[arin-ppml] Prop-50 and the differences in the various transfer policy proposals
sleibrand at internap.com
Sun Oct 19 23:14:21 EDT 2008
[Cc'ing prop-50 discussion to sig-policy.]
Geoff Huston wrote:
> Hi Scott,
>>> In your article you imply that the RIRs' registry functions are not the
>>> proper lever from which to apply the various regulatory functions
>>> that the
>>> community has indicated are needed. Where/how would you propose the
>>> regulatory function reside / be applied instead?
> Again, the real question is, MUST the RIRs have an answer for
> _everything_? Must the RIR's devise complex procedures that attempt to
> counter particular behaviours, at the common community cost of more
> onerous procedures with higher overheads. And without any practical
> enforcement mechanism why will others even listen to the RIRs?
I understand that the RIRs don't have to do this. I'm asking who else (or
what other set of distributed incentives and emergent properties) should
do it instead.
If no one / nothing else can do it, and it needs done, maybe we should
try. If you think APNIC can't do so for whatever reason, I still think
ARIN could (and should) for the ARIN region.
>>> Or, to put a more practical face on the same question: how do you
>>> that the industry deal with the deaggregation that will result from the
>>> widespread transfer of small netblocks (as allowed under prop-50)?
> Thats a very good example, because deaggregation in the address space
> has been a constant factor for decades. i.e. if enforcing strong
> aggregation in the routing space was a metric of success of the policy
> framework associated with allocation, then the metrics of the routing
> system over the past 10 years would have to assign a failing grade here.
I would argue that current levels of deaggregation have not yet posed
undue burden on default-free operators, and based on that, the
historical/current level of routing table growth is manageable. I am
therefore only talking about attempting to provide sufficient incentive to
maintain the current "weak" level of aggregation.
> Again, to quote from the article:
> "However, fragmentation of the routing space has not been directly
> linked to the further allocation function, and the results of this
> decoupling of policy with a risk of any negative outcome is clearly
> evident in the continuing fragmentation observed in the routing space."
> So, no, I don't think that any transfer policy proposal will do any
> better than the allocation policy framework, and the allocation policy
> framework has been, on the whole, ineffectual.
I agree that we can't do any better than we do today. However, we can do
a lot worse, and likely will under prop-50.
For example, consider two requests from two different organizations, the
first for a /16 and the second for a /18. Today, that is obviously two
allocations and two new routes in the DFZ. Now consider what happens in a
simplified transfer market where the supply consists of five discontiguous
/18s and a /16, with the /18s priced at $1000 each and the /16 at $5000.
Under prop-50, the first organization will get four discontiguous /18s for
$4000 (passing up the intact /16 at $5000). The second will get the fifth
/18 for $1000. In the end, that means that we will have 4+1=5 new routes
in the table.
Under an RIR-regulated transfer market, however, the first organization
would be required to get a contiguous /16, for $5000. The /18 would still
be a /18, so that would be 2 new routes in the table.
As you can see from the example above, or from a more general application
of economic principles to the likely supply and demand of a transfer
market, constraining the recipient of space under transfer to receiving
only a single block large enough to meet their needs approximately
preserves the current rate of routing table growth. However, moving to a
transfer policy like prop-50 results in an increase in the rate of routing
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