[arin-ppml] ARIN-prop-157 Section 8.3 Simplification
tvest at eyeconomics.com
Thu Sep 22 23:01:20 EDT 2011
On Sep 22, 2011, at 8:17 PM, Benson Schliesser wrote:
> On Sep 22, 2011, at 6:53 PM, Tom Vest wrote:
>> I am not suggesting that Geolocation and/or Geoproximity are relevant now or might cease to be relevant for transferred ASNs, but rather that the increased mobility of ASNs could reduce the effectiveness Geolocation and/or Geoproximity for everything else.
> Geolocation approaches are fundamentally broken if they assume networks are static. The relationship of an address-location might change over long-ish timescales, but it does indeed change. And an ASN doesn't necessarily align with a geography. I don't see how ASN transfers materially change this situation.
>> For now I'll assume that the relevance of ASNs to the other four of the six issues identified in the ISOC paper ("Identifying abusers," "Spam," "Authentication and security," and "Lawful intercept/forensics") is somewhat clearer; please let me know if you disagree.
> I'm struck that all of these issues are effectively dealt with by using Whois. This is true for IP prefixes as well as ASNs. So I'm not sure I understand how you're applying these beyond their original context of address sharing. It's certainly not clear to me why they're reasons to prohibit updating Whois records to reflect ASN transfers. Can you explain further?
Briefly, you are both right in observing that using Whois is precisely how we solve this problem this today, and utterly wrong in assuming that Whois participation levels (e.g., share of population participating * [completeness/richness of individual records * accuracy of records * timeliness of registry record updates] as motivated solely by the uncoordinated (i.e., "policy-free") profit-seeking behavior of anonymous "sovereign" resource holders would actually remain high enough for that solution to remain viable. Registries and other (even very high) value-added services that give rise to "free riding" incentives, but which permit no countervailing/self-perservation mechanisms follow a natural evolutionary trajectory, which is nicely illustrated by the history of RADB.
Individual private incentives alone just aren't enough.They never have been. Systems that reinforce and invest natural private incentives with some means of mitigating free riding risks can and often work for long periods of time, i.e., for as long as the interests of individual members remain aligned "enough."
Of course, that's only true for systems in which participants do not generally insist on framing their own private interests as "anything I want, now," and who are not inclined to interpret any/every outcome that falls short of that ideal as a manifestation of totalitarian oppression.
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