[arin-ppml] ULA-C
Michael Richardson
mcr at sandelman.ca
Mon Apr 12 21:00:04 EDT 2010
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>>>>> "David" == David Farmer <farmer at umn.edu> writes:
David> Therefore, I believe the concerns about ULA-C becoming a path
David> for policy abuse cannot be completely discounted. However,
David> in reality the risk is no where near as large as some are
David> claiming. Further, I believe this risk can be easily managed
David> via the RIRs' number resource policy processes, if the RIRs
David> were to be given full policy control of ULA-C registrations.
mcr> I agree --- there could be abuse.
mcr> Rather than overconstrain ourselves in advance, is there
mcr> nothing we can do on a complaint basis?
David> Where do those complaints go? How do we resolve disputes? For
David> PA and PI essentially that is dealt within the policy
David> development processes for the RIRs. That is how we hash
David> things out as a community, it seems logical to use the same
David> processes for ULA-C.
Let's say that I start announcing 134.84.123.0/24 from my ASN.
What would you do? Who would you complain to?
(yes, RPKI is a tool to prevent that, as is the RPDB, assume it happens)
But, assuming it gets through, how is that different than announcing
IANA's FC00::/7 on the public Internet?
What I'm asking is: why do we have to think through all possible actions
in advance, and write intricate policies... why do we have no mechanisms
to permit judgement? There is a pathology where organizations try to
write policies for everything, as opposed to routine things+clear
exceptions, only I don't know what the word is.
- --
] He who is tired of Weird Al is tired of life! | firewalls [
] Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works, Ottawa, ON |net architect[
] mcr at sandelman.ottawa.on.ca http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ |device driver[
Kyoto Plus: watch the video <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kzx1ycLXQSE>
then sign the petition.
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