[arin-ppml] ARIN-prop-172 Additional definition for NRPM Section 2 - Legacy Resources

Tom Vest tvest at eyeconomics.com
Tue Jun 12 16:08:25 EDT 2012


I stand corrected (see below)...

On Jun 12, 2012, at 10:26 AM, Tom Vest wrote:

> On Jun 12, 2012, at 8:37 AM, Milton L Mueller wrote:
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Paul Vixie [mailto:paul at redbarn.org]
>>> no sir, it is not directly parallel. community assigned holdership takes
>>> the place of securities law in your example. therefore the ability and
>>> methods of resource trading are a matter to be determined by the same
>>> community who would decide whether to recognize those trades.
>> 
>> [Milton L Mueller] you are again missing the point, or we are talking past each other. 
>> The issue is not what law applies. The issue is whether multiple entities (brokers and registries) can coordinate resources that are traded. You argued in your ACM piece that "physics" prevented it. The CUSIP example proves you wrong. 
> 
> Hi Milton, 
> 
> It's nice to see that you've been giving more thought to the parallels between the Internet operations and monetary/financial industrial sectors ;-)
> Unfortunately, you're completely off base with this particular parallel. 
> 
> Are you suggesting that, of the several virtues that an Internet protocol number resource allocation regime might or might not possess, the capacity for "coordination of resources" *that are in the process of being traded* is more important than the capacity  for reliable/predictable *use* of such resources when they are *not* in the process of being traded? 
> After all, IP addresses are not financial instruments. The financial instruments for which CUSIP was developed derive exactly 0.00% of their value/functionality from non-trading related functions, whereas the exact opposite is true for Internet protocol number resources. While anything may be traded "in theory," in practice not all markets are self-sustaining, and not all self-sustaining markets are net beneficial -- even within the domain where CUSIP actually has operational relevance. 
> 
> Granted, the financial sector still seems to be quite comfortable with their mechanisms for "coordination of resources that are traded."

This is not entirely true; some financial sector decision makers are not, in fact, comfortable with existing mechanisms for coordination "resources that are traded" --- up to and including CUSIP (which is "used primarily in the United States and Canada").

In fact, some are advocating what is, effectively, an RIR-style standardized registry for financial market participants! 

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723298

According to the (FRB NY) authors, the key features that such a registry should embody include:

-- Open (i.e., "voluntary consensus") standards-based 
-- Singularity and (perpetual) uniqueness of registrant identity:identifier relationships 
-- Persistent and neutral accessibility of registration services and registration data to all market participants and interested parties
-- Extensibility
-- Reliability and interoperability
-- (Qualified) incentive compatibility (i.e., "Some degree of compulsion may be necessary to start the process [or universal registration], but every effort should be made to involve players in such a way that everyone has a vested interest in [the registry's] continuation."

The authors consider the feasibility and merits of public sector-led, private sector-led, and mixed implementation scenarios, but (perhaps predictably) suggest that, given the immense start-up costs involved and the dim prospects of a spontaneous global industry-wide convergence to a common standard, scenarios involving a mixed "private sector solution with public sector involvement" are most likely to lead to the emergence of an effective universal financial sector "entity identifier." 

Too bad for the bankers (and in a real sense, for the rest of us) that they didn't inherit such a system, or the "voluntary consensus"-based standards and decision-making mechanisms that make it possible to sustain such an arrangement as time and circumstances change. 

I wonder how how much time, effort, and money it will take to create such a system from scratch -- assuming that it's even possible in the existing (opaque, accountability-defying) financial industry environment? 

Food for thought, esp. for those who are tempted to "discount" the uniqueness and value of our current coordination mechanisms.

TV

> But then the members of that industry seem to enjoy de facto blanket impunity from any adverse results arising from such trades, while retaining 100% of the upside. 
> 
> I doubt that the same will be true in our case, though it seems that some are quite eager to find out. 
> 
> Regards, 
> 
> TV
> 
>>>>> i think you "simply" need to stop thinking about ip addresses as
>>>>> assets having titles which can be traded, and focus your energies on
>>>>> studying
>>>> [Milton L Mueller] but they _can_ be traded, and _are_ being traded.
>>> And RSAs and Whois registrations are nothing if not "titles." Is this
>>> dialogue moving backwards to 2005?
>>> 
>>> i've been told by several operators that they are aware of or engaging
>>> in underground optioning of rights, in order to lay in a long term
>>> supply of growth capacity for their ipv4 networks. each of them plans to
>>> execute NRPM 8.3 trades when they can justify each tranche they have
>>> options on. none of them has told me that they need a new registry
>>> without ARIN's "needs basis" in order to run their businesses. if so,
>> 
>> [Milton L Mueller] That's interesting, and that's fine by me and apparently by you. If indeed you are speaking for every single legacy holder, which I doubt, there will be no need to quarrel about this issue, because there will be no need for ARIN to try to force them to trade via its own process by threatening to de-list the transferred blocks. If you are not right....?
>> 
>>> if you're aware of "trades" which are not futures or options, and which
>>> reflect the extant desire of some operators to put into active use
>>> address resources whose need they cannot currently justify, i'm all
>>> ears, please regale me.
>> 
>> [Milton L Mueller] See above. I guess you have forgotten the context of this discussion. There is a policy proposal to define legacy resources in a specific way. Opponents of this new definition have insisted that ARIN holds rights over the exchange of those resources and are rejecting the proposed definition because of that. If you are confident that no legacy holders will ever try to engage in trades outside of ARIN, then you really shouldn't care about this definition, should you? 
>> 
>>> at this moment the only
>>> people i know of who want what dr. mueller is calling "propertization"
>>> are speculators, not operators.
>> 
>> [Milton L Mueller] I am quite confident that this is incorrect. last time I looked the proponent of this prop-172 was an operator (Marty) as well as some of its supporters. 
>> 
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