[arin-ppml] IPv4 Transfer Policy Change to Keep Whois Accurate

[Owen DeLong]

On May 20, 2011, at 7:55 AM, Mike Burns wrote:

> 
> 
> Good Morning Owen,
>> 
>>>> Like those unfortunate souls who will find themselves behind CGN will likely enrich their ISP, who can sell as many addresses into the market as he can without losing too many customers who demand >>non-CGN access.
>> 
>>> So you are saying that your proposal will increase the deployment of LSN... Yet another reason to oppose.
>> 
>> No, I am saying the deployment of LSN is likely to happen, and when it does an uncertain number of ip addresses may be freed up to supply the transfer market.
>> 
> 
>> Either your proposal makes a difference here, or, your above statement isn't relevant to the discussion. If your
>> proposal makes a difference in this regard (encouraging LSN), that is a negative IMHO.
> 
> I was replying to your thread with Matthew wherein you claimed to have proof of the size of the transfer pool, which proof, combined with the known and stable demand, led you to a 4 year timeframe.
> I don't see any impact on my proposal, though.
> 

If your policy doesn't have an impact here, my estimates are likely accurate.

> 
>> 
>>>> Or even the deployment of plain old NAT could free up addresses which are currnently being  advertised now for sale later.
>>> 
>> 
>>> So you are saying that your proposal will increase the deployment of NAT... Yet another reason to oppose.
>> 
>> I am saying that your "proof" of the size of the transfer pool is not valid because you assume 100% efficiency in routed space.
> 
>> I actually don't assume that at all, but, that's OK. There may be other assumptions built in. I would argue that increasing
>> NAT does not increase the efficiency of address utilization, but, merely increases the number of users on a single
>> address while decreasing the utility of those addresses. The net efficiency remains roughly the same if one considers
>> he utility factor as part of the efficiency equation.
> 
>> So, again, either your proposal will make a difference here (encouraging NAT) or it won't. If it doesn't, there's
>> not a lot of relevance to your statement.
> 
> No, my proposal doesn't impact, my statment was in reply to your establishing with any accuracy the size of the transfer pool.
> 

If your policy doesn't change the situation, my estimates are likely accurate.

>> 
>> 
>>>> The pool of buyers is known to be monotonically increasing and ARIN's average issuance
>>>> of ~190,000 IPv4 /24s each year by ARIN would indicate an annual market demand for 25%
>>>> of the maximum possible pool from which to develop such a market (roughly 12 /8s)
>>> 
>>>> Therefore, even if we assume that all possible addresses will come on the market with
>>>> your policy, the supply will be gone in 4 years or less. Any churn beyond that would leave
>>>> a need-gap behind unless it is the result of successful abandonment of IPv4. At the point
>>>> where organizations can begin successful abandonment of IPv4 altogether, the market
>>>> will invariably collapse anyway.
>>> 
>>> And you believe this and still think there is a danger from speculators? When the market is at most 4 years in duration and then subject to collapse due to IPv6?
>>> 
>> 
>>> Yes. I think that if you open it up to speculation, the duration becomes much closer to 4 minutes
>>> than 4 years.
>> 
>>> Owen
>> 
>> Owen, any single entity is limited to a /12. I trust the ARIN staff to be able to determine whether the entity is a sham company, and even by the size of your limited pool, a /12 can't corner the market. So maybe we can at least temper the fear that a speculator would enter into a 4 minute market.
>> 
> 
>> It doesn't have to be a sham company, it can simply be a subsidiary. For example, last year, a certain
>> cable provider got a /9. They would have no problem whatsoever creating 8 regional operating
>> companies each of whom needed a /12 in my estimation.
> 
>> The /12 limit is both absurd and utterly useless in having the effect you claim. All it would really
>> do is penalize large providers (note, I'm seeking fairness, not penalties for either side) and
>> increase disaggregation.
> 
>> Owen
> 
> How does it penalize anybody but the people you have expressed such fear of, the speculators and market cornerers?

> If the large company can show need, it can continue to get addresses above and beyond a /12.

I see your point. I had missed that subtlety. OK, so, it's merely a no-op, not punitive.

> The number is designed to allow for almost all entities to engage in fluid transactions without requiring ARIN oversight, but would prevent anybody from "buying up all the addresses", as has been very commonly expressed as a negative aspect to my proposal.

Except it wouldn't actually prevent buying up all the addresses, it would just require more paperwork to do so.

> Since my expressed intent for the /12 is to prevent these kinds of activities, but it has been mentioned that it could be gamed through the creation of sham companies (or subsidiaries) I am open to any suggestions to the phrasing of that limit, but my assumption is that we would rely on ARIN staff interpretation of the facts in the light of the proposal's expressed intent.
> 

Needs basis works to prevent this without having to create elaborate rules to prevent gaming an indirect
management scheme such as what you are proposing. Seems to me that needs basis is a superior
mechanism for accomplishing this goal.

Owen