[arin-ppml] Policy Proposal: IPv4 Recovery Fund

[Robert Bonomi]

> Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2008 11:11:14 -0500
> From: Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu>
>
[[  sneck  ]]
>
> I am deeply concerned about the degree to which your proposal seems
> designed to maintain ARIN's control just for the sake of maintaining
> ARIN's control. I would prefer a bilateral transaction based regime in
> which ARIN is limited to a title office function. 

A =direct= consequence of that approach is that IP addresses _are_ 
"property", that the recipient of the allocation/assignment *does*
"own" them, and can do "whatsoever they wish" with them.

If one is not going to buy into that mode, then having ARIN offer 'bribes' 
to people to get them to release their hold on resources is about the only
way to stimulate the release of those resources. 

Additionally, in the absense of a 'needs based' market-ENTRY (and 'position 
limit') barrier, and absent any other mandatory regulatory controls ( I'll
admitt, I'm not sure just _which_ government would/could make/implement/enforce
them), the developing market would be absolutely ripe (not to be confused with 
RIPE :) for all kinds of market-manipulation abuses, including artificially 
induced scarcity, speculative hoarding, 'cornering' the market, to name just 
a few.

Simple 'unbridled, naked capitalism' has, in virtually every instance where 
it was allowed, degenerated into abuse by the "have more's" of those who 
"have less", for no better reason than "because the could do it".

If a resource _is_ being utilized, albeit under-utilized, or inefficiently
utilized, there -are- costs to the user of that resource to switch to more-
efficient utilization and/or discontinue completely the use of that resource.

When the pool of those who _will_ underwrite that expense themselves, "for the
good of the community", is exhausted, one must appeal to the 'self-interest'
of the remainder --  i.e. that _not_ 'doing the right thing' will *cost* them 
money.  It is a fact that ARIN has no 'teeth' -- insofar as assessing active
penalties for non-compliance -- except for witholding additional assignments
from the compliance.  Thus the only -viable- way for ARIN to 'cost them (the
inefficient users) money' is to offer payment (that is in excess of the costs
of 'becoming efficient') to the currently inefficient.  The 'Recovery Fund'
policy proposal _does_ do just that.