tedm at ipinc.net
Tue Apr 26 16:20:17 EDT 2011
On 4/26/2011 12:43 PM, George, Wes E [NTK] wrote:
> Ted, I think you're directing your comments at the wrong person/company. I only made the comments regarding SIDR, conveniently
> preceded with "[WEG]". I simply quoted a previous commenter for context.
There were no quote marks in front of the section preceded with WEG so I
assumed you had posted that and were not quoting someone else. Sorry
> So if you had a point, either related to Sprint or to the overall conversation, I missed it.
The point was the people focusing on the idea that ARIN
has no direct control over Internet routers, and thus supposedly
cannot affect routing, are wrong. ARIN has control over WHOIS and
many networks use that as authoratative of whether an organization can
announce a route or not.
All routes on the Internet lead somewhere, and the upstreams of the
hijackers can often be persuaded to do the right thing if the WHOIS
data supports it.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net] On Behalf Of Ted Mittelstaedt
> Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2011 3:35 PM
> To: arin-ppml at arin.net
> Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] Hijackings
> On 4/26/2011 6:29 AM, George, Wes E [NTK] wrote:
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net]
>> On Behalf Of Ronald F. Guilmette
>> Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2011 4:29 AM
>> To: arin-ppml at arin.net
>> Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] Hijackings
>>>> Note that the above proposal, if adopted, would still not result in
>>>> ARIN becoming in any sense the "router police".
>>> See above.
>> ARIN does not now, and would not, under this proposal, have its hands
>> on the proverbial switches, knobs, and dials of any routers anywhere.
> When we connected to Sprint they would not adjust their BGP filters to allow us to announce our block until the WHOIS database had
> been updated.
> And that was a few years ago.
>> As now, it could not tell anybody what to route or conversely what
>> not to. (The community quite clearly opposes any such control on
>> ARINs part
> Nobody is proposing that ARIN have such control.
> If Sprint made a company decision to ignore WHOIS that would be their decision, ARIN could not interfere no matter what it put in
> But when Sprint does makes such a decision, you let me know, Wes.
> and this proposal would do nothing to change the fact that ARIN does not own or operate any routers, other
>> than its on in-house ones.
>> [WEG] I should note that as the SIDR origin validation stuff comes
>> online, there may be some additional knobs in the form of revocation
>> of certificates (or lack of those certificates in the first place)
>> that would make any announcements of routes identified to be in this
>> situation show up as invalid to those participating in the SIDR origin
>> validation. However, because what one does with invalid (vs valid)
>> routes is a matter of policy applied within one's own network, its impact is still not really controlled by ARIN, it simply gives
> ARIN an additional way to alert network operators of a potential problem. I would still recommend that if anyone decides to move
> this recommendation into a formal policy proposal, that they consider the implications of SIDR on how it is implemented.
>> Wes George
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