[arin-ppml] Hijackings

[George, Wes E [NTK]]

Ted, I think you're directing your comments at the wrong person/company. I only made the comments regarding SIDR, conveniently
preceded with "[WEG]". I simply quoted a previous commenter for context.

So if you had a point, either related to Sprint or to the overall conversation, I missed it.

Wes

-----Original Message-----
From: arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net] On Behalf Of Ted Mittelstaedt
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2011 3:35 PM
To: arin-ppml at arin.net
Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] Hijackings

On 4/26/2011 6:29 AM, George, Wes E [NTK] wrote:
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net] 
> On Behalf Of Ronald F. Guilmette
> Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2011 4:29 AM
> To: arin-ppml at arin.net
> Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] Hijackings
>
>
>>> Note that the above proposal, if adopted, would still not result in 
>>> ARIN becoming in any sense the "router police".
>>
>> See above.
>
> ARIN does not now, and would not, under this proposal, have its hands 
> on the proverbial switches, knobs, and dials of any routers anywhere.


When we connected to Sprint they would not adjust their BGP filters to allow us to announce our block until the WHOIS database had
been updated.

And that was a few years ago.

>  As now, it could not tell anybody what to route or conversely what 
> not to.  (The community quite clearly opposes any such control on 
> ARINs part

Nobody is proposing that ARIN have such control.

If Sprint made a company decision to ignore WHOIS that would be their decision, ARIN could not interfere no matter what it put in
WHOIS.

But when Sprint does makes such a decision, you let me know, Wes.

Ted

  and this proposal would do nothing to change the fact that ARIN does not own or operate any routers, other
> than its on in-house ones.
>
> [WEG] I should note that as the SIDR origin validation stuff comes 
> online, there may be some additional knobs in the form of revocation 
> of certificates (or lack of those certificates in the first place) 
> that would make any announcements of routes identified to be in this 
> situation show up as invalid to those participating in the SIDR origin 
> validation. However, because what one does with invalid (vs valid) 
> routes is a matter of policy applied within one's own network, its impact is still not really controlled by ARIN, it simply gives
ARIN an additional way to alert network operators of a potential problem. I would still recommend that if anyone decides to move
this recommendation into a formal policy proposal, that they consider the implications of SIDR on how it is implemented.
>
> Wes George
>
>
>
>
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