[arin-ppml] Draft Policy ARIN-2014-9: Resolve Conflict Between RSA and 8.2 Utilization Requirements
David.Huberman at microsoft.com
Wed Mar 26 16:36:14 EDT 2014
In discussing opposition to 2014-9, and why audited needs-basis is still very much important,
Owen laid out the following point in support of needs assessments in NRPM 8.2:
> 1. To raise the visibility when an 8.3 transfer is being attempted through structures designed
> to disguise it as an 8.2 transfer.
I read this as an anti-speculation argument. It has been asserted in PPML over the years that
there exists the possibility of well-capitalized actors coming into the IPv4 market, buying up
tracts of available space, and then artificially raising the prices for the sole purpose of making
a profit. This would be a bad thing to genuine needers of IPv4. By making policy levers a
certain way, ARIN policy can quash those behaviors before they develop. It's a clear and concise
argument that has, so far, won out in the policy development process
The counter argument over the years has been equally consistent: markets work, let the
markets be markets, ARIN shouldn't impede on markets. (That's my lay understanding,
anyway. I am an engineer, not an arm chair economist.)
I think the quoted text is the most compelling argument against part of my 2014-9 proposal,
because Owen's probably right: it would be a great way for a speculator to get around the
24-month rule that exists in NRPM 8.3.
It's been a few years (I think) since the ARIN PPML community has really argued through the
speculator-vs-free market argument in a substantive policy discussion, so maybe Chicago is
the right venue to see where the community's feelings tend towards nowadays.
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