[arin-ppml] Draft Policy 2012-3: ASN Transfers
owen at delong.com
Fri Mar 16 15:13:58 EDT 2012
Given the lack of good revocation procedures for certificates and the fact that even when
good revocation procedures have been available, they tend not to get used, having
ASNs milling about with multiple possibly legitimate-looking signers would, in fact,
reduce the usefulness of RPKI.
On Mar 16, 2012, at 11:40 AM, David Farmer wrote:
> On 3/16/12 10:11 CDT, Tom Vest wrote:
>> 3. Entities that would not be unhappy to see SIDR/RPKI fail
>> absolutely and/or to succeed primarily in turning the current
>> industry pecking order into a perpetual, insurmountable reputation
>> hierarchy -- where no amount of good of behavior can ever be truly
>> reassuring (if you're a new entrant), and no instance of bad behavior
>> need ever tarnish one's own reputation (if you're an incumbent
>> operator) -- would have everything they require to achieve those
> I'd be interested in more details on the risks you see ASN transfers creating for RPKI.
> Would such risks to RPKI associated with ASN transfers be any different than ARIN reassigning an ASN that was returned to it or that ARIN reclaimed?
> Are you saying that ASNs are suppose to be both globally and eternally unique?
> I'm not saying I'd be opposed to ASNs being eternally unique, but I didn't know it was a requirement, especially of RPKI.
> David Farmer Email:farmer at umn.edu
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