[ppml] /48 vs /32 micro allocations
owen at delong.com
Tue Mar 15 14:35:43 EST 2005
I agree this isn't a solution to hijacking. I still believe that issuing
/32s to people who would get /48s under current policy will exacerbate the
problem, not improve it. I propose we avoid exacerbating the hijacking
--On Tuesday, March 15, 2005 12:43 PM -0500 Jimmy Kyriannis
<jimmy.kyriannis at nyu.edu> wrote:
> Yes. One might also view that the sparsity of routing entries would
> constitute an environment in which would be "harder to get away with"
> hijacking, since filtering longer length prefixes creates a population of
> much more visible/impactful prefix targets to hijack. In that vein, if a
> longer prefix were to "sneak into" the routing tables, it would also be
> rather visible.
> Either way, IMO, the fundamental problem of route hijacking won't be
> solved here, since it doesn't lie within the filtering of routes, but
> rather hardening the protocols which make this possible for disreputable
> or unaware providers.
> At 09:17 AM 3/15/2005, Paul Vixie wrote:
>> > I can think of at least one...
>> > The greater the sparsity of address utilization, the easier
>> > it is to hijack portions of the address space. That, in and of itself,
>> > to me seems like a good reason NOT to pursue a sparse allocation
>> > policy.
>> this is nonsequitur. ipv4 is a lot smaller and denser than ipv6, and yet
>> spammers routinely advertise ipv4 blocks, spam from them for a few
>> minutes, and then withdraw the route before most folks get around to
>> we're going to need some form of end to end bgp authentication no matter
>> whether we move to ipv6 or not, or do so with sparse allocations or
If it wasn't crypto-signed, it probably didn't come from me.
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