[arin-ppml] Policy Proposal: IPv4 Recovery Fund

Owen DeLong owen at delong.com
Fri Nov 21 15:46:44 EST 2008


On Nov 21, 2008, at 12:36 PM, William Herrin wrote:

> On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 2:12 PM, Member Services <info at arin.net>  
> wrote:
>> To illustrate the intent of section 4.10.2, let's say that ARIN has
>> the following requests in the following order:
>>
>> 1.      a /22 for XYZ Corp. ($300)
>> 2.      a /15 for BIll's Bait and Hosting Megacorp. ($2500)
>> 3.      a /19 for John's Host Hideaway ($2000)
>> 4.      a /21 for Piner Klerpin's New Net ($800)
>>
>> Example 1:
>> ARIN receives a /18 from someone, but, pays an incentive of
>> $2200 for that /18.
>>
>> ARIN would offer a /19 to John's Host Hideaway for $1100
>> ARIN would then satisfy Piner Klerpin's request for $225
>> ARIN would then satisfy XYZ Corp's request for $112.50
>> ARIN would still have a /20, /21, and /22 for future requests.
>
> Let me suggest a slightly different approach:
>
> The four orgs make those bids to ARIN. ARIN then makes the following
> public bids:
>
> $75 for a /24 only if the rest of the /22 CIDR block is held free by  
> ARIN
> $150 for a /23 only if the rest of the /22 CIDR block is held free  
> by ARIN
> $300 for a /22
> $800 for a /21
> $1100 for a /20
> $2000 for a /19
> $3100 for a /18
> $3100 for a /17
> $3100 for a /16
> $3100 for a /15 (which _won't_ be given to Bill's Bait because $3100> 
> $2500)
> $5600 for a /14 or anything shorter.
>
> As soon as someone accepts one of these bids and sells space back to
> ARIN, these offers are retracted and new ones published based on the
> remaining demand. The difference in money folks pay per address is
> reflected in the place they claim in the queue. Any addresses left
> over from a buy will go to anyone who bids at least as much per
> address as the most expensive person in the buy. These relatively
> random infusions fund ARIN's administrative overhead for this payment
> system.
>

I'm absolutely opposed to this alternative approach.  The goal, here, in
my opinion is to remain as close to the first-come/first-serve  
justified need
that we have in place now. The funding is strictly to deal with the fact
that getting people to do the right thing requires motivation.

The policy is written specifically to come as close as practicable to  
the
existing situation while still attempting to preserve some flow of IPv4
addresses for people who need them.

Auctioning the addresses off to the highest bidder is, IMHO, not in the
best interests of the community. Unfortunately, people on both sides
of this opinion will point to FCC spectrum auctions as a shining example
of why it is a (good|bad) idea.

Owen




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