[arin-ppml] IPv4 Transfer Policy Change to Keep Whois Accurate
owen at delong.com
Thu May 12 05:14:13 EDT 2011
On May 11, 2011, at 7:41 PM, Martin Millnert wrote:
> On Wed, May 11, 2011 at 10:23 PM, Owen DeLong <owen at delong.com> wrote:
>>>> then, either:
>>> 1) policies (eventually) change to adjust more towards reality (if a
>>> party can get working internet w/o involving the RIR, by an ISPs free
>>> will choice to accept the addresses as legitimate theirs, they have no
>>> real reason to involve the RIR )
>>> 2) the RIR's whois loses accuracy,
>>> 3) the RIR corrupts its practices of the community policies to avoid
>>> 2, lacking 1.
>> You left out:
>> 4) The RIR eventually identifies these outliers and reclaims the numbers
>> to be reissued to members of the community willing to comply with policy.
> Well, you'd potentially destroy uniqueness if the other party and its
> ISPs disagrees and continues to use the addresses.
That is a theoretical risk today with hijackings. I fail to see the difference.
>> 5) The community directs the RIRs to take some more aggressive action
>> with respect to these outliers.
> It's just bits, numbers, and you said yourself you are free to
> configure whatever bits you want wherever you want.
Yep. There are things the RIR can do to make that harder for hijackers
and others not conforming to community policy if that becomes desirable.
Currently, I'm not inclined to believe that it is a desirable alternative.
Personally, I think 4 is probably the best option. However, I'm not entirely
convinced of any widespread validity of the assertion stated in 1, so,
that's probably part of the issue.
More information about the ARIN-PPML