[ppml] Policy Proposal: Resource Reclamation Incentives
John Santos
JOHN at egh.com
Wed Jul 4 00:52:17 EDT 2007
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On Tue, 3 Jul 2007 michael.dillon at bt.com wrote: > > > - Specifically, that their space cannot be revoked for > > failing to use > > it. > > That is going to be intractable as we get closer to IPv4 exhaustion. > When ISP X is facing losses of millions of dollars due to the fact that > ARIN has no more addresses to give, and it is known that ISP Y has an > unused hoard, then what happens. Define "used" and "unused". > > Perhaps ISP X simply "borrows" ISP Y's hoard. Will Y go to court and > argue that X can't do that because ARIN's whois shows that these are Y's > addresses? Will X argue that Y has no right to addresses because they > are not an ARIN member and have no contract with ARIN, therefore no > expectation of service from ARIN? Will the court revoke all of Y's > addresses? Will the court order Y to return unused addresses to ARIN > because they are, by proxy, causing ARIN to materially damage X's > business? What if Exxon wants to drill for oil in my back yard because, hey, I'm not doing it. Am I materially damaging Exxon's profits by not allowing them to drill? > > The complexity makes your head spin. In general, courts are supposed to > be a last resort after the parties have sat down, discussed the issue, > and tried to hammer out an agreement. Can Y really be said to have done > this if Y has not joined ARIN, signed the RSA, returned excessive unused > addresses and made and honest attempt to comply with ARIN policy? ARIN > is not just a 3rd party here; ARIN is the forum in which all parties > come together and hammer out the mutual agreement to shared these > limited resources. Y got its IP addresses according to the rules, before ARIN existed. ARIN can't just arbitrarily change the rules on them, whatever you want it to do. > > Organizations which do not enagage with each other in ARIN are the > rogues who refuse to negotiate. No, in Y's view, ARIN is the rogue that is trying to change the rules out from under it. > > It's hard to predict the legal outcomes but one thing is certain, any > organizations which persist in refusing to join ARIN will suffer the > consequences of a lot of negative publicity as we get closer to IPv4 > exhaustion. Even if they don't don the black hat and get involved in a > court case, these organizations will be tarred with a nasty brush. In > particular the larger ones with class A and B allocations because one > would expect them to have the most capability for implementing IPv6 and > reducing their consumption of IPv4 addresses. Actually, ARIN's lawyer apparently has predicted the legal outcome, and his prediction is that ARIN would lose... > > > - Turn in your existing bucket of disjoint small netblocks for > > one large, aggregateable netblock. > > Hmmm... Thought experiment. > Entity A has acquired 300 class C address blocks. None of these are used Define "used"... > at all, just acquired. Entity A goes to ARIN and turns in their 300 > class C's in return for a /16 which is 256 /24 equivalents, therefore it > is less than their original hoard. Now Entity A markets itself to > organizations who are concerned about the pending IPv4 shortage. They > manage to rake in 6 figures for their shell company and the buyer gets a > /16 to use. Sale is timed to close shortly after the buyer gets their > next ARIN allocation. > > Obviously this could only occur if Entity A does not have to fully > justify their space. Currently the wording of the policy does allow for > this loophole. > > I can't help but think that we would make better policy if we started > out with use-cases and requirements rather than diving straight into the > specific text of a policy. > > --Michael Dillon > _______________________________________________ > This message sent to you through the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List > (PPML at arin.net). > Manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > > -- John Santos Evans Griffiths & Hart, Inc. 781-861-0670 ext 539
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