[arin-ppml] Policy Proposal: Whois Integrity Policy Proposal
tedm at ipinc.net
Wed Aug 20 14:55:35 EDT 2008
> -----Original Message-----
> From: arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net
> [mailto:arin-ppml-bounces at arin.net] On Behalf Of William Herrin
> Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 9:34 AM
> To: Paul Vixie
> Cc: Randy Bush; arin-ppml at arin.net
> Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] Policy Proposal: Whois Integrity
> Policy Proposal
> If you (meaning ARIN) believe it desirable to bring the
> legacy registrants into the fold, you really have two options:
> 1. Do it substantially on their terms.
> 2. Do it by soliciting sufficient legal authority for ICANN
> from the USG so that "the community," by way of ARIN, can
> force the issue.
There is a 3rd option, one that ARIN is currently employing:
3) make their non-participation in the fold, irrelevant.
When the Internet has switched to IPv6 then there will be no
more legacy holders "out of the fold"
I'm not saying that "do nothing" is preferable, only that it
is an option.
> We can argue about it on PPML for the next ten years
In ten years IPv4 will be well on it's way to becoming irrelevant
and so will the legacy holders. (if they don't adopt IPv6)
> On Wed, Aug 20, 2008 at 1:40 AM, Ted Mittelstaedt
> <tedm at ipinc.net> wrote:
> >> > Thus, how exactly would this legacy resource holder
> system be any
> >> > different than what the legacy resource holders have
> right now with
> >> > the ARIN legacy RSA?
> >> It would be terminable in the event of a dispute. The practical
> >> effect of the LRSA language is that its not terminable by the
> >> registrant.
> > So then, is a legacy holder wants to opt out of it due
> > to disputing it, they can. In which case the legacy
> > holder system admin would pull their names out from
> > their system and it seems your right back where you started
> with the
> > same problem.
> > How is that better?
> Because it tends not to happen. The system admin has a pretty
> good idea which behaviors will cause more than a handful of
> registrants to jump ship, so he avoids those behaviors even
> when he really really doesn't want to. It's called "checks
> and balances." It helps keep people honest.
> > What is the point of signing a contract that has no teeth?
> Excellent question but it cuts both ways. With the LRSA, we
> know what teeth bite the registrant if he doesn't uphold his
> end: he loses his addresses. What teeth bite ARIN if they
> don't uphold theirs? What's ARIN's penalty for trying to
> skirt the edge of what the contract allows? Without as strong
> a penalty as the registrant faces for failing to uphold his
> end, the LRSA is lopsided even before you consider the
> beneficial status the legacy registrant holds if he signs no contract.
ARIN isn't an address user. If you
think about it you will realize that ARIN has no real interest in
taking back addresses from legacy holders who are using them.
What are the legacy holders doing with large blocks of addresses
that they have? Assigning them to customers. If ARIN "takes away"
a block of addresses from a legacy holder, those customers will
still need addresses. Where are they going to get them? From
non-legacy holders. And the non-legacy holders now need more
addressing and they get it from ARIN.
And so you have just succeeded in moving a block of addresses in
a big circle, you have taken it from the customers of a legacy
holder and given it to a non-legacy holder who just gives them back
to the same customers that you took them from in the first place.
In short, you have gained absolutely nothing. This behavior will
not create IPv4 addresses out of thin air.
ARIN only has an interest in taking IPv4 addresses away from legacy
holders who are sitting on them and who are NOT using them. And,
this interest also aligns with the interests of everyone else on
the Internet, including I might add, other legacy holders who happen
to have assigned out all their allocation and need more numbers.
And I would assume that legacy holders who are doing that (basically
engaging in speculation of IPv4) are not interested in signing
ANYTHING either a LRSA or an alternative registry run by legacy
holders, because they don't want to draw attention to what they
The $64,000 question here is one of motive. You speak of both
the legacy holders and ARIN having incentives to violate the LRSA.
What are those incentives? What motive exists for either side to
violate the LRSA?
And in addition the Legacy holders can always opt to sign a regular
RSA -instead- of a LRSA if the LSRA is so bad. You may as well ask what
are the penalties to ARIN for violating a regular RSA with a regular
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