[arin-ppml] (no subject)

[George Bonser]

> > One might also consider the merits of this "distributed management"
> > approach to maintaining whois as a useful mechanism for preserving
> the
> > openness and transparency of ARIN policy outcomes. The more that
such
> > (by current convention, "public") contact information remains
> publicly
> > accessible, the less ARIN members have to rely on ARIN staff to
> produce
> > summary answers to sensitive policy questions using
> > non-sharable/non-disclosable member data. In a world where virtually
> > every important institution is at the center of a permanent debate
> > between defenders of "x is generally good" and partisans of "x is
> > hopelessly corrupt"  -- with the vast majority of stakeholders
likely
> to
> > be in the "trust but verify" center -- seems like it would be
prudent
> to
> > weigh the costs and benefits very carefully before eliminating the
> > public data resources that make such independent
> analysis/verification
> > efforts possible.
> 
> ... ^ what he said.

More openness is better.  If a provider knowingly provides incorrect
info, they should be at risk of losing the IP space.  The addresses do
not belong to them, they are entrusted with them by the community.  I am
generally not in favor of things that stifle competition, either.

I would possibly support a proposal that would eliminate SWIP/RWHOIS
requirements for networks that are announced ONLY from the provider's
network.  SWIP would only be required if the network is announced out of
another net or the address is to be disaggregated from the provider's
block.  That would probably remove a lot of the customers from the WHOIS
information and serve most of the needs of the ISP.   But I that might
significantly increase the volume of calls and they might not have the
staff to deal with that depending on how big they are.  Putting a top
end on the size of blocks not requiring SWIP might be a good idea ...
maybe something like blocks ge /20 don't require SWIP if they have only
one path to the Internet but then the provider themselves is held
responsible for abuse if they don't SWIP it.

If a customer were going to announce the network out of another ISP, I
would think the ISP would WANT accurate SWIP data to be public so the
customer could then be contacted directly if there were problems.

For multi-homed networks using BGP and having an AS, one can find their
customers anyway by looking up the ASNs announced from their networks
space.

For customers where the issuing provider is their sole transport path,
the provider can then reasonably take actions to mitigate whatever the
problem is so I don't have a problem with SWIP requirements being
dropped completely for that case.