[ppml] /48 vs /32 micro allocations

[Michael.Dillon at radianz.com]

> Either way, IMO, the fundamental problem of route hijacking won't be 
solved 
> here, since it doesn't lie within the filtering of routes, but rather 
> hardening the protocols which make this possible for disreputable or 
> unaware providers.

Not necessarily!
It could lie within an alternate (non-BGP) way for 
AS holders to publish the possible set of valid routes
so that people can do non-BGP validation of what has
been published as well as BGP filtering of what has not
been published.

There's more than one way to skin a cat. Perhaps it's
time to take another look at what can be done
to improve route registries rather than trying to
dump all the requirements into the BGP protocol
and the router hardware.

I would think that an RIR would be a key player in
any such routing registry web of trust.

--Michael Dillon