[arin-ppml] Policy Proposal 2008-6: Emergency TransferPolicyfor IPv4 Addresses - Last Call

Geoff Huston gih at apnic.net
Fri Jan 2 19:18:13 EST 2009

On 03/01/2009, at 10:36 AM, Randy Bush wrote:

> On 09.01.03 07:12, Geoff Huston wrote:
>> I believe that the RIPE policy, which places RIPE in the role of
>> a "market qualifier" places the RIPE NCC into a position that is
>> unreasonable and, I suspect, untenable. I have the same problem  
>> with a
>> recent policy proposal proposed in the APNIC region which contains
>> similar words relating to the RIR performing some form of
>> qualification of market participants. Such a role is one that exposes
>> the RIR to extremely high levels of risk in terms of the potential
>> liability in its assessment procedures and also places it into a role
>> of market regulator where the RIR is singularly ill equipped to
>> perform and it has no recognized mandate or authority to perform
> but have been performing exactly that for some years.

What? Performing the role of regulator in a market for address  
transfers? Really?

>  enough folk seem to have requested to maintain that status quo that  
> the transfer proposal in ripe passed with it and the new one in  
> apnic includes it to see if that will help get apnic past the thrice  
> repeated non-consensus of a proposal without it.  personally, i am  
> not strongly religious either way.

"Thrice repeated non-consensus"???

That is simply not the case, and I 'm surprised given your role in the  
APNIC policy development process that you have such a misunderstanding  
of the background of this proposal.

The proposal has only been presented to the open policy forum for an  
indication of support once to my knowledge, and that was in September  
2008. Previous presentations were informational only. The upshot of  
that consideration by the community was that the Japanese community  
were to further consider the proposal at their meeting in November  
2008, which has taken place.

>> calls into question the RIR's current de facto monopoly position with
>> respect to address distribution and price setting. The scale of risk
>> here, as I see it, is appropriately phrased as a risk to the  
>> continued
>> existence of the RIR structure itself.
> this is new?  the rirs have chosen to walk this line for a long time.

What? Performing the role of regulator in a market for address  
transfers? Really?

> that it is getting thinner and thinner is no big shock.  that there  
> is no obvious bump or narrowing in this path may have led the rirs  
> to keep slowly walking it.  the level of self-righteousness in  
> organizational self-preservation may have assisted :).

Perhaps some facts would assist your line of argument here, rather  
than such rather strained assertions of "self-righteousness in  
organizational self-preservation," or are such mere details  
inappropriate here?

> it would be interesting to see a movement to where the rirs got out  
> of (needs based) regulation of ipv4 and ipv6.  i don't see much  
> support for that in the arin or apnic communities.  i am not sure  
> what this says for the good of the internet.

What would be interesting to see is an analysis of particular  
assertions being made in your response here that specifically relate  
to "the good of the internet" and how.

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