[arin-ppml] Revisit RPKI TAL Relying Party Agreement?
job at ntt.net
Mon Jan 30 03:42:22 EST 2017
For many years now, the publication of ARIN's cryptographic RPKI
materials has been a point of contention. See , , , and  as
examples of the ongoing discussion.
Third parties who wish to validate BGP route announcements to protect
their ARIN-region-based customers and partners, or to use RPKI data in
provisioning processes (such as prefix-filters generation), must
(implicitly) agree to the "Relying Party Agreement".
"ARIN publishes all Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs), and RPKI-signed objects in its Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) Repository. The ARIN Repository is available
to anyone under the terms and conditions in the Relying Party
These materials are intended to be used by both ARIN members as well as
non-ARIN affiliated organisations (who might not even have a presence in
the ARIN region).
What stands out to me is that (as example) the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator
ships with materials from all the RIRs, except ARIN. The RPKI Validator
is a commonly used software package to interact with the RPKI.
(notice that LACNIC, AfriNIC, APNIC, RIPE NCC are all there)
As such, the RPKI Validator (out of the box) is not complete. I
attribute this to ARIN's RPA. This phenomenon puts a burden on every
organisation wishing to use RPKI.
I view this as a shortcoming of the ecosystem and detrimental to our
efforts maintain a secure routing system.
Of course any party can read the RPA and (if they agree) download the
ARIN TAL and add it to their RPKI Validator installation, but I strongly
prefer an ecosystem which out-of-the-box is operating in a secure mode.
I'd argue that ARIN has an obligation to its members to make these
materials unencumbered by legal constraints and freely available to
A comparison can be drawn with DNSSEC: ICANN (through the IANA) go above
and beyond to publish the DNSSEC materials required for validation, and
ensure distribution as widely as possible: https://www.iana.org/dnssec/files
The strategy is described here:
Note that there is no mention of "Agreement" or "Indemnification".
Imagine DNSSEC without trivial availability of public keys: it wouldn't
I'd like to request that we revisit the topic of the RPKI TAL Relying
Party Agreement, with the goal to make these cryptographic materials
freely available in such a way that they can be bundled with software
distributions. When ARIN's TAL can be bundled freely, I anticipate more
innovation in the secure routing problem space. RPKI can play a
significant role in not only as a defense mechanism, but also as part of
provisioning processes. Unlimited distribution of the RPKI TALs is key.
I consider the limited availability of the ARIN TAL a showstopper for
global RPKI deployment.
More information about the ARIN-PPML