[arin-ppml] Discussion on elimination of SWIP requirements.

Ronald F. Guilmette rfg at tristatelogic.com
Sat Jun 3 18:06:09 EDT 2017

In message <551ebd1d-517e-5fb2-e379-0c45674b1f9d at linuxmagic.com>, 
Michael Peddemors <michael at linuxmagic.com> wrote:

>.. and given the 
>large increase in nefarious actors on the internet, it is important to 
>have accurate information on the responsible party for that part of the 
>I for one want to see ARIN do more, and be given a mandate to enforce 
>the given requirements already in place.

As should be evident to anybody who has been paying attention, I
agree completely.  And it isn't just me.  Not by a long shot.  It
should be self-evident also that essentially every member of the
law enforcement community, at all levels, would also like to see,
if anything, the existing SWIP rules strengthened, rather than
diluted, and, more importantly, would like to see them actually
enforced someday.

Unfortunately, as the examples I gave, of and, vividly illustrate, not only are the existing
rules being openly flouted, but they are even being *brazenly*
flouted, by at least some crooked providers... in this case
Limestone Networks... who, for all I know, are selling identity
protection services to criminals, as would appear to be the
case here.  (If anyone wants all of the particulars about the
specific bad actors that are hiding out within the two blocks
in question, and/or their direct links to an active and ongoing
malware distribution operation, you can contact me off list and
I will provide details.)

Of course, Limestone Networks and its clearly non-residential
"residential customer" are far from the only example I could
cite here.  It just happens to be among the most brazen and
obvious.  A fuller listing of all of the active identity
concealment services that are, as we speak, being provided
by entities holding direct ARIN allocations (and to various
flavors of bad actors / criminals)  would be so lengthy that
I'm sure nobody here would bother to read it.

In my more idealistic moments, I like to believe that we all have
a shared and common interest in the security of the Internet as
a whole.  Few of us find the ongoing presence of spammers,
hackers, and malware distributors to be directly beneficial.
But clearly there are exceptions.  Some holders of direct ARIN
allocations are provably and unambiguously profiting from
ignoring even the minimal and ineffectual SWIP rules that are
currently on the books, and are doing so consciously, and in
clear cooperation with bad actors, as a paid "service" to protect
the true identities of these bad actors.

Apparently, this is all exactly how the ARIN community wants things
to be... nevermind the obviously negative effects to the security of
all of us, and nevermind the general disrepute that these few "bad
apple" providers bring to the ARIN community as a whole.  The
community makes sure that nobody, least of all the bad apple providers,
will ever have to do or document anything that they don't much feel
like doing or documenting, and the bad apple providers then, in turn,
drive their proverbial trucks through the gaping loopholes in the
rules and/or their enforcement, and thus profit handsomely by selling
identity protection services to snowshoe spammers and malware distribtion
operations, presumably for some additional premium, addded on top of
the price for the usual and customary provision of non-cloaked services.

I like to think that someday the vast majority of law-abiding and
rule-following members of the ARIN community are going to wake up
and realize that a small minority (<5%) of ARIN direct allocation
holders are responsible for the vast majority (>95%) of all of the
problems on the Internet, and that at some point the majority will
at last conclude that enough is enough, and that all of these clever
"hide the ball" games and shenanigans should finally, seriously, be
ended.  But I'm realistic enough to know that that day is not today.

As with most problems faced by mankind... including global warming...
things are going to have to get much much worse before they get any
better, and the only thing that has been shown, over time, to reliably
motivate homo sapiens to get up and out of their comfortable barcoloungers
is a crisis that can no longer be ignored.

I wish for once that we humans could be smart enough to act to solve at
least this one evident problem early, i.e. -before- things reach crisis
proportions, but in this case that doesn't seem at all likely.

Would that it were otherwise.


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