[ppml] /48 vs /32 micro allocations
hannigan at verisign.com
Wed Mar 16 02:51:31 EST 2005
As someone who is coming up to speed on IPV6,
I am somewhat understanding where the WG is coming from and
I find myself tending to agree - and looking forward to
I think Bill nailed it. To me it translated to
it's better to drop what I don't want than to not get what
I do want, which has been a theme to live by over the years.
Martin Hannigan (c) 617-388-2663
VeriSign, Inc. (w) 703-948-7018
Network Engineer IV Operations & Infrastructure
hannigan at verisign.com
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-ppml at arin.net [mailto:owner-ppml at arin.net]On
> Behalf Of Jeff
> Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2005 4:34 AM
> To: Jimmy Kyriannis
> Cc: Paul Vixie; ppml at arin.net
> Subject: Re: [ppml] /48 vs /32 micro allocations
> Jimmy and all,
> I didn't get from Paul's remarks he was eluding to
> filtering. I agree
> also that hardening of Protocols is also a very good idea. I believe
> Paul has been moving in that direction as well...
> Jimmy Kyriannis wrote:
> > Yes. One might also view that the sparsity of routing entries would
> > constitute an environment in which would be "harder to get
> away with"
> > hijacking, since filtering longer length prefixes creates a
> population of
> > much more visible/impactful prefix targets to hijack. In
> that vein, if a
> > longer prefix were to "sneak into" the routing tables, it
> would also be
> > rather visible.
> > Either way, IMO, the fundamental problem of route hijacking
> won't be solved
> > here, since it doesn't lie within the filtering of routes,
> but rather
> > hardening the protocols which make this possible for disreputable or
> > unaware providers.
> > Jimmy
> > At 09:17 AM 3/15/2005, Paul Vixie wrote:
> > > > I can think of at least one...
> > > > The greater the sparsity of address utilization,
> the easier
> > > > it is to hijack portions of the address space. That,
> in and of itself,
> > > > to me seems like a good reason NOT to pursue a sparse
> allocation policy.
> > >
> > >this is nonsequitur. ipv4 is a lot smaller and denser
> than ipv6, and yet
> > >spammers routinely advertise ipv4 blocks, spam from them
> for a few minutes,
> > >and then withdraw the route before most folks get around
> to traceroute'ing.
> > >
> > >we're going to need some form of end to end bgp
> authentication no matter
> > >whether we move to ipv6 or not, or do so with sparse
> allocations or dense.
> Jeffrey A. Williams
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