[arin-ppml] Creating a market for IPv4 address space in absence of routing table entry market

[Tom Vest]

Isn't that a bit like worrying about whether or not "Congress is going  
to screw us"? What can the RIRs do -- what have they ever been --  
other than an open forum for collective decision making about the  
treatment of a common (as in "everybody needs it") critical resource,  
the treatment of which by a minority or even a single party might  
affect the value and functioning of the resource and the system it  
supports for every other user?

If you really think that creation of the mechanism itself, and its  
dependence on a (any) hierarchy with real/potential power is a fatal  
flaw, then you might also want to consider a proposal to dissolve the  
RIRs entirely; after all, pro-authority agents might sneak into one of  
the open policy meetings and pull off a bloodless coup, or over time  
established community members themselves might develop false  
consciousness...

And finally, do you really imagine that if sovereign authorities elect  
to start imposing their will on number resources or policy, that they  
would simply throw up their hands if community-managed certification  
(or the RIRs themselves) did not exist?

I would think that a more plausible explanation for the continued  
autonomy of this particular sphere is that the other authorities  
perceive that the current arrangement is working "good enough" (their  
own internal benchmark I'm told), and doesn't appear to be in imminent  
danger of melting down, so autonomy looks like a good, stable bet for  
everyone. It seems to me that if the "good enough" benchmark is  
shifting, either because the system is more "critical" or the bad guys  
more capable today, then it would probably be prudent for the  
community to step up and address that fact, so that no one else is  
tempted or obliged to.

TV

On Jun 18, 2008, at 3:41 AM, Milton L Mueller wrote:

> Very interested and concerned about the interaction between secure  
> routing and centralization of authority over what has before now  
> been a relatively loose system of routing self-governance by ISPs. I  
> guess I am less worried about IANA and RIRs abusing their authority  
> over a validation chain than I am about governments or lawsuits that  
> force them to do so. Think of DNS and the UDRP.
>
> From: arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net on behalf of Randy Bush
> but, to hoist myself on my own petard, are you/folk at all concerned
> that, as the rpki becomes used in secure routing, iana and the rirs  
> will
> have affect your prefixes routability far more than they do today?
>
> while we are trying to make it so an accidental ops slip at an rpki  
> node
> will not damage you if it is corrected in reasonable time, if you piss
> off someone up the validation chain (or worse, if someone up the chain
> two links pisses someone >2 links up), they can break the validation
> chain for your certs/roas.
>
> randy
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