[arin-ppml] private whois record

Kevin Kargel kkargel at polartel.com
Tue Aug 7 14:12:19 EDT 2012


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Chris Engel [mailto:cengel at conxeo.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 12:40 PM
> To: Kevin Kargel; 'ARIN PPML (ppml at arin.net)'
> Subject: RE: [arin-ppml] private whois record
> > I see no great problem with private registration so long as there are
> active
> > authoritative contacts that can actually do something should a network
> or
> > abuse issue occur.  Having an abuse or NOC contact point to someone who
> > can
> > call someone who knows who to call is unacceptable.  We need to be able
> to
> > reach a network administrator directly.
> >
> > Having said that, if you are operating on the public network and wish to
> > keep your contact information private then something just doesn't jive.
> I
> > do strongly support transparency.  If you don't want to disclose any
> > information the solution is simple, don't transact on public networks.
> >
> >
> > Kevin
> While I sympathize with Kevin,  but from the standpoint of many
> organizations that (direct contact to an admin)  just doesn't make sense.
> Organizations are generally better off having the listed contact be some
> sort of CSR/answering service type that has their own private
> contact/escalation list of who to call for a given situation. The reason
> is that Engineers tend to be a much more valuable/expensive resource then
> CSR/Answering Service personnel. You don't want to waste that resource
> with the initial screening of calls that might include a very high noise
> to signal ratio. The CSR can perform the initial screening of calls and
> separate the  "Hey I've got a great deal on routers I'd like to sell you"
> ,  from the "Your network seems to be flooding me with what looks to be a
> DOS attack",  from the "I sent an e-mail to someone at your network and it
> bounced back". This is a much more effective use of resources, especially
> for smaller organizations who may not have 24/7 Engineer staffing.  I know
> if I kept getting calls in the middle of the night from guys wanting to
> sell me network equipment, I would simply turn off my phone and then you'd
> have no contact to deal with your emergency.  The key here is that the CSR
> has enough training to separate real emergencies from the chaff and has
> accurate contact info of who to get ahold of for genuine emergencies. No
> one likes dealing with layers of abstraction when they have a genuine
> problem. But the reality is that publicly published information will get
> abused by people who don't have such problems. It's not an unreasonable
> trade-off for that to expect to have to deal with some initial screening
> and a layer or two of abstraction as long as you do eventually get to deal
> with someone who has authority to act on your problem, and it's done in a
> reasonably timely fashion. YMMV.
> Christopher Engel
[kjk] How does that help us when an email process or an Ethernet interface
runs amok and my servers are in a DoS condition because of traffic from your
network?  Is my only solution to block all traffic from your entire netblock
and wait for you to decide to wake up and call me?  
One step away with a single triage desk I can handle, as in our case the
listed phone number will reach our front desk and you will be forwarded to
someone authoritative in the same call.  
In a worst case scenario where the front desk is overwhelmed you will be
given our service that will contact a company manager.  I realize this is
effectively degrees of separation, but at least you are in the correct
organization from the start.

The problem I have is in dealing with private registrations often times
there are five or more degrees of separation between the listed contact and
someone that can actually do anything.  It can be as long as a week with
that scenario to get to someone that can do anything to actually resolve a
problem.  That just doesn't work.

In the case of abuse and NOC email addresses those certainly need to be
actual monitored email addresses, not a mailbox that will get checked once a
week and forwarded to someone who knows who to really send it to when they
have time.

I don't know about how you run your NOC, and I don't mean to tell you what
to do, but for our NOC legitimate role contacts are listed that will get to
staff.  If something is running amok in my network I want to know about it.
I don't want to know about it tomorrow.  
IP Address:
Country:      USA - North Dakota
Network Name: POLARCOMM-BLK-2
Owner Name:   Polar Communications
>From IP:
To IP:
Allocated:    Yes
Contact Name: Polar Communications
Address:      110 4th St E, PO Box 270, Park River
Email:        hostmaster at polarcomm.com
Abuse Email:  hostmaster at polarcomm.com
Phone:        +1-701-284-7221
Yes, that is our real name, our real phone number, that is a monitored email
address, and if you want you can even send me schwag like coffee cups or
t-shirts to the postal address listed and I will greatly appreciate it.  

I can and do hang up on salesmen.  I really do not have a big problem with
junk calls.  I think you are working on a solution in search of a problem.

I will stick to my original statement - a part of transacting on public
networks is providing contact information.  If you don't want to do that you
can always tunnel through someone else's circuits and protect your

The administrators for routing devices connected directly to the public
network need to be reachable without hours of detective work or unreasonable
contact delays.  

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