George, Wes E [NTK]
Wesley.E.George at sprint.com
Tue Apr 26 09:29:30 EDT 2011
From: arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net] On Behalf Of Ronald F. Guilmette
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2011 4:29 AM
To: arin-ppml at arin.net
Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] Hijackings
>> Note that the above proposal, if adopted, would still not result in
>> ARIN becoming in any sense the "router police".
ARIN does not now, and would not, under this proposal, have its hands on the proverbial switches, knobs, and dials of any routers
anywhere. As now, it could not tell anybody what to route or conversely what not to. (The community quite clearly opposes any such
control on ARINs part and this proposal would do nothing to change the fact that ARIN does not own or operate any routers, other
than its on in-house ones.
[WEG] I should note that as the SIDR origin validation stuff comes online, there may be some additional knobs in the form of
revocation of certificates (or lack of those certificates in the first place) that would make any announcements of routes identified
to be in this situation show up as invalid to those participating in the SIDR origin validation. However, because what one does with
invalid (vs valid) routes is a matter of policy applied within one's own network, its impact is still not really controlled by ARIN,
it simply gives ARIN an additional way to alert network operators of a potential problem. I would still recommend that if anyone
decides to move this recommendation into a formal policy proposal, that they consider the implications of SIDR on how it is
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