[ppml] Dean Anderson, 130.105.0.0/16 and the future of the IPv4 Internet.

[Leo Bicknell]

I think it's unfortunate that Dean's presence on the list has been
so polarizing.  For better or for worse many people on this list
have history with Dean, usually with opposing points of view.

The reason I think it is unfortunate is because I think this list
can actually take some valuable study from his situation.  There
is one particular dispute that should be of interest to the readership
of PPML.  If you put "Dean Anderson SORBS" into google you will
find that Dean and various people of SORBS have been in a long
running argument.  It is over the netblock 130.105.0.0/16.  Both
sides have their arguments well documented in multiple forums across
the Internet.

I think Dean, in this case, is the canary in the coal mine.

Legacy space has been transferred.  In some cases completely
legitimately, in some cases fraudulently; and in many cases in some
sort of grey area.  Historically there were no rules.  Can a legacy
holder transfer their space to another party?  Are they required
to tell anyone if they do?  If someone disputes the transfer, what
constitutes proof?  What role does ARIN play in any of this process?
Can a technical contact initiate the transfer, or does it need to
be authorized by an officer of the company?

As IPv4 space increases in value I suspect we'll see many more cases
of all possible outcomes.  Hijacked space will turn up like crazy
as people wake up and take notice.  Legitimate transfers that were
never documented will cause headaches for many companies.  Companies
that were previously friendly and worked on a handshake arrangement
will turn hostile, and the lack of documentation will harm them
all.

It's IANA's problem.  It's ARIN's problem.  It's DARPA and the DOD's
problem.  It may turn out to be the courts problem, but most of
all, it's the community's problem.  Should netblock ownership and
routing slots descend into some sort of Mad Max type of future we're
all going to loose, big time.  Secure routing is never going to
work if we can't figure out who gets the certificate.

While we can learn from Dean's specific case, arguing over the
details is not productive.  If we want to have a productive discourse
about this issue we need to consider all of the legacy space.

-- 
       Leo Bicknell - bicknell at ufp.org - CCIE 3440
        PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/
Read TMBG List - tmbg-list-request at tmbg.org, www.tmbg.org
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 187 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <https://lists.arin.net/pipermail/arin-ppml/attachments/20070724/5db58878/attachment.sig>