[arin-ppml] 2011-1 dissent Was: Re: ARIN-2011-1:ARINInter-RIRTransfers - Last Call

George Herbert george.herbert at gmail.com
Mon Oct 24 19:10:07 EDT 2011

On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 3:57 PM, William Herrin <bill at herrin.us> wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 6:43 PM, Mike Burns <mike at nationwideinc.com> wrote:
>> How many times could you rinse/repeat this cycle before the activity became
>> so evident that ARIN refused to authorize the transfer, and instead
>> attempted reclamation due to fraud?
> Hi Mike,
> As many as you want until the Board adopts a policy which declares
> defines such use illegitimate. If the policy says it isn't fraud then
> it isn't fraud no matter how egregious. ARIN simply isn't allowed to
> make it up as they go; they're bound by the policies. One problem with
> 2011-1 as presently drafted is that it takes some dubious activities
> that current policy defines as "not fraud" and creates an only
> moderately circuitous path to easy cash.
>> I agree that protections against fraud in obtaining addresses from the free
>> pool will become increasingly important, and if there was some work in the
>> past related to detecting related-legal-entities, it would be prudent to
>> revisit that subject.
> I'll take counterpoint: protections will become unimportant relatively
> quickly because we're nearly out of addresses in the ARIN free pool
> too. Nevertheless, we need some protections _until_ events render
> matter moot.
>> Bill, what would you think about preventing those who receive addresses from
>> the free pool from selling addresses for some timeframe commencing at the
>> time of their last allocation?
> Do we really want to lock unused or underused addresses out of play
> for folks who DO meet ARIN's needs-justification when the whole point
> of transfers is that we don't have enough addresses to go around?
> Regards,
> Bill Herrin

Obviously locking addresses out of play a bit is the point; we're
putting up some roadblocks, nobody objects to the idea of it not being
a free-for-all.

The question is whether the roadblocks are effective and limited
(i.e., don't get in the way of those with legitimate non-speculative
needs, do at least slow down speculators just in it for a few $$$).

I am so far convinced that we don't actually know the answer; this, to
me, argues for slowing down and some more thinking about it and gaming
the scenarios some more.

Slowing down has its own costs - including potentially affecting those
with legitimate non-speculative needs.  The point at which those costs
become real and significant is perhaps a bit too late; figuring out
where we are in the understanding as we approach that point would be
optimal.  But this is a policy and business scenario debate, not a
game theory exercise per se...

-george william herbert
george.herbert at gmail.com

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