[arin-ppml] Can a personal property approach ever transition into multi-stakeholder, private sector led, bottom-up policy development model?
Ted Mittelstaedt
tedm at ipinc.net
Thu Apr 28 17:19:49 EDT 2011
On 4/28/2011 1:05 PM, John Curran wrote:
> On Apr 28, 2011, at 2:31 PM, David Conrad wrote:
>> The reality (at least as I see it) is that at least some legacy holders believe (if they consider the question at all) that the IP addresses in their inventory are their asset to do with as they please.
>
> Let's explore that statement a little further to see if we can get
> some clarity on underlying issues...
>
> 1) It's the position of many stakeholders that we should operate
> in a model of multi-stakeholder, private sector led, bottom-up
> policy development model of technical coordination for these
> identifies that acts for the benefit of global Internet users.
>
> 2) Such policy development model should not only allow open
> participation, but ideally should be based on the voluntary
> contractual agreement of participants for purposes of
> implementation of the developed policies. This also means
> that no governmental or regulatory mandates are necessary
> for the system to operate effectively.
>
> 3) Presume an hypothetical organization (JKL) that does this for
> all IP address holders globally, and also provides for big
> picture overall policy goals like periodic recompetition,
> integrity protections, transparency, accountability, etc.
>
> Once that's all up and running just fine, how do the existing
> legacy address holders transition into the system? It is clear
> that has to happen if you want to be able to evolve and set
> effective policies systemwide, but how does such a transition
> for those outside the system occur?
>
> A government mandate or ruling to that effect is suboptimal, since
> that's contrary to the principles that we are building something
> that doesn't require such to operate. Yet, in the absence of such
> forms of governmental involvement, there is unlikely to be any
> benefit for parties working outside the system to ever participate,
> as they already have all the benefits of the system without any
> of encumbrances. A few might, but there will be many that see
> no reason to do so.
>
> Can we actually have *any* multi-stakeholder, private sector led,
> bottom-up policy development system for technical coordination
> of identifiers at the same time as we have parties presently that:
> 1) have no existing contractual requirements to participate in the
> system, but 2) presently hold number resources in their belief as
> personal property?
>
> How would such a transition ever occur? Do you deprive those outside
> the system of the benefits to encourage participation, or does the
> community decide that the presence of parties without contracts yet
> with resources means that they should operate eternally outside the
> system? Or do they compromise on the "government mandate" approach
> and obtain one, despite the departure from the very framework that
> has been established?
>
> These are some of the underlying questions to the situation that
> we're presently facing, and appears quite possible that parties
> "who feel IP addresses are their asset to do with as they please"
> are inherently incompatible with the goals that we've set for
> private sector led, bottom-up policy development.
>
I think it's important to clarify that it is IPv4 addresses your
talking about, not "IP addresses"
Legacy holders who choose to remain "outside the walls" as it were can
only do this with IPv4 resources.
All IPv6 resources are "inside the walls" at the current time.
If your position is that a shift to IPv6 will never happen, then
the legacy position that they are going to remain "outside the wall"
stays relevant.
But if your point of view is that an IPv6 transition is inevitable,
then it is inevitable that the legacy holders adopting an "outside
the wall" approach are going to be marginalized - as are LRSA
holders.
So, what is your POV?
I am much more concerned with propagation of the LRSA because
of two reasons. First, that
document was only envisioned by the community as a transition
mechanism for IPv4. If ARIN is going to allow resources under LRSA to
stay under LRSA after a transfer, or resources that SHOULD be under LRSA
to go under LRSA as a result of a transfer, then it seems to me you are
encouraging companies like Microsoft that put large amounts
of resources under LRSA to push to have the LRSA apply to IPv6
resources too. Just how flexible are you going to allow the LRSA
to be? Are we going to be reading abut Microsoft getting out of
paying fees for IPv6 next by creative use of the LRSA??
Secondly, how much of a disincentive does a permanent transfer market
in IPv4 create towards migration to IPv6?
It is one thing to use the transfer market to free up old abandoned
IPv4 resources so that the laggards that are suddenly waking up to
the reality of IPv4 depletion can get breathing room to migrate to IPv6
But it is another to use it to create a permanent, ongoing method of
keeping IPv4 resources alive.
ARIN's actions with regard to the Nortel-to-Microsoft transfer have
greatly strengthened the latter use of the transfer mechanism. The
Nortel resources were legacy and needed to be freed up - but the buying
org definitely isn't a laggard, and knew all about IPv6. This transfer
essentially represented a decision by someone within Microsoft to
spend 7.5 million dollars on IPv4 instead of spending 7.5 million
dollars on IPv6. And ARIN helped them to do it.
Maybe I should burn my Team ARIN comics.
Ted
> /John
>
> John Curran
> President and CEO
> ARIN
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> PPML
> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to
> the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List (ARIN-PPML at arin.net).
> Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at:
> http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-ppml
> Please contact info at arin.net if you experience any issues.
More information about the ARIN-PPML
mailing list