[arin-ppml] Using fees to encourage route aggregation

[tvest at eyeconomics.com]

On Oct 15, 2009, at 11:36 PM, Milton L Mueller wrote:

>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>>
>> The RIRs role is NOT to afflict routing policy with their judgment of
>> how it should be done.

That said, for the last decade-plus, it has been the RIR's role, as  
the executor of community-defined policies, to administer eligibility  
(i.e., "needs"-based allocation) policies that ultimately determine  
*who* gets to exercise their judgement about how to route. The terms  
of those policies have varied over time, but they have always been  
defined in terms of beneficial, operational control of addressable  
capital equipment. That "capitalization" requirement has helped to  
incentivize address recipients to exercise their independent judgment  
in ways that are more often more likely to be aligned toward the  
survival of the Internet, and less often directed toward activities  
that might degrade both the Internet and the value of their own capex.

Obviously it's not a perfect arrangement, but can anybody think of one  
that might provide a better trade-off between individual freedom of  
"routing judgment" and the preservation of a well functioning Internet?

>> The RIRs should focus on allocation policies that meet the needs of
>> the community and leave routing issues to those that run routers  
>> and the
>
> I pretty much agree with that on principle (see proviso below), but  
> it's interesting that on Tuesdays I get excoriated for not  
> understanding how essential RIR central planning of the address  
> space in order to enforce route aggregation and on Thursdays we hear  
> how RIRs have nothing to do with routing. Let's get the story  
> straight.

The story remains straight, and intact despite the attempted  
grammatical contortions.

> To be consistent, the disclaimer above is pretty clearly false. It's  
> clear that many, many things RIRs already do are based on routing  
> considerations. Think of your approach to PI allocations, for  
> example. The whole thrust of post-CIDR policy is to require ip  
> address users to aggregate under providers, which is all about  
> routing.
>
> Bearing in mind that I am not at this point arguing for an  
> aggregation fee, it is nevertheless important to understand that  
> such a fee doesn't tell people how to route (any more than policies  
> that promote provider-based aggregation do), but sets parameters or  
> incentives around which people base routing decisions.
>
>
>> Which view of the routing table would be
>> considered the authoritative reference for
>> disaggregation? Would momentary leaks of
>> more specifics count against someone if
>> they just happened to coincide with the
>> billing sweep through the table? Over what
>> period of time should a prefix have to be
>> disaggregated in order to increase the
>> billing for the prefix? Should the bill increase with
>> the amount of time the route remains in the table?
>
> These are the _interesting_ and _useful_ questions that my floating  
> of the aggregation fee idea was meant to elicit. Thanks!
>
> But your ability to raise such questions, which are clearly  
> unanswered at this point, does not mean that they cannot in  
> principle be answered. Regulatory systems are full of such metrical  
> issues
>
>
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