[arin-ppml] [EXT] Re: Open Petition for ARIN-prop-266: BGP Hijacking is an ARIN Policy Violation

Keith W. Hare Keith at jcc.com
Tue May 7 09:51:59 EDT 2019


I have not yet seen a complete clear consistent definition of BGP/Route hijacking. Such a definition is a prerequisite to defining a meaningful policy.

If you read through ARIN’s Documents:

·         Bylaws (https://www.arin.net/about/corporate/bylaws/)

·         Articles of Incorporation (https://www.arin.net/about/corporate/documents/incorporation/)

·         Policy Development Process (https://www.arin.net/participate/policy/pdp/)

·         Number Resource Policy Manual (https://www.arin.net/participate/policy/nrpm/)

you will find that ARIN has a very narrow scope and no legal power to enforce anything outside of its narrow scope. Any policy needs to take that narrow scope into account.

So, within ARIN, a policy proposal needs to:

·         Clearly define what the proposal is attempting to address

·         Fit into ARIN’s narrow scope

Yesterday, John Curran provided a link to a blog describing ARIN’s current practices with regard to handling reports of potential route hijacking:


I recommend reading this blog.

To me, ARIN’s current practice is a good way of responding to BGP/Route hijacking reports. It includes the flexibility, investigation, and communication necessary to identify and correct issues. The current practice works by using communication and persuasion. It has the advantage that the details are not codified in policy and so can adjust depending on the actual details and intent discovered during the investigation.


From: ARIN-PPML [mailto:arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net] On Behalf Of Marilson Mapa
Sent: Monday, May 6, 2019 11:41 PM
To: Owen DeLong <owen at delong.com>
Cc: arin-ppml at arin.net
Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] [EXT] Re: Open Petition for ARIN-prop-266: BGP Hijacking is an ARIN Policy Violation

They say that there are more than 80,000 autonomous systems with about one million prefixes. The coexistence of this universe without the BGP seems impossible with equal operability. But the BGP has at its origin a critical design flaw. Whoever designed it or was ill-intentioned, or assumed that the world would have no borders, would have no economic geopolitical problems, and ISP managers would be a caste of people with unquestionable reputation. The vulnerability in BGP design allows any of these thousands of ISPs to hijack network traffic.

But Hijack is not a result of system vulnerability. It is the result of the actions of malicious individuals or organizations and the result of the precariousness of a policy and its customary ill will (or bad intention?) In implementation.
Mr. Owen, I'd like to be able to answer your questions, but I'm not an IT professional and my role is not to tell you how to solve such problems. My role is to charge solution and ethical behavior because I am your victim.
Yesterday was "out of scope", today "there are no legal powers", tomorrow... only the devil knows.
Mr. Ash's swamp is not on prop-266, it's on this corrupt internet that treats the population as beef cattle.
Why so such resistance? Hmm?...


Em seg, 6 de mai de 2019 às 03:42, Owen DeLong <owen at delong.com<mailto:owen at delong.com>> escreveu:

On May 4, 2019, at 15:02 , Marilson Mapa <marilson.mapa at gmail.com<mailto:marilson.mapa at gmail.com>> wrote:

> I have no opposition to doing something if we can get a proposal that offers something that ARIN can do.
> The first step must be to identify what ARIN can do and accept what is beyond ARIN’s mandate and capabilities.

Owen, this is a position that will certainly be supported by all who have endured prop-266. With respect to items 3, 4 and 5 of your pronouncement, punitive rules could be imposed by ARIN in order to reduce illicit acts.

The devil is in the details… What punitive rules do you see ARIN being able to enact that would have
any real effect? How do you see those rules being enforced? Who would those rules be enforced on?

Consider the typical situation:

Organization A has an RSA with ARIN and is registered with resource X.
Organization C has an RSA with another RIR and is registered with resource Y.
Organization Q has no RSA with any RIR and advertises space X to Organization C.
Organization Q presented Organization C with a fraudulent LOA from Organization A.

Please explain what punitive rules ARIN could enact in this case.
Please explain who ARIN would inflict what penalties on and how that would cause
organization Q to stop?
Please explain how ARIN becomes aware that Q’s LOA from A is forged?

Please provide a detailed suggestion or at least enough of a blueprint that it can lead
to actionable policy.



Em sáb, 4 de mai de 2019 às 16:09, Owen DeLong <owen at delong.com<mailto:owen at delong.com>> escreveu:

> On May 3, 2019, at 10:13 , Carlos Friaças via ARIN-PPML <arin-ppml at arin.net<mailto:arin-ppml at arin.net>> wrote:
> Hi,
> On Fri, 3 May 2019, Andrew Bagrin wrote:
>> I'm curious why do people not want to let ARIN try to start getting involved to help resolve the issue of hijacking?

I don’t accept the premise of the question. I think people are perfectly willing to see ARIN expand its involvement in
resolving issues of hijacking to the extent that ARIN can have a meaningful impact on the situation. I think others
in this discussion have a greatly inflated opinion of ARIN’s powers and capabilities in this regard.

> <proposer hat on>
> This is uncharted territory. Some people fear the unknown.

I think that is overly dismissive and an inaccurate assessment of most of the opposition to this proposal.

Indeed, IMHO, this is  actually well charted territory as similar discussions of ARIN’s ability to curtail routing
problems have been held before in this and other fora with the consistent outcome that after a period of education,
most in the discussion arrive at the same conclusion:

        1.      Most of the resource hijackers are not those who have contracts with ARIN with one notable exception.
        2.      Those with a contract with ARIN generally are those who have committed resource fraud in order to
                obtain said contract with ARIN and upon sufficient proof, ARIN already has policies and procedures
                in place to reclaim the resources.
        3.      Stopping hijacking requires an action by those who run routers. ARIN does not run (many) routers.
        4.      ARIN does not control the businesses who run routers.
        5.      ARIN does not have the authority to dictate business practices to ISPs beyond those related to the
                maintenance of the ARIN registration database.
        6.      The theory that ARIN allocates exclusive rights to use number resources on some amorphous
                concept known as “the global internet” is a novel idea, but not particularly proximal to reality.

>> Why would anyone be against ARIN having a process to help resolve these issues?  Sure we can question how effective it will be, but anything will be more effective than nothing, and by actually doing, failing and learning, ARIN will only improve and refine the process. We will all learn from this.
> I've learned a lot between proposal versions in RIPE, LACNIC and ARIN.

I have no opposition to doing something if we can get a proposal that offers something that ARIN can do.

The first step must be to identify what ARIN can do and accept what is beyond ARIN’s mandate and capabilities.


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