[arin-ppml] [EXT] Re: Open Petition for ARIN-prop-266: BGP Hijacking is an ARIN Policy Violation

Marilson Mapa marilson.mapa at gmail.com
Tue May 7 16:05:53 EDT 2019


Hi Keith,

After all an exempt comment. No disparagement without ulterior motives and
respectful. You are a rare bird. INCITS must have been successful in
recognizing efforts and professional dedication. But we're not perfect,
right?

Ø  you will find that ARIN has a very narrow scope and no legal power to
enforce anything outside of its narrow scope. Any policy needs to take that
narrow scope into account.

Tell me Keith, who wrote this scope? Was this scope imposed by some supreme
authority or was it written by members of the community itself?

Ø  The License will terminate automatically upon any breach by you of the
terms of this Policy.

Ø  A failure by JCC to enforce any of its rights under this Policy is not a
waiver of those rights or any other rights JCC has under this Policy.

This scope was written by you on the JCC. Tell me, is it pro forma or is it
for real?

Ø  I recommend reading this blog.

I read Keith and there is a speech that continues to resonate in my head:
“The main reason that ARIN does not report... does not report... does not
report…

And: “ARIN takes route hijacking very seriously, and does work, where
possible, to address these issues.” This is not the stance shown by the
ARIN advisors on the list.

Ø  ARIN’s current practice… …includes the flexibility, investigation, and
communication…

If the ARIN’s current practice includes the flexibility, investigation, and
communication about BGP Hijacking, why is the development of such a policy
out of scope as well as the legal right to carry it out?

“JCC delivers on time and within budget. JCC brings to projects, not only
knowledge and experience, but also software tools and a robust development
and testing environment.”

“Successful projects begin with an architecture based on a thorough
understanding of the component parts and how they interact.”

Who honored the above principles received the INCITS Award. What prize
would you give to ARIN? GoldenPoo?

Marilson


Em ter, 7 de mai de 2019 às 10:52, Keith W. Hare <Keith at jcc.com> escreveu:

> Marilson,
>
>
>
> I have not yet seen a complete clear consistent definition of BGP/Route
> hijacking. Such a definition is a prerequisite to defining a meaningful
> policy.
>
>
>
> If you read through ARIN’s Documents:
>
>
>
> ·         Bylaws (https://www.arin.net/about/corporate/bylaws/)
>
> ·         Articles of Incorporation (
> https://www.arin.net/about/corporate/documents/incorporation/)
>
> ·         Policy Development Process (
> https://www.arin.net/participate/policy/pdp/)
>
> ·         Number Resource Policy Manual (
> https://www.arin.net/participate/policy/nrpm/)
>
>
>
> you will find that ARIN has a very narrow scope and no legal power to
> enforce anything outside of its narrow scope. Any policy needs to take that
> narrow scope into account.
>
>
>
> So, within ARIN, a policy proposal needs to:
>
> ·         Clearly define what the proposal is attempting to address
>
> ·         Fit into ARIN’s narrow scope
>
>
>
> Yesterday, John Curran provided a link to a blog describing ARIN’s current
> practices with regard to handling reports of potential route hijacking:
>
>
>
>
> https://teamarin.net/2019/05/06/how-does-arin-handle-reports-of-route-hijacking/
>
>
>
> I recommend reading this blog.
>
>
>
> To me, ARIN’s current practice is a good way of responding to BGP/Route
> hijacking reports. It includes the flexibility, investigation, and
> communication necessary to identify and correct issues. The current
> practice works by using communication and persuasion. It has the advantage
> that the details are not codified in policy and so can adjust depending on
> the actual details and intent discovered during the investigation.
>
>
>
> Keith
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* ARIN-PPML [mailto:arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net] *On Behalf Of *Marilson
> Mapa
> *Sent:* Monday, May 6, 2019 11:41 PM
> *To:* Owen DeLong <owen at delong.com>
> *Cc:* arin-ppml at arin.net
> *Subject:* Re: [arin-ppml] [EXT] Re: Open Petition for ARIN-prop-266: BGP
> Hijacking is an ARIN Policy Violation
>
>
>
> They say that there are more than 80,000 autonomous systems with about one
> million prefixes. The coexistence of this universe without the BGP seems
> impossible with equal operability. But the BGP has at its origin a critical
> design flaw. Whoever designed it or was ill-intentioned, or assumed that
> the world would have no borders, would have no economic geopolitical
> problems, and ISP managers would be a caste of people with unquestionable
> reputation. The vulnerability in BGP design allows any of these thousands
> of ISPs to hijack network traffic.
>
>
>
> But Hijack is not a result of system vulnerability. It is the result of
> the actions of malicious individuals or organizations and the result of the
> precariousness of a policy and its customary ill will (or bad intention?)
> In implementation.
>
> Mr. Owen, I'd like to be able to answer your questions, but I'm not an IT
> professional and my role is not to tell you how to solve such problems. My
> role is to charge solution and ethical behavior because I am your victim.
>
> Yesterday was "out of scope", today "there are no legal powers",
> tomorrow... only the devil knows.
> Mr. Ash's swamp is not on prop-266, it's on this corrupt internet that
> treats the population as beef cattle.
>
> Why so such resistance? Hmm?...
>
> Marilson
>
>
>
> Em seg, 6 de mai de 2019 às 03:42, Owen DeLong <owen at delong.com> escreveu:
>
>
>
>
>
> On May 4, 2019, at 15:02 , Marilson Mapa <marilson.mapa at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > I have no opposition to doing something if we can get a proposal that
> offers something that ARIN can do.
> > The first step must be to identify what ARIN can do and accept what is
> beyond ARIN’s mandate and capabilities.
>
>
>
> Owen, this is a position that will certainly be supported by all who have
> endured prop-266. With respect to items 3, 4 and 5 of your pronouncement,
> punitive rules could be imposed by ARIN in order to reduce illicit acts.
>
>
>
> The devil is in the details… What punitive rules do you see ARIN being
> able to enact that would have
>
> any real effect? How do you see those rules being enforced? Who would
> those rules be enforced on?
>
>
>
> Consider the typical situation:
>
>
>
> Organization A has an RSA with ARIN and is registered with resource X.
>
> Organization C has an RSA with another RIR and is registered with resource
> Y.
>
> Organization Q has no RSA with any RIR and advertises space X to
> Organization C.
>
> Organization Q presented Organization C with a fraudulent LOA from
> Organization A.
>
>
>
> Please explain what punitive rules ARIN could enact in this case.
>
> Please explain who ARIN would inflict what penalties on and how that would
> cause
>
> organization Q to stop?
>
> Please explain how ARIN becomes aware that Q’s LOA from A is forged?
>
>
>
> Please provide a detailed suggestion or at least enough of a blueprint
> that it can lead
>
> to actionable policy.
>
>
>
> Owen
>
>
>
>
>
> Marilson
>
>
>
>
>
> Em sáb, 4 de mai de 2019 às 16:09, Owen DeLong <owen at delong.com> escreveu:
>
>
>
> > On May 3, 2019, at 10:13 , Carlos Friaças via ARIN-PPML <
> arin-ppml at arin.net> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> >
> > On Fri, 3 May 2019, Andrew Bagrin wrote:
> >
> >> I'm curious why do people not want to let ARIN try to start getting
> involved to help resolve the issue of hijacking?
>
> I don’t accept the premise of the question. I think people are perfectly
> willing to see ARIN expand its involvement in
> resolving issues of hijacking to the extent that ARIN can have a
> meaningful impact on the situation. I think others
> in this discussion have a greatly inflated opinion of ARIN’s powers and
> capabilities in this regard.
>
> >
> > <proposer hat on>
> >
> > This is uncharted territory. Some people fear the unknown.
>
> I think that is overly dismissive and an inaccurate assessment of most of
> the opposition to this proposal.
>
> Indeed, IMHO, this is  actually well charted territory as similar
> discussions of ARIN’s ability to curtail routing
> problems have been held before in this and other fora with the consistent
> outcome that after a period of education,
> most in the discussion arrive at the same conclusion:
>
>         1.      Most of the resource hijackers are not those who have
> contracts with ARIN with one notable exception.
>         2.      Those with a contract with ARIN generally are those who
> have committed resource fraud in order to
>                 obtain said contract with ARIN and upon sufficient proof,
> ARIN already has policies and procedures
>                 in place to reclaim the resources.
>         3.      Stopping hijacking requires an action by those who run
> routers. ARIN does not run (many) routers.
>         4.      ARIN does not control the businesses who run routers.
>         5.      ARIN does not have the authority to dictate business
> practices to ISPs beyond those related to the
>                 maintenance of the ARIN registration database.
>         6.      The theory that ARIN allocates exclusive rights to use
> number resources on some amorphous
>                 concept known as “the global internet” is a novel idea,
> but not particularly proximal to reality.
>
> >> Why would anyone be against ARIN having a process to help resolve these
> issues?  Sure we can question how effective it will be, but anything will
> be more effective than nothing, and by actually doing, failing and
> learning, ARIN will only improve and refine the process. We will all learn
> from this.
> >
> > I've learned a lot between proposal versions in RIPE, LACNIC and ARIN.
>
> I have no opposition to doing something if we can get a proposal that
> offers something that ARIN can do.
>
> The first step must be to identify what ARIN can do and accept what is
> beyond ARIN’s mandate and capabilities.
>
> Owen
>
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