[arin-ppml] RIPE/ITU

Skeeve Stevens Skeeve at eintellego.net
Fri Feb 26 20:43:05 EST 2010


Do you have any reference to where the APNIC community is suggesting phasing out the NIR model?

...Skeeve

--
Skeeve Stevens, CEO/Technical Director
eintellego Pty Ltd - The Networking Specialists
skeeve at eintellego.net / www.eintellego.net
Phone: 1300 753 383, Fax: (+612) 8572 9954
Cell +61 (0)414 753 383 / skype://skeeve
www.linkedin.com/in/skeeve ; facebook.com/eintellego
--
NOC, NOC, who's there?


> -----Original Message-----
> From: arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net] On
> Behalf Of McTim
> Sent: Saturday, 27 February 2010 9:51 AM
> To: Milton L Mueller
> Cc: arin-ppml at arin.net
> Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] RIPE/ITU
> 
> Hi Milton,
> 
> On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 1:15 AM, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu>
> wrote:
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > You might want to look into APNIC's NIR model which is exactly
> > > that, and then make a formal proposal.
> >
> > My understanding is that the people at APNIC are not exactly
> delighted with the NIR model;
> 
> My understanding is that the people who make up the APNIC community
> are not exactly delighted with the NIR model, and the model is being
> phased out as not viable.
> 
> >
> > it was a concession to some of the same political pressures that are
> now leading to the call for CIRs. Indeed, it is a bit inconsistent for
> this community to argue against the Ramadass proposal for CIRs and then
> propose NIRs instead.
> 
> agreed, but the community hasn't endorsed this idea AFAICS.
> 
> >
> > I prefer McTim's approach of supporting the principle that addresses
> should be allocated to users (ASs) and not to governments or other
> entities who want to interpose themselves as intermediaries.
> >
> > If it comes down to a choice between NIRs and CIRs, then the only
> relevant difference is whether the RIRs retain a monopoly on higher-
> level allocations or not. I think that's a weak position to be in. Here
> we need to frankly realize that the issues are fundamentally political.
> >
> > Note that the ITU proposal for CIRs does not propose to make them
> exclusive, but rather proposes that an ITU-mediated CIR be an
> additional option. If one supports competing ISPs, why not alternative
> address registries?
> 
> RFC2050
> 
> "Service areas will be of continental dimensions."
> 
> In addition there are various other reasons outlined in the Circleid
> post I sent earlier.
> 
> >
> > One cannot argue against this option on the grounds that we don't
> have enough ipv6 addresses to make it viable; we do. One cannot argue
> against it on the grounds that it messes up the efficiency of routing,
> 
> You can actually.
> 
> >because new, RIR-sanctioned NIRs or new RIRs carved out of existing
> ones would have basically the same effects on routing.
> 
> perhaps, or perhaps not, depending on the policies they adopt.
> 
> >
> > The only way to viably challenge this proposal is to face squarely
> the political issues and question whether states who gain control of ip
> addresses will truly allow competitive alternatives, or instead try to
> leverage their control of the resource to gain more control over
> internet supply and usage, or to favor incumbent, national champion
> network operators.
> 
> 
> or to boost government revenue, or use IP address revenue to feather
> individual nests, or not develop policies in an open, transparent
> manner, etc, etc.
> 
> 
> >
> > One can also try to question the need for this proposal (solution in
> search of a problem). There is merit in this argument, but the issue is
> not quite as simple as it may seem. Developing countries aware of the
> landrush for ipv4 addresses that took place in the early stages of the
> internet's development have a legitimate reason to worry about whether
> history will repeat itself. An inherent feature of needs-based
> allocations is that developed economies will be able to show "need"
> well before undeveloped ones. The ITU is basically arguing for a system
> of reservations that guarantees each nation-state a substantial chunk
> of address resources just in case that happens. Naturally enough, given
> its basis in an intergovernmental organization, the ITU considers
> nation-states the appropriate stewards for these reservations.
> 
> 
> Speaking of "reservations" I am under the impression that it is the
> IETF that instructs the IANA to reserve IP blocks.  If this is
> correct, then the ITU and the RIR policy lists are not the correct
> fora to discuss this proposal.  The ITU should write a draft RFC and
> submit it to the IETF.  Perhaps I am mistaken.
> 
> >
> > If setting aside address block reservations were the ONLY price we
> had to pay to assuage these political concerns, I would say, "do it."
> But other prices could be extracted - as I explained above, linking ip
> address allocations to the nation state system so closely could have
> serious political and regulatory repercussions. That price is not worth
> paying.
> 
> 
> I hope you plan to say this to the ITU in March!
> 
> 
> --
> Cheers,
> 
> McTim
> "A name indicates what we seek. An address indicates where it is. A
> route indicates how we get there."  Jon Postel
> _______________________________________________
> PPML
> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to
> the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List (ARIN-PPML at arin.net).
> Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at:
> http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-ppml
> Please contact info at arin.net if you experience any issues.



More information about the ARIN-PPML mailing list