT 2019
Owen, I almost cried with the paradise you described.
Ø people of good will and good character
Ø like a small town where everyone could leave their doors unlocked
In the 20th century? Steve Jobs described a very different environment. I
was there and I was already an adult, and this paradise only existed in the
hippy communities sprinkled with marijuana.
Besides, I did not mention the creation of the Internet. Read again: “But
the BGP has at its origin a critical design flaw.”
I mentioned the creation of BGP that replaced EGP, with policy-based
routing, a routing based on a set of non-technical rules, defined by
Autonomous Systems, to BGP4 designed to withstand the problems caused by
the great growth of the Internet.
I have a file with 1.3 GB of criminal attitudes from ISPs, Registrars and
ICANN, protecting and hiding spammers and scammers. Scammers who were often
the providers themselves. Since 2014 I have sent spam and scam reports to
these institutions. There were hundreds of ISPs, and everyone, without
exception, protected and concealed their customers. So keep these old
wives’ tale for your grandchildren.
Ø perhaps you would have a legitimate accusation
One? I have 1.3 GB. You insist on disqualifying me for not having the
technical competence to discuss these problems. Not being the professional
that you are, is a reason for pride. If not, let's see: I am an architect
and urban planner. I have been trained to provide comfort, security and
well-being to people in their homes, workplaces, amusements and in multiple
activities inside and outside the buildings. While your profession is
marked by providing irritation and malaise to billions of people.))
Ø I’m telling you that I don’t have good answers to those questions and
that I believe the RIRs to be the wrong tool for the job.
Ø You are again mistaken.
Ø Yesterday was “out of scope” and today I believe it is still out of
It is outside the scope of the Registrars, it is outside the scope of the
RIRs, it is outside the scope of ICANN ... It is out of the scope of all.
Should we appeal to Pope Francis? Maybe to the Queen of England...
This situation you created is very comfortable, is not it? When no one is
responsible we have no one's land. Not the paradise you created in the 20th
century. But your old wild far west of the 18th and 19th centuries. The
insistence on not demanding ethical behavior from the community and respect
for their AUPs and ToSs takes them to the police pages of the newspapers.
The Economist coined the acronym BAADD for tech giants as a threat to
democracy. I coined the acronym GGM21C - the Great Global Mafia of the 21st
Century. The billionaires fines are being applied and the community insists
on doing nothing.
I repeat: Mr. Ash's swamp is not on prop-266, it's on this corrupt internet
that treats the population as beef cattle.
Em ter, 7 de mai de 2019 às 15:43, Owen DeLong <owen at delong.com> escreveu:
> On May 6, 2019, at 8:40 PM, Marilson Mapa <marilson.mapa at gmail.com> wrote:
> They say that there are more than 80,000 autonomous systems with about one
> million prefixes. The coexistence of this universe without the BGP seems
> impossible with equal operability. But the BGP has at its origin a critical
> design flaw. Whoever designed it or was ill-intentioned, or assumed that
> the world would have no borders, would have no economic geopolitical
> problems, and ISP managers would be a caste of people with unquestionable
> reputation. The vulnerability in BGP design allows any of these thousands
> of ISPs to hijack network traffic.
> But Hijack is not a result of system vulnerability. It is the result of
> the actions of malicious individuals or organizations and the result of the
> precariousness of a policy and its customary ill will (or bad intention?)
> In implementation.
> You are quite mistaken in some of your beliefs here.
> The design of BGP occurred in an era when the assumption that all
> participants in the internet were people of good will and good character
> was completely valid and perfectly acceptable. It was a time when we were
> all able to run telnet and rsh servers on our hosts without significant
> fear of exploitation. A time when the internet was a community that, while
> geographically diverse, was much more like a small town where everyone
> could leave their doors unlocked and if you needed medicine in the middle
> of the night, there was no problem walking into the local pharmacy and
> leaving the money on the counter with a note explaining your situation.
> In such an environment, it’s perfectly understandable that people did not
> design protocols for security because it simply didn’t occur to us that
> this would be an issue. The web browser hadn’t been invented, let alone the
> concept of e-commerce. There was little to be gained from redirecting
> people’s packets full of email and ftp data.
> In essence, you are accusing malice and/or incompetence against engineers
> who were operating in a vastly different environment with very different
> design criteria from what exists today. If we were starting from scratch
> building the internet routing system today, knowing then what we know now,
> perhaps you would have a legitimate accusation.
> Mr. Owen, I'd like to be able to answer your questions, but I'm not an IT
> professional and my role is not to tell you how to solve such problems. My
> role is to charge solution and ethical behavior because I am your victim.
> Then please listen to those who have greater knowledge and understand that
> you must approach the parties capable of solving the problem if you
> actually want to see the problem solved.
> The current approach being undertaken is sort of like going to Hershey’s
> and complaining about the flavor of M&Ms.
> You claim you are unable to answer my questions because you are not an IT
> professional, yet my questions were not of a technical nature.
> My questions were of a political and policy nature. Either you can answer
> them with policy ideas, or, you should at least recognize that these
> questions need to be answered if we are to formulate a policy idea which
> has any chance of producing effect from the RIRs. I am an IT professional
> and I’m also pretty well versed in the RIR system and policies. I’m telling
> you that I don’t have good answers to those questions and that I believe
> the RIRs to be the wrong tool for the job. If you wish to tell me that I am
> wrong about that, then the obligation falls to you to provide some contrary
> evidence and some idea which can be implemented or at least some answers to
> those questions.
> Yesterday was "out of scope", today "there are no legal powers",
> tomorrow... only the devil knows.
> You are again mistaken.
> Yesterday was “out of scope” and today I believe it is still out of scope.
> ARIN also lacks any legal authority to manage other people’s routers or do
> anything more than suggest how they do so. These are not mutually exclusive
> and there is no time sequence to them. These are simply the facts of the
> situation as it exists today, existed yesterday, and will continue to exist
> until something changes. If you want to change the legal powers of the
> RIRs, then I suggest you approach the legislators who are able to do so. I
> personally think this would be a bad idea, but if you are determined to use
> the RIRs as a vehicle to solve this problem, then that is a prerequisite.
> Mr. Ash's swamp is not on prop-266, it's on this corrupt internet that
> treats the population as beef cattle.
> Why so such resistance? Hmm?…
> I am not resistant to the idea of solving the hijacking problem. I am
> attempting to point out that you cannot solve it through the RIRs because
> you are attempting to use a fly swatter to drive a nail. It’s simply not
> the correct tool and it simply won’t get the job done.
> Em seg, 6 de mai de 2019 às 03:42, Owen DeLong <owen at delong.com> escreveu:
>> On May 4, 2019, at 15:02 , Marilson Mapa <marilson.mapa at gmail.com> wrote:
>> > I have no opposition to doing something if we can get a proposal that
>> offers something that ARIN can do.
>> > The first step must be to identify what ARIN can do and accept what is
>> beyond ARIN’s mandate and capabilities.
>> Owen, this is a position that will certainly be supported by all who have
>> endured prop-266. With respect to items 3, 4 and 5 of your pronouncement,
>> punitive rules could be imposed by ARIN in order to reduce illicit acts.
>> The devil is in the details… What punitive rules do you see ARIN being
>> able to enact that would have
>> any real effect? How do you see those rules being enforced? Who would
>> those rules be enforced on?
>> Consider the typical situation:
>> Organization A has an RSA with ARIN and is registered with resource X.
>> Organization C has an RSA with another RIR and is registered with
>> resource Y.
>> Organization Q has no RSA with any RIR and advertises space X to
>> Organization C.
>> Organization Q presented Organization C with a fraudulent LOA from
>> Organization A.
>> Please explain what punitive rules ARIN could enact in this case.
>> Please explain who ARIN would inflict what penalties on and how that
>> would cause
>> organization Q to stop?
>> Please explain how ARIN becomes aware that Q’s LOA from A is forged?
>> Please provide a detailed suggestion or at least enough of a blueprint
>> that it can lead
>> to actionable policy.
>> Em sáb, 4 de mai de 2019 às 16:09, Owen DeLong <owen at delong.com>
>>> > On May 3, 2019, at 10:13 , Carlos Friaças via ARIN-PPML <
>>> arin-ppml at arin.net> wrote:
>>> > Hi,
>>> > On Fri, 3 May 2019, Andrew Bagrin wrote:
>>> >> I'm curious why do people not want to let ARIN try to start getting
>>> involved to help resolve the issue of hijacking?
>>> I don’t accept the premise of the question. I think people are perfectly
>>> willing to see ARIN expand its involvement in
>>> resolving issues of hijacking to the extent that ARIN can have a
>>> meaningful impact on the situation. I think others
>>> in this discussion have a greatly inflated opinion of ARIN’s powers and
>>> capabilities in this regard.
>>> > <proposer hat on>
>>> > This is uncharted territory. Some people fear the unknown.
>>> I think that is overly dismissive and an inaccurate assessment of most
>>> of the opposition to this proposal.
>>> Indeed, IMHO, this is actually well charted territory as similar
>>> discussions of ARIN’s ability to curtail routing
>>> problems have been held before in this and other fora with the
>>> consistent outcome that after a period of education,
>>> most in the discussion arrive at the same conclusion:
>>> 1. Most of the resource hijackers are not those who have
>>> contracts with ARIN with one notable exception.
>>> 2. Those with a contract with ARIN generally are those who
>>> have committed resource fraud in order to
>>> obtain said contract with ARIN and upon sufficient
>>> proof, ARIN already has policies and procedures
>>> in place to reclaim the resources.
>>> 3. Stopping hijacking requires an action by those who run
>>> routers. ARIN does not run (many) routers.
>>> 4. ARIN does not control the businesses who run routers.
>>> 5. ARIN does not have the authority to dictate business
>>> practices to ISPs beyond those related to the
>>> maintenance of the ARIN registration database.
>>> 6. The theory that ARIN allocates exclusive rights to use
>>> number resources on some amorphous
>>> concept known as “the global internet” is a novel idea,
>>> but not particularly proximal to reality.
>>> >> Why would anyone be against ARIN having a process to help resolve
>>> these issues? Sure we can question how effective it will be, but anything
>>> will be more effective than nothing, and by actually doing, failing and
>>> learning, ARIN will only improve and refine the process. We will all learn
>>> from this.
>>> > I've learned a lot between proposal versions in RIPE, LACNIC and ARIN.
>>> I have no opposition to doing something if we can get a proposal that
>>> offers something that ARIN can do.
>>> The first step must be to identify what ARIN can do and accept what is
>>> beyond ARIN’s mandate and capabilities.
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