[ppml] Policy Proposal: Reinstatement of PGP Authentication Method
Bill Woodcock
woody at pch.net
Tue Oct 24 17:37:29 EDT 2006
1. Policy Proposal Name: Reinstatement of PGP Authentication Method
2. Authors:
1. name: Paul Vixie
2. email: paul at vix.com
3. telephone: +1 650 423 1300
4. organization: Internet Systems Consortium
1. name: Mark Kosters
2. email: markk at verisignlabs.com
3. telephone: +1 703 948 3200
4. organization: Verisign
1. name: Chris Morrow
2. email: christopher.morrow at verizonbusiness.com
3. telephone: +1 703 886 3823
4. organization: Verizon Business/UUnet
1. name: Jared Mauch
2. email: jmauch at us.ntt.net
3. telephone: +1 214 915 1356
4. organization: NTT/Verio
1. name: Bill Woodcock
2. email: woody at pch.net
3. telephone: +1 415 831 3100
4. organization: Packet Clearing House
3. Proposal Version: 1
4. Submission Date: Tuesday, October 24, 2006
5. Proposal type: New
6. Policy term: Permanent
7. Policy statement:
ADDITION TO NRPM
3.5 Authentication Methods
ARIN supports three authentication methods for
communication with resource recipients.
3.5.1 Mail-From
This section intentionally left blank.
3.5.2 PGP
ARIN accepts PGP-signed email as authentic
communication from authorized Points of Contact. POCs
may denote their records "crypt-auth," subsequent to
which unsigned communications shall not be deemed
authentic with regard to those records.
3.5.3 X.509
This section intentionally left blank.
UPDATES TO TEMPLATES
ARIN shall include the auth-type field in request templates as
necessary to distinguish between cryptographic and mail-from
authentication methods.
UPDATES TO DOCUMENTATION
ARIN shall update documentation as appropriate, to explain the
differences between mail-from, PGP, and X.509 authentication
methods.
KEY USE IN COMMUNICATION:
ARIN shall accept PGP-signed communications, validate the
signature, compare it to the identity of the authorized POCs
for records referenced in the correspondence, and act
appropriately based upon the validity or invalidity of the
signature.
ARIN shall PGP-sign all outgoing hostmaster email with the
hostmaster role key, and staff members may optionally also
sign mail which they originate with their own individual keys.
ARIN shall accept PGP-encrypted communications
which are encrypted using ARIN's hostmaster public key.
ARIN shall not encrypt any outgoing communications, except by
explicit mutual prior agreement with the recipient.
NON-BINDING RECOMMENDED KEY MANAGEMENT PRACTICES:
It is recommended that ARIN utilize normal POC-verification
processes as necessary to accommodate users who lose the
private key or passphrase associated with the POCs for their
crypt-auth protected resources.
It is recommended that ARIN exercise reasonable caution in
preventing the proliferation of copies of the hostmaster
private key and passphrase.
It is recommended that ARIN print out a copy of the private key
and passphrase, and secure them in a safe-deposit box outside
of ARIN's physical premises, which any two ARIN officers might
access in the event that the operating copy of the key is lost
or compromised.
It is recommended that ARIN publish the hostmaster public key
on the ARIN web site, in a manner similar to that of the other
RIRs:
http://lacnic.net/hostmaster-pub-key.txt
https://www.ripe.net/rs/pgp/ncc-pgpkey-2006.asc
ftp://ftp.apnic.net/pub/zones/PUBLIC_KEY
It is recommended that ARIN publish the hostmaster public key
by submitting it to common PGP keyservers which, among others,
might include:
pgp.mit.edu
www.pgp.net
It is recommended that ARIN attempt to cross-sign the
hostmaster PGP keys of the other four RIRs and ICANN.
It is recommended that ARIN's hostmaster public key be signed
by members of the ARIN board of trustees.
8. Rationale:
Globally, PGP is the most commonly used cryptographic
authentication method between RIRs and resource recipients who
wish to protect their resource registration records against
unauthorized modification. The PGP-auth authentication method
is supported by RIPE, APNIC, LACNIC, and AfriNIC, and it was
historically supported by the InterNIC prior to ARIN's
formation. By contrast, current ARIN resource recipients have
only two options: "mail-from," which is trivially spoofed and
should not be relied upon to protect important database
objects, and X.509, which involves a rigorous and lengthy
proof-of-identity process and compels use of a compatible MUA,
a combination which has dissuaded virtually all of ARIN's
constituents.
There isn't a lot of work to do here, and certainly nothing
tricky. The hostmaster key has existed since InterNIC days, and
ARIN staff have verified that the key and passphrase are still
known and working fine. This is simple code, which all the
other RIRs deployed without a second thought or complaint. If
RIPE and APNIC have always done this, the InterNIC did it
before ARIN was formed, and LACNIC and AfriNIC took this for
granted as a part of their startup process, we see no reason
why ARIN should be the only RIR to not offer this most basic of
protections to its members.
We need to get PGP support reinstated, so that our records can
be protected against hijacking and vandalism, and so we won't
look like idiots as the only one of the five regions that can't
figure this stuff out.
9. Timetable for implementation: Immediate
10. Meeting presenter: Bill Woodcock
END OF TEMPLATE
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