[arin-ppml] Fw: Accusationof fundamentalconflictofinterest/IPaddress policypitched directly to ICANN

Mike Burns mike at nationwideinc.com
Thu May 5 10:04:02 EDT 2011

Hi Owen, answers in italics
   Now, if you mentioned the judiciary, you might have a point, but, you did not. You chose
  the governor.

  Small case "g" governor, see how semantic this can get. I think with your response, my concept is clear.
  If you pretend I mentioned judiciary, then maybe you can sense that what I am trying to say is that it can be argued either way in terms of authority.
  And that argument is boring. I don't think the authority structure is as clear as you describe. Or as I conceive it. 
  Could be that is uniquely murky, and seems to be in the midst of transition away from US government control, in any case, leading to further murkiness.
  No, it proffers one possible set of requirements which could be used to do so.
  That is (and was) my point. Other than the author, there is no reliable evidence
  that anyone has reviewed or accepted this as the way such a thing should
  be done, let alone the way they would be done if such a structure were to be

  OK, we can read the letter. It's pretty clear it's a proposed (not ratified) set of standards for private ip registries, based on those existing for DNS registries.
  I never said it was reviewed or accepted, just that Benson's proposals lacked these kinds of regulations on new registry entities.
  I don't pretend to know what would happen if the author of the letter's proposals were accepted, and the Board of ICANN decided to implement them.
  My suspicion is that they would somehow become policy, though through what mechanism, I don't know.

        I just skimmed it, but if the community decided that Benson's proposals suffered only from a lack of oversight, and required action at a global level, then perhaps they will add their voice to the support which I offered.

      Perhaps, but, you would still need a global policy proposal to voice support for.

      Unless ICANN board actually does make the decision they are being asked to make. The link above is  policy proposal on the ICANN correspondence page, and it is referenced in this letter:
      http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/holtzman-to-olive-02mar11-en.pdf providing reasons for requesting the decision at the ICANN board level. Based on the appeal to the authority of the DoC contract, I expect there could be a further appeal to the DoC or NTIA level if the ICANN board decides not to make a decision. It is interesting that ICANN requested information from ARIN instead of summarily dismissing the request as coming outside of policy. ARIN's reply to ICANN is on the same site.

  I cannot see any correspondence that shows ICANN board requesting information from ARIN that was done after ICANN received this letter.
  Can you point to a link to such?

  Here is the sequence
  http://icann.org/en/correspondence/holtzman-to-beckstrom-27jan11-en.pdf     T
  This was a letter of  complaint to ICANN and a request for an appeal at the ICANN level based on authority derived from the DoC contract.

  This is the letter from ICANN to ARIN which requests more information instead of summarily dismissing the request as coming outside of normal policy development channels.

  This is John Curran's reply to ICANN

  This is the letter which includes the proposed regulations on new registries.
  I'm pretty sure that's the flow. A request last year from Depository to ARIN for bulk whois data in order to provide directory services.
  ARIN denies it and says it violates the AUP, it's not a valid purpose for bulk access.
  Then the letters above start, the first one is an appeal to ICANN, which I took as a means of going over ARIN's head, although such talk of levels is like a verbal Escher drawing, apparently.
  You seem certain that ICANN both won't and can't make this decision and make it apply to ARIN's sharing of whois data. I'm not so sanguine. 
  I think courts seem more likely to deal with contracts then Memorandums and Agreements of Understanding.
  My guess, and I'm not a lawyer, is that should push come to shove in a legal arena, the courts may decide that the authority comes from the DoC contract.
  It could be as you say, that ICANN has no authority to dictate anything to ARIN; the letters say there is no contract between ARIN and ICANN.
  Just a guess, and I could be wrong. If it turns out that ICANN either can't or won't make the decision, as John points out in his letter, (or maybe elsewhere) that there remains the ability to change the global policy which specifies regional registry properties which he believes preclude private registries. Perhaps ICANN has power to make those changes, and the ARIN MoU would then require ARIN to submit?

  >Proper stewardship is to make policy that will increase the supply of addresses and bring down their price, while increasing whois reliability and removing the biggest distinction between legacy and >non-legacy addresses.
  >In general, I would agree with you about the goals of proper stewardship. Obviously, I do not
  >think that is the effect competing registries would have.

  Maybe I have found an appealing argument in the idea that increasing supply will reduce price. Since in a post-exhaust world, even those with need will have to pay for IP addresses, maybe the best stewardship is the policy which will lead to the lowest price?  Should frame the debate in that way?  Which policies should be implemented which will create the greatest supply to replace the free pool, in order that price be driven down?  Which types of markets lead to lowest prices, those with fewer regulations or those with more regulations?  Is low price to be desired by the proper steward? Now we are stewards of the rules and not the addresses.

      Are you accusing the APNIC community of abandoning stewardship, and if they did, why do you think they did that? Is the region largely peopled by IPv4 profiteers?

  >Yes. I believe that the transfer policy in the APNIC region was an abandonment of their
  >stewardship role and I have said as much on their policy development mailing list.
  >Why? Because Geoff Huston and a few other leaders in that community pushed long
  >and hard to get that position adopted mainly by creating fear that failing to do so would
  >render all RIR policy meaningless because the RIR policy would simply be bypassed
  >in favor of people doing what they wanted anyway.

  >Personally, I think that argument is absurd. Making theft legal just because you can't
  >stop people from stealing makes no sense to me.

  Well, that information leads me to discount the deaggregation argument against removing need requirements.
  I consider Geoff Huston to be en expert on BGP tables and defer to his judgement here. 
  Clearly he did not see the risk of BGP table growth as a cause to retain needs requirements.
  I hope the ARIN community can take away the idea that it is not just a few IPv4 profiteers who have different visions of stewardship.

  Let me know if you need any help. While I don't agree with your goals and think they would be bad policy, I am happy to help
  bring such proposal before the community for their consideration.

  Thanks, I appreciate the help and the advice.

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